Oklahoma Law Review
Volume 67

Number 4

2015

Recent Developments in Estoppel and Preclusion Doctrines in
Consumer Bankruptcy Cases; Volume II of II: Preclusion
Kevin M. Lewis
Paul M. Lopez
ShannonGracey, plopez@shannongracey.com

Scott Lawrence
Tim Springer
Norton Rose Fulbright, tim.springer@nortonrosefulbright.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kevin M. Lewis, Paul M. Lopez, Scott Lawrence & Tim Springer, Recent Developments in Estoppel and
Preclusion Doctrines in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases; Volume II of II: Preclusion, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 733
(2015),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

Recent Developments in Estoppel and Preclusion Doctrines in Consumer
Bankruptcy Cases; Volume II of II: Preclusion
Cover Page Footnote
The authors would like to collectively acknowledge and thank Judge D. Michael Lynn, Karen McClendon,
Dean Nancy B. Rapoport (University of Nevada Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law), TexasBarCLE,
and the Bankruptcy Law Section of the State Bar of Texas for their support.

This article is available in Oklahoma Law Review: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/2

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTOPPEL AND
PRECLUSION DOCTRINES IN CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY CASES; VOLUME II OF II:
PRECLUSION *
K.M. LEWIS, PAUL M. LOPEZ, SCOTT LAWRENCE
& TIMOTHY S. SPRINGER **
Table of Contents
I. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata) ............................................................ 736
A. Definition ......................................................................................... 736
B. Illegal Bankruptcy Plans and Claim Preclusion............................... 741
1. Student Loans and Claim Preclusion............................................ 743
a) Espinosa: The Supreme Court Giveth Its Blessing to Dischargeby-Declaration of Student Loans, and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away ................................................................................................ 743
b) Espinosa in the Trenches: Post-Espinosa Lower Court
Decisions .......................................................................................... 752
(1) Educational Loan Debt ............................................................... 752
* A prototype of this article was originally presented at TexasBarCLE's 28th Annual
Consumer Bankruptcy Course on February 1, 2013.
** Kevin M. Lewis, Term Law Clerk to the Honorable W. Eugene Davis, United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Former Term Law Clerk to the Honorable D. Michael
Lynn, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. Harvard Law
School, J.D., 2012; Illinois Wesleyan University, B.A., 2009.
Paul M. Lopez, Associate, Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller, LLP; Former Career Law
Clerk to the Honorable D. Michael Lynn, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Texas. Texas Wesleyan University School of Law, J.D., 2010; Texas State
University, B.A., 2007.
Scott Lawrence, Term Law Clerk to the Honorable Mark X. Mullin, United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. Former Term Law Clerk to the
Honorable D. Michael Lynn, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Texas. SMU Dedman School of Law, J.D., 2013; Executive Editor, Southern Methodist
University Science and Tech Law Review, 2012–2013; University of Oklahoma, B.A., 2007.
Timothy S. Springer, Associate, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP; Former Term Law
Clerk, the Honorable D. Michael Lynn, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Texas; SMU Dedman School of Law, J.D., cum laude; Managing Editor of The
International Lawyer (2012-2013); B.B.A., in Finance cum laude, Baylor University
Hankamer School of Business.
The authors would like to collectively acknowledge and thank Judge D. Michael Lynn,
Karen McClendon, Dean Nancy B. Rapoport (University of Nevada Las Vegas, William S.
Boyd School of Law), TexasBarCLE, and the Bankruptcy Law Section of the State Bar of
Texas for their support.

733

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

734

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:733

(2) “Whose Child Is This?”: Domestic Support Obligations After
Espinosa ........................................................................................... 757
(3) Taxes........................................................................................... 763
(4) Secured Debts ............................................................................. 766
(5) Espinosa Analysis....................................................................... 770
C. Peeking Behind the Curtain: Brown, Archer, and Exceptions
to Claim Preclusion in Bankruptcy....................................................... 770
1. Dischargeability Proceedings in Bankruptcy ............................... 771
a) Brown v. Felsen............................................................................ 771
b) Archer v. Warner ......................................................................... 776
c) Recent Developments: Brown and Archer in the Trenches ......... 779
(1) Brown and Archer Mean What They Say ................................... 780
(2) Failed Attempts to Sidestep Brown and Archer ......................... 782
(3) Exceptions to the Exceptions ...................................................... 784
(4) Extensions of Brown and Archer ................................................ 791
D. Intervening Change in the Law........................................................ 792
II. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel) ................................................. 796
A. Definition ......................................................................................... 796
B. Recent Developments ...................................................................... 798
1. The Underlying Judgment: What Elements Apply?..................... 798
2. Valid and Final Judgment ............................................................ 800
3. The Litigation Requirement ......................................................... 804
a) Waiver .......................................................................................... 804
b) Settlement Agreements and Consent Judgments ......................... 806
c) Traditional v. Post-Answer Default Judgments ........................... 807
4. Same Facts and Legal Standard.................................................... 808
5. The Facts Were Essential to the Prior Judgment .......................... 810
6. Mutuality of Parties ...................................................................... 813
C. A “New” Problem Potentially Plaguing the Preclusive Effect of
Bankruptcy Court Orders ..................................................................... 816
1. From the 1978 Amendments to Stern........................................... 817
2. From Stern to Executive Benefits ................................................. 820
3. Executive Benefits to Wellness International and Beyond ........... 823
D. Offensive and Defensive Uses of Issue Preclusion ......................... 828
E. Exceptions to Issue Preclusion ......................................................... 829
III. Practice Tips........................................................................................ 830
IV. Other Related Doctrines for Practitioners to Consider ....................... 831
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 832

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/2

2015]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTOPPEL (VOL. II)

735

Since the last major article on estoppel and preclusion doctrines in
bankruptcy law was released in 2005, 1 courts have issued a number of
decisions affecting the operation of estoppel and preclusion principles in
consumer bankruptcy cases. It is imperative that practitioners keep abreast
of these developments. If they do not, they run the risk that unclear
language in court filings or inadvertent (or advertent) omissions at the
beginning of a bankruptcy case will subsequently return to haunt both them
and their clients. This danger is especially acute in the bankruptcy context
because estoppel and preclusion are partially uncodified common law
doctrines that are easy for bankruptcy practitioners, who are understandably
accustomed to working within a closed statutory code, to overlook. 2
It is not enough, however, to know of the existence of these doctrines;
the practitioner must also understand the nuances of each and the
differences between them. 3 Each has distinct elements, and different
policies and theories underlie them. The failure to distinguish between
varieties of estoppel or preclusion in court filings may result in the court
applying a doctrine the litigant did not intend to plead.4
This Article, presented in two volumes, canvasses post-2005 consumer
bankruptcy 5 decisions on the subjects of judicial estoppel, equitable
1. See Honorable Christopher Klein et al., Principles of Preclusion and Estoppel in
Bankruptcy Cases, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 839, 839-40 (2005); see also Theresa M. Beiner &
Robert B. Chapman, Take What You Can, Give Nothing Back: Judicial Estoppel,
Employment Discrimination, Bankruptcy, and Piracy in the Courts, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1
(2005); David Gray Carlson, The Res Judicata Worth of Illegal Bankruptcy Reorganization
Plans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 351 (2009); Robert F. Dugas, Note, Honing a Blunt Instrument:
Refining the Use of Judicial Estoppel in Bankruptcy Nondisclosure Cases, 59 VAND. L. REV.
205 (2006); Eric Hilmo, Note, Bankrupt Estoppel: The Case for a Uniform Doctrine of
Judicial Estoppel As Applied Against Former Bankruptcy Debtors, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
1353 (2012); Steven Jackson, Comment, Heavy Backpacks: Res Judicata and Appropriate
Notice to Creditors During a Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
235 (2009); Honorable James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Judicial Estoppel and the
Eleventh Circuit Consumer Bankruptcy Debtor, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1115 (2005).
2. See Klein et al., supra note 1, at 839-40.
3. “Incantations such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, or equitable
estoppel, often lead courts into summary resolution of actions without being precise about
the niceties of the doctrines being invoked. Imprecision, while expedient, tends to produce
unfortunate consequences in the case at hand and future actions.” Id. at 839.
4. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. (In re Sharpe), 391 B.R. 117, 164
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2008) (“The plaintiffs do not identify the type of estoppel the Court
should apply. There are many. Based on the complaint, the Court presumes it is one of the
two most frequently raised. Those are ‘judicial estoppel’ and ‘equitable estoppel.’”).
5. For recent developments on these topics in the field of corporate bankruptcy, see,
for example, Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137 (2009); Jones v. Estate of Cole,
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estoppel, claim preclusion (also known as res judicata),6 and issue
preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel). 7 We have discussed the
former two doctrines in an earlier volume; 8 the latter two will be discussed
in this volume. Each preclusive doctrine will be treated in a separate
section, which will begin by defining the doctrine and distinguishing it from
similar but distinct doctrines. Brief summaries of cases of interest will
follow, including important takeaways. These takeaways will benefit not
only attorneys who practice in the field of consumer bankruptcy, but also
nonbankruptcy attorneys who represent consumers who have gone through
bankruptcy, are currently in bankruptcy, or who may declare bankruptcy in
the future.
I. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata)
A. Definition
Before defining the term “claim preclusion,” also known as “res
judicata,” it is important to note a crucial distinction oft-neglected by
courts, commentators, and practitioners alike:
“Res judicata” has been used . . . as a general term referring to
all the ways in which one judgment will have a binding effect on
another. That usage is and doubtless will continue to be
common, but it lumps under a single name two quite different
effects of judgments. The first is the effect of foreclosing any
litigation of matters that have never been litigated, because of the
determination that they should have been advanced in an earlier
suit. The second is the effect of foreclosing relitigation of
matters that have once been litigated and decided. The first of
these, preclusion of matters that were never litigated, has gone

483 F. App’x 468 (10th Cir. 2012); Adelphia Recovery Trust v. HSBC Bank USA (In re
Adelphia Recovery Trust), 634 F.3d 678 (2d Cir. 2011); Logan Med. Found., Inc. v.
Hayflich & Steinberg (In re Logan Med. Found., Inc.), 346 B.R. 184 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va.
2006).
6. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 722-73 (5th ed. 1994)
(citing Allan D. Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29 (1964)).
7. Id. Some jurisdictions refer to issue preclusion by names other than collateral
estoppel, such as “estoppel by judgment.” See In re Barrett, 377 B.R. 667, 671 n.3 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 2007).
8. K.M. Lewis & Paul M. Lopez, Recent Developments in Estoppel and Preclusion
Doctrines in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases; Volume I of II: Estoppel, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 459
(2014).
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under the name, “true res judicata,” or the names, “merger” and
“bar.” The second doctrine, preclusion of matters that have once
been decided, has usually been called “collateral estoppel.”
Professor Allan Vestal has long argued for the use of the names
“claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion[,]” [respectively,] for
these two doctrines, and this usage is increasingly employed by
the courts . . . . 9
Accordingly, this Article will use the term “claim preclusion” to the
exclusion of “res judicata,” with few exceptions. 10
Claim preclusion means essentially this: when a court has finally
adjudicated a claim, a litigant will generally not be allowed to relitigate that
claim in the same or another court. 11 Thus, as a general matter, even where
the court has committed error in adjudicating the claim in question, the
losing party is forbidden from relitigating the claim if “the loser had the
opportunity to test the final judgment on appeal.”12
As one widely-cited case establishes,13 claim preclusion generally
requires the following elements:
1) the prior suit must have ended with a judgment on the merits; 14

9. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 722-23 (emphasis added); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553
U.S. 880, 892 (2008).
10. When referring to principles of finality generally, we may use the term “res judicata
principles.” Also, when quoting courts and commentators who use the general term “res
judicata,” we will preserve that usage.
11. Carlson, supra note 1, at 353 (citing Universal Am. Mortg. Co. v. Bateman (In re
Bateman), 331 F.3d 821, 830 (11th Cir. 2003)).
12. E.g., Sanders v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. (In re Sanders), No. AZ-06-1382PaBMo, 2007 WL 7540961, at *3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2007) (citing Paine v. Griffin (In
re Paine), 283 B.R. 33, 39 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)).
13. Jackson, supra note 1, at 241-42 (citing Nwosun v. Gen. Mills Rests., Inc., 124 F.3d
1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997)).
14. For example, a consent decree constitutes a final judgment on the merits for the
purposes of claim preclusion unless the decree includes an express reservation of rights.
Munoz v. Sovereign Bank, 323 F. App’x 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v.
Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 n.5 (3d Cir. 1984)).
By contrast, an interlocutory order, such as a temporary restraining order, has no claim
preclusive effect. In re Schwartz, Bankruptcy No. 07-30508, 2007 WL 3051865, at *4
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007).
In some courts, a judgment remains final for the purposes of claim preclusion even where
an appeal is pending. See Rainey v. Davenport (In re Davenport), 353 B.R. 150, 192 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2006) (citing Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.
1986)).
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2) the parties must be identical or in privity;
3) the suit must be based on the same cause of action; 15 and
4) the plaintiff must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the claim in the prior suit. 16
Some courts consider additional elements, such as whether the prior
judgment was “rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction” 17 or whether
“the issues in the prior action [were] decided adversely to the plaintiff’s
contentions in the instant case.” 18 Some courts deemphasize or remove
By contrast, in some courts, claim preclusion is not applicable to a dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds. See Smyth v. City of Oakland (In re Brooks-Hamilton), 271 F. App’x
654, 657-58 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying California law).
Claim preclusion is also inapplicable to a “no change” letter issued by a state's Franchise
Tax Board, because such letters are “not the same as a final judgment issued by a court.”
Franchise Tax Board of the State of Cal. v. Kipperman (In re Adams), Nos. SC–07–1283–
KMkDo, SC–07–1394–KMkDo, 2008 WL 8444788, at *9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008).
Some courts have noted that the finality element for claim preclusion is more stringent
than the finality requirement for issue preclusion. Allen v. Loughery (In re Loughery), No.
09-69033-PWB, 2010 WL 4642131, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 12, 2010) (quoting Christo
v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000)).
15. To determine whether the suit was based on the same cause of action, many courts
utilize the “transactional approach.” See, e.g., Dye v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 289 F. App'x
941, 944 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Wisconsin law); Humphreys v. EMC Mortg. Corp. (In re
Mack), Nos. CC-06-1123-MoDK, CC-06-1242-MoDK, 2007 WL 7545163, at *8 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982)); Rose v.
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 835 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1018 (D. Or. 2011) (citing Mpoyo v.
Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005)) (applying federal law);
Crowe v. Moran (In re Moran), 413 B.R. 168, 178 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (citing LaPoint v.
AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 193 (Del. 2009)) (applying Delaware law);
Monsour v. Monsour (In re Monsour), 372 B.R. 272, 277-78 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007). If two
claims are derived from a common nucleus of operative fact, they arise from the same
transaction. In re Moran, 413 B.R. at 178 (citing LaPoint, 970 A.2d at 193). This entails a
pragmatic consideration of “whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit
conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24. For instance, “a contract is [generally] considered to be a
single ‘transaction’ for the purpose of claim preclusion.” In re Moran, 413 B.R. at 178.
16. Jackson, supra note 1, at 241-42 (citing Nwosun, 124 F.3d at 1257).
17. See McDonald v. Redstone Fed. Credit Union (In re McDonald), 374 F. App'x 937,
940 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying Alabama law) (quoting Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 566
So.2d 723, 725 (Ala. 1990)); see also Dover v. United States, 367 F. App'x 651, 653 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citing Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877, 880 (6th Cir. 1997)); In
re Moran, 413 B.R. at 178; Bailey v. City of Wilmington, 766 A.2d 477, 481 (Del. 2001))
(applying Delaware law); Calaway v. Cozart (In re Cozart), No. 5:08-bk-73392, 2009 WL
1955294, at *4-5 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. July 6, 2009) (applying Eighth Circuit federal law).
18. See In re Moran, 413 B.R. at 178; Bailey, 766 A.2d at 481.
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some of the elements listed above. 19 These differences may have dispositive
consequences. 20
Courts have also placed some limits on claim preclusion. “Suits on postcomplaint conduct generally are not barred under principles of” claim
preclusion. 21 By logical extension, even “facts representing a continuance
of the same course of conduct” would not be barred as precluded claims. 22
The burden is on the party asserting claim preclusion to satisfy all
applicable elements.23 However, in some jurisdictions, even if the parties do
not formally address the applicability of claim preclusion, a court may
apply the doctrine sua sponte if all the elements are satisfied.24
The general purpose of claim preclusion doctrine is to further “such
fundamental policies as promoting finality, economy, consistency, and
comity in the judicial process.” 25 However, per the U.S. Supreme Court,
because [claim preclusion] may govern grounds and defenses not
previously litigated, . . . it blockades unexplored paths that may
lead to truth. For the sake of repose, [claim preclusion] shields

19. For instance, Wisconsin, North Carolina, New Jersey, and other jurisdictions do not
list the “full and fair opportunity to litigate” element in their formulations of claim
preclusion. See, e.g., In re Cozart, 2009 WL 1955294, at *4-5; Bennett v. Smith (In re
Smith), No. 05-10041, 2006 WL 3333801, at *10 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Nov. 16, 2006) (citing
Green v. Dixon, 528 S.E.2d 51, 53 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)); Cotter v. Skylands Cmty. Bank
(In re Cotter), No. 08-12504 (NLW), 2011 WL 5900811, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2011)
(citing In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008)); Dye v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co.,
289 F. App'x 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶¶ 20-21,
279 Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879, 885).
Georgia state law removes the “full and fair opportunity” element and the “judgment on
the merits” element and replaces them with a “court of competent jurisdiction” element. See,
e.g., Omega Cotton Co. v. Sutton (In re Sutton), No. 06-60373-JTL, 2008 WL 4527761, at
*2 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2008) (citing Austin v. Coca-Cola Co., 458 S.E.2d 409 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1995)).
20. See In re Barrett, 377 B.R. 667, 671 n.3 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007).
21. Era Franchise Sys. L.L.C. v. Kroeber (In re Kroeber), No. 09-32125 (LMW), 2010
WL 4064026, at *8 (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2010) (citing Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree
Italiane, S.P.A., 400 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 2005)).
22. Legnani, 400 F.3d at 141 (citation omitted).
23. E.g., Caresource, Inc. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), No. 11-38159-BKC-AJC, 2012 WL
3781134, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2012) (quoting Kaiser Aerospace Elecs. Corp. v.
Teledyne Indus., Inc. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001)).
24. See Wendt v. Hanson (In re Hanson), No. 10-19165-MM7, 2011 WL 6148429, at
*2 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011) (citing Columbia Steel Fabricators v. Ahlstrom
Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1995)).
25. In re Barrett, 377 B.R. at 672.
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the fraud and the cheat as well as the honest person. It therefore
is to be invoked only after careful inquiry. 26
Claim preclusion rulings are typically reviewed on appeal de novo as
mixed questions of law and fact in which legal questions predominate. 27
However, in some (but not all) courts, “[o]nce it is determined that
preclusion doctrines are available to be applied, the actual decision to apply
them is left to the trial court's discretion.” 28
Claim preclusion also raises interesting choice of law issues.
“Frequently, properly applying the law of claim . . . preclusion involves an
initial step of deciding which jurisdiction’s rules for preclusion apply, a step
sometimes ignored in reported cases.” 29 For example, when a federal court
must decide whether a prior state court judgment has claim preclusive
effect, the full faith and credit statute 30 requires the federal court to give
that judgment the same preclusive effect that a court of that state would
give. 31 As a result, the federal court must apply the claim preclusion
elements of the state in which the judgment was rendered, rather than the
law of the state in which the federal court sits.32 Likewise, in a federal

26. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979).
27. E.g., Laurance v. Ranger Ins. Co., Inc. (In re Laurance), No. CC-04-1348-KJB, No.
SA 01-19470-JB, 2006 WL 6810984, at *2 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2006); Alary Corp. v.
Sims (In re Associated Vintage Grp., Inc.), 283 B.R. 549, 554 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)); cf.
Wash. Mut. Bank v. Carlson (In re Carlson), 464 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2012)
(reviewing a court’s decision whether or not to apply claim preclusion de novo as a purely
legal question).
28. Laurance, 2006 WL 6810984, at *2; George v. City of Morro Bay (In re George),
318 B.R. 729, 732-33 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 144 F. App’x 636 (9th Cir. 2005));
accord Int’l Harvester Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 628 F.2d 982,
986 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[E]ven where the technical requirements of res judicata have been
established, a court may nonetheless refuse to apply the doctrine.”); Humphreys v. EMC
Mortg. Corp. (In re Mack), Nos. CC-06-1123-MoDK, CC-06-1242-MoDK, 2007 WL
7545163, at *3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2007) (citing Khaligh v. Hadaegh (In re Khaligh),
338 B.R. 817, 823 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006)); In re Antonie, 432 B.R. 843, 850 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2010) (declining to apply claim preclusion solely on the grounds of judicial
discretion). But see, e.g., Dye v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 289 F. App'x 941, 944 (7th Cir.
2008) (suggesting that under Wisconsin law, claim preclusion automatically applies when all
prongs of the test are satisfied).
29. In re Barrett, 377 B.R. 667, 671 n.3, 672 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
31. E.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005).
32. See, e.g., Ngo v. Webb (In re Webb), No. 08-bk-743, 2009 WL 1139548, at *3
(Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2009) (applying the preclusion law of California rather than
West Virginia).
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diversity action, the court must apply the forum state’s preclusion rules,
rather than federal rules of preclusion, unless the state’s rules are
incompatible with federal interests. 33 By contrast, “[i]n a federal-question
case based on a prior federal judgment, the federal rules of [claim
preclusion] apply.” 34
When requesting that a court apply claim preclusion, the party should
provide the court with a copy of the pleadings and the final judgment in the
prior case and affirmatively explain why the prior judgment should have
preclusive effect, lest that party run the risk of waiving his or her claim
preclusion argument. 35
B. Illegal Bankruptcy Plans and Claim Preclusion
Claim preclusion can come into play in consumer bankruptcy
proceedings in several respects. “In the mad chaos of the American
bankruptcy system, courts unwittingly confirm illegal reorganization plans”
(that is, plans that fail to comply with one or more provisions of the Code),
“especially in the highly frenetic context of a Chapter 13” consumer debtor
case.36 Nonetheless, “[e]ach reorganization chapter” of the Code contains a
finality provision that “includes a sweeping statement to the effect that
confirmed plans are binding” on the debtor and all creditors. 37 These
33. Semtek Intern. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001); Munoz v.
Sovereign Bank, 323 F. App’x 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S.
880, 891 n.4 (2008); Houbigant, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 374 F.3d 192, 205 (3d Cir. 2004)).
34. Sommers v. Vaught (In re Wilson), No. 05-81190, 2007 WL 1040565, at *1 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2007) (citing Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1326 n.10 (5th Cir.
1981)).
35. See, e.g., Neely v. Johnson (In re Knezek), 370 F. App'x 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2010).
36. Carlson, supra note 1, at 352; accord Ralph Brubaker, Supreme Court Upholds
“Discharge by Declaration” of Student Loan Debts in Chapter 13 (Or Does It?), 30 No. 6
BANKRUPTCY LAW LETTER 1 (Westlaw) (2010).
37. Carlson, supra note 1, at 352 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141, 1327) (2012)). Code §
1141(a) reads as follows:
Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, the
provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any entity issuing securities
under the plan, any entity acquiring property under the plan, and any creditor,
equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor, whether or not the claim
or interest of such creditor, equity security holder, or general partner is
impaired under the plan and whether or not such creditor, equity security
holder, or general partner has accepted the plan.
Id. § 1141(a). Similarly, § 1327(a) reads: “The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the
debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the
plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the
plan.” Id. § 1327(a).
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finality sections “'generally codif[y] the doctrine of [claim preclusion] with
respect to confirmed' reorganization plans.” 38 Thus,
“[c]onfirmation of a Chapter 13 plan by a bankruptcy court of
competent jurisdiction, in accordance with the procedural
requirements of notice and hearing of confirmation, is given the
same [preclusive] effect as any district court's final judgment on
the merits.” This [preclusive] effect prohibits the collateral attack
of a confirmed plan, “bar[ring] litigation not only of every matter
which was actually offered and received to sustain the demand,
but also of every claim which might have been presented.”39
“In sum, the principle of res judicata precludes a creditor from waiting until
a plan is approved to assert its rights.” 40
These finality provisions often operate “even if the confirmed
bankruptcy plan contains illegal provisions,” 41 and necessarily so: “Were
the rule otherwise, no judgment would ever be conclusive, as a party
aggrieved by it could endlessly re-litigate errors supposedly committed by
the trial court.” 42 However, as an astute commentator has vividly explained,
“Common sense requires that exceptions mitigate the absoluteness of [the
Code’s finality provisions].” 43 A confirmed plan giving the debtor the right
to murder a creditor, for example, is clearly absurd and not enforceable.44
When, therefore, does an illegal reorganization plan bind the parties, and
when must the plain language of the Code's finality provisions give way to
sense and sensibility?

38. Carlson, supra note 1, at 353 (quoting Hutchinson v. Del. Sav. Bank FSB, 410 F.
Supp. 2d 374, 378 (D.N.J. 2006)).
39. Clark v. Shapiro & Pickett, L.L.P., 452 F. App'x 890, 894 n.7 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Universal Am. Mortg. Co. v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 331 F.3d 821, 825 n.4, 830
(11th Cir. 2003)).
40. Albert Togut & Lara R. Sheikh, The “Absolute Finality” Rule: Confirmation Orders
After Travelers v. Bailey and United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 20 NORTON J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 2 (2011) (Westlaw).
41. Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, 553 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd,
559 U.S. 260 (2010) (quoting Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Pardee (In re Pardee), 193
F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999)).
42. Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1199.
43. Carlson, supra note 1, at 353.
44. Id. at 353; see also Brubaker, supra note 36 (“Notwithstanding the statutory finality
attributed to confirmed Chapter 13 plans, the speed with which Chapter 13 plans are filed
and confirmed and the less-than-fastidious form and process for many confirmed Chapter 13
plans can test the ultimate binding effect of the plan in many different ways.”).
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Since the publication of an illuminating and exhaustively-researched
article canvassing the res judicata worth of illegal bankruptcy plans in
2009, 45 there have been several developments that have radically changed
the landscape of claim preclusion and illegal plans in the consumer
bankruptcy context.
1. Student Loans and Claim Preclusion
a) Espinosa: The Supreme Court Giveth Its Blessing to Discharge-byDeclaration of Student Loans, and the Supreme Court Taketh Away 46
Student loans are generally nondischargeable under the Code,47 as your
authors are painfully aware. However, the Code provides an exception to
the nondischargeability of student loans when “excepting such debt from
discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor's dependents.” 48 “Congress left the courts to define what constitutes
an undue burden. . . .” 49 As it happens, it is generally agreed that courts
have, on the whole, interpreted the undue hardship standard in a manner
that makes it quite difficult for student loan debtors to receive a discharge. 50

45. Carlson, supra note 1.
46. For further reading, see generally, Brubaker, supra note 36; Karen Cordry,
Espinosa: It's Not So Simple: Part 1, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2010, at 12
[hereinafter Cordry, Part I]; Karen Cordry, Espinosa, It's Not So Simple: Part II, 29 AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2010, at 12 [hereinafter Cordry, Part II]; Janet A. Flaccus, Revisiting
Bankruptcy Discharge of Student Debt by Declaration in a Chapter 13 Plan, 2010 ARK. L.
NOTES 21; James J. Haller, Creativity Alive in Chapter 13 Plans After Espinosa, 30 AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2011, at 40; Gloria J. Liddell & Pearson Liddell, Jr., Errors in
Judgment or How to Get Debts Discharged in Bankruptcy “(Il)legally:” A Matter of Notice,
5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 193 (2011); Kerry Brian Melear, The Devil's Undue: Student Loan
Discharge in Bankruptcy, The Undue Hardship Standard, and the Supreme Court's Decision
in United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 264 ED. L. REP. 1 (2011); Togut & Sheikh, supra
note 40.
47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8), 1328(a) (2012).
48. Id. § 523(a)(8) (emphasis added).
49. Jackson, supra note 1, at 239.
50. See, e.g., C. Aaron LeMay & Robert C. Cloud, Student Debt and the Future of
Higher Education, 34 J.C. & U.L. 79, 83-84 (2007); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey,
The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J.
179, 181 (2009); Richard Fossey, Review of Alan Michael Collinge, the Student Loan Scam:
The Most Oppressive Debt in U.S. History - And How We Can Fight Back, 38 J.L. & EDUC.
715, 717 (2009) (book review). But see Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student
Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 495 (2012)
(citing empirical data suggesting that the undue hardship standard is not as unduly
burdensome as is often suggested).
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Faced with this high hurdle to dischargeability, some consumer debtors
began to attempt an end run around the undue hardship requirement:
discharge-by-declaration. A debtor would “include[] a declaratory
statement in his or her bankruptcy petition that his or her student loan [was]
an undue burden” and hope that the lender would not object.51 If the lender
objected, the debtor would be drawn into an adversary proceeding, in which
she would have to demonstrate affirmatively that she satisfied the
applicable undue hardship elements as articulated by courts in that
jurisdiction. 52 If the lender did not object, however, and the bankruptcy
court confirmed the plan, the debtor could discharge his or her student loans
without having to prove an undue hardship, and claim preclusion principles
would prevent the lender from challenging the plan for noncompliance with
the Code's nondischargeability provisions.53
Prior to 2010, discharge-by-declaration met a chilly reception in the
courts. Of the circuits that considered the issue, nearly all ultimately54
concluded “that there must be an adversarial proceeding” pursuant to which
the debtor affirmatively demonstrates an undue hardship “for res judicata to
apply. . . . [T]hus, a student loan cannot be discharged by mere
declaration.” 55 Ruling otherwise, reasoned these courts, would be
tantamount to confirming an illegal plan that violated the
nondischargeability provisions of the Code. 56 Indeed, discharge-bydeclaration was so poorly received by the courts “that use of this tactic had
largely died out.” 57
51. Jackson, supra note 1, at 236.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 236-43.
54. The Tenth Circuit initially concluded that discharge-by-declaration was acceptable,
but subsequently reversed its position. Id. at 244 (citing Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v.
Mersmann (In re Mersmann), 505 F.3d 1033, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 2007), abrogated by United
Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010); Andersen v. UNIPAC-NEBHELP
(In re Andersen), 179 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled by In re Mersmann,
505 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2007)).
55. Id. (citations omitted); accord Carlson, supra note 1, at 412.
56. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 244; see also Carlson, supra note 1, at 410-11.
57. Cordry, Part I, supra note 46, at *12.
The first point of note about Espinosa is that it is an anachronism. The tactic of
“discharge by declaration” began in the early 1990s as a way of avoiding the
requirements of Rule 7001. . . . [A]s such provisions blossomed, courts began
to look for them (either on their own, or based on creditors' objections), roundly
condemned the tactic, ordered broad remedial measures for pending cases, and
threatened significant sanctions against debtors' counsel who persisted in using
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By contrast, the Ninth Circuit took the increasingly lonely position that a
discharge-by-declaration was perfectly acceptable if the creditor did not
object. 58 This result was criticized by a number of commentators,59 and
when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue,60 many
confidently predicted that the Court would reverse the Ninth Circuit as a
poorly-reasoned outlier. 61
That prediction was wrong. In United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa, 62 decided in 2010, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
Ninth Circuit, thereby abrogating the case law of numerous other circuits. 63
The Court held that although the bankruptcy court confirmed a Chapter 13
debtor's bankruptcy plan providing for a discharge of his student loans
“without . . . an adversary proceeding . . . . or making a finding of undue
hardship,” 64 the confirmation order was nonetheless not void.65 According
to the Court, a confirmation order is void, and therefore not binding, 66 only

them. The result was that use of this tactic had largely died out by the middle of
this decade.
Id.
58. See, e.g., Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.
2008), aff'd, United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010).
59. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 410-12; Jackson, supra note 1, at 247-56.
60. Espinosa, 557 U.S. 903 (2009).
61. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 250-52 (“[T]he Supreme Court is leaning toward the
requirement of an adversarial proceeding to show undue hardship. . . . [the Ninth Circuit]
will likely be overturned . . . .”); see also Flaccus, supra note 46, at *21 (“I thought (dumb
me) there was only a slim chance the Supreme Court would affirm the Ninth Circuit and
overturn all of the circuits on the opposite side, but that is what the Supreme Court did!”).
62. 559 U.S. 260 (2010).
63. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mersman (In re Mersmann), 505 F.3d 1033, 104748 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 2005); Ruehle v. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. (In re Ruehle), 412 F.3d 679, 682-84 (6th Cir. 2005); Whelton v. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp., 432 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2005); Banks v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re
Banks), 299 F.3d 296, 302-03 (4th Cir. 2002).
64. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 265.
65. Id. at 272.
66. The Supreme Court did not frame its holding in terms of res judicata principles, and
the Ninth Circuit expressly denied that res judicata principles were even implicated at all:
[W]hat we have here is not a question of res judicata—giving the judgment in
the bankruptcy case preclusive effect in another case. . . . A discharge
injunction does not operate by way of res judicata; it is, rather, an equitable
remedy precluding the creditor, on pain of contempt, from taking any actions to
enforce the discharged debt. . . . There was no second lawsuit in our case . . . .
Res judicata thus has no application to a case like ours . . . .
Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, 553 F.3d 1193, 1200 (9th Cir. 2008).
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in the exceptional circumstances where either (1) “the court that rendered
judgment lacked even an 'arguable basis' for jurisdiction” 67 or (2) “a
violation of due process . . . deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to
be heard.” 68 Granting a discharge-by-declaration was not a jurisdictional
defect that would render the confirmation order void.
First, [Code section] 523(a)(8)'s statutory requirement that a
bankruptcy court find undue hardship before discharging a
student loan debt is a precondition to obtaining a discharge
order, not a limitation on the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.
Second, the requirement that a bankruptcy court make this
finding in an adversary proceeding derives from . . . [Rule
7001(6)], which [is a] “procedural rule[] adopted by the Court
for the orderly transaction of its business” [and is] “not
jurisdictional.” 69
Nor was the lender's constitutional right to due process violated by the
confirmation order; the lender “received actual notice of the filing and
contents of [the debtor's] plan,” which “more than satisfied [the lender's]
due process rights” even though the debtor “fail[ed] to serve a summons
and complaint” as would be required in an adversary proceeding. 70
However, the Supreme Court did not accept the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
wholesale. The Ninth Circuit stated in its opinion below:

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's silence and the Ninth Circuit's denials, Espinosa
does indeed implicate res judicata principles insofar as it relates to whether a party can
attack a plan provision that could have or should have been attacked in a prior proceeding.
As one commentator explains:
Extinguishment of a claim pursuant to a plan simply means that the student
loan creditor has no cause of action once the plan is complete. This would have
been the case even if a court refused to issue a discharge order pursuant to §
1328(a). Therefore, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the case turned on
res judicata of the plan after all. The plan itself does not give rise to the
discharge injunction. Only a discharge order could do so.
Carlson, supra note 1, at 409. But see Brubaker, supra note 36 (arguing that res judicata
principles are not implicated in Espinosa).
67. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271 (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir.
1986)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 271-72.
70. Id. at 272. For further reading on the notice and procedural analysis in Espinosa, see
generally, Cordry, Part I, supra note 46; Cordry, Part II, supra note 46; Liddell & Liddell,
supra note 46.
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[S]tudent loan debts can be discharged by way of a Chapter 13
plan if the creditor does not object, after receiving notice of the
proposed plan, and that such notice [sic] is not constitutionally
inadequate. We find it highly unlikely that a creditor whose
business it is to administer student loans will be misled by the
customary bankruptcy procedures or somehow be bamboozled
into giving up its rights by crafty student debtors. If the creditor
is notified and fails to object, it is doubtless the result of a
careful calculation that this course is the one most likely to yield
repayment of at least a portion of the debt. In such
circumstances, bankruptcy courts have no business standing in
the way. 71
To this, the Supreme Court responded:
This, we think, was a step too far.
. . . [C]ontrary to the [Ninth Circuit's] assertion, the Code
makes plain that bankruptcy courts have the authority—indeed,
the obligation—to direct a debtor to conform his plan to the
requirements of [Code sections] 1328(a)(2) and 523(a)(8). . . .
[T]he bankruptcy court must make an independent determination
of undue hardship before a plan is confirmed, even if the creditor
fails to object or appear in the adversary proceeding. 72
Thus, the Supreme Court gave claim preclusive effect to the discharge-bydeclaration before it, notwithstanding “the Bankruptcy Court's failure to
find undue hardship before confirming Espinosa's plan was a legal error.”73
The Court immediately followed with the announcement that bankruptcy
courts would henceforth have the obligation to be vigilant and deny
confirmation of plans that seek to skirt the undue hardship standard.74
Ultimately, the takeaway from Espinosa for bankruptcy courts is unclear.
Espinosa saddles courts with the obligation, but not the incentive, to
extirpate discharges-by-declaration from proposed Chapter 13 plans. Courts
may “deny confirmation of [a] posited, uncontested discharge-bydeclaration plan without something more (e.g., some evidentiary showing
or proffer at confirmation regarding undue hardship).” 75 Beyond that,
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1205 (citations omitted).
Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 276-78.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 276-77.
Brubaker, supra note 36.
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however, given that “Chapter 13 procedure is so accelerated that the
opportunity for error is much increased,” 76 courts are unlikely to comb
through every Chapter 13 plan in search of offending provisions unless
guided by a creditor's objection, especially if the plan will be given claim
preclusive effect under Espinosa even if the debtor sneaks in an illegal
term. 77 Incentives aside, there is also “no clear answer as to whether courts
have the resources to oversee compliance with the provisions that violate
the Code.” 78
Instead, courts are increasingly turning to local rules and model plans for
Chapter 13 debtors that help to curtail some of the more challenging tactics
debtors employed to work around nondischargeable debts. 79 In Colorado,
for example, debtors are required under the local rules to include provisions
in their plans that bind the debtors to file a modification to deal with
priority or secured claims post-confirmation. 80 This provision has proven
controversial, but does achieve the goal of giving creditors more effective
notice of unusual or unexpected provisions in Chapter 13 plans.
The takeaway for creditors is that the onus remains on them to vigilantly
police proposed plans for illegal provisions. “Despite the court's duty,
creditors should not rely on the bankruptcy courts to police a debtor's plan,
as there is no clear answer as to whether courts have the resources to”
police every proposed Chapter 13 plan.81
Although the debtor's counsel's ethical duties should deter such
illegal provisions, creditors cannot sleep on their rights or bury
their heads in the sand. From the creditor's perspective, in light
of Espinosa, objecting to plan provisions that appear to be
contrary to the . . . Code is the prudent course of action. The
alternative could mean malpractice. Creditor's counsel should

76. Carlson, supra note 1, at 355.
77. See Flaccus, supra note 46, at 24 (“A question remains whether the bankruptcy
judges will start scrutinizing Chapter 13 plans.”).
78. Faiq Mihlar & Heather Giannino, Creativity in Chapter 13 Has Limits After
Espinosa, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2011, at 41, 95. Mihlar and Giannino suggest that this
duty could be delegated to the Chapter 13 trustee, but express doubt as to whether trustees
have the resources to perform the task either. See id.
79. Karen Cordry, Claims Bar Dates and Confirmation Orders: Can’t We All Just Get
Along?, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2012, at 12, 72 [hereinafter Cordry, Claims Bar
Dates].
80. Id.
81. Mihlar & Giannino, supra note 78, at 95.
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not rely on the courts or the trustee to police for or be a caretaker
of the creditor. 82
Some creditors, particularly taxing authorities, have therefore evinced an
increased willingness to scour plans for illegal terms and aggressively seek
sanctions for violations of the Code.83
One bit of good news for creditors appeared in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in the case In re
Anderson. 84 There, a court refused to confirm a plan containing illegal
provisions on the objection of a secured creditor.85 The case is notable,
however, because the decision simultaneously found the creditor to lack
standing to make the objection. 86 Picking up on the Supreme Court’s
admonition in Espinosa, the bankruptcy court refused to ignore the issues
raised by the creditor after becoming aware of them and refused to confirm
the debtors’ plan sua sponte. 87
At the same time, however, “creditor[s'] counsel should also be looking
out for the practical aspects and cost/benefits to [their] clients.” 88 Paying
associates to read every word of every Chapter 13 plan that comes across a
creditor's desk would be significantly burdensome, especially on large
lenders with millions of clients. Thus,
[g]iven today's environment, the uncertainty as to how courts
will handle plans containing provisions in contravention of the
82. Id.
83. One commentator explained the development this way:
[T]he states are politely putting debtors' counsel on notice—the days of
“anything goes” in a plan are over, as are the days of carving out the loudest
voices and keeping the provisions in for everyone else. If debtors' counsel
continue to include such provisions, they can expect the states' response to
escalate up to and including requests for sanctions under Rule 9011. Thus far,
the State of Texas has convinced a number of debtors to voluntarily remove
problematic provisions from their plans entirely; other states are expected to
follow suit. They trust that soon, like discharge by declaration, improper
provisions will disappear from plan proposals. If they do not, the Supreme
Court made clear that bankruptcy courts have means at their disposal to police
these problems. The states intend to ensure that the courts are apprised of when
they need to exercise those means.
Cordry, Part II, supra note 46, at 12.
84. 458 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011).
85. Id. at 503.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Mihlar & Giannino, supra note 78, at 95.
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Code, and the ethical considerations surrounding the same, it
would be advisable to creditor's counsel and its client to stay
vigilant and practical at the same time. There may not be a
universal or simple answer; each case will need to be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis. 89
What is the takeaway for consumer debtors' attorneys? Has it suddenly
become easier to discharge student loan debts and other nondischargeable
debts? 90 Should debtors with student loans attempt discharge-by-declaration
after Espinosa? Despite the relative unlikelihood that courts will
independently sift through Chapter 13 plans looking for illegal provisions,
we believe attorneys would be well-advised not to attempt discharge-bydeclaration in the future.91 The Supreme Court intimated in Espinosa that
“[d]ebtors and their attorneys face penalties” for “bad-faith attempts to
discharge student loan debt without the undue hardship finding Congress
required.” 92 Even if courts are unlikely to catch the illegal provisions, a
creditor's attorney vigilantly fulfilling his or her duty to zealously represent
his or her client might, 93 which could lead to sanctions against debtor’s
counsel. Such penalties “should cause debtor[s'] counsel to think twice
about proposing plan provisions that do not conform to the . . . Code.” 94
That said, the Supreme Court also suggested that other end-runs around the
undue hardship standard remain viable: “Neither the Code nor the Rules
prevent the parties from stipulating to the underlying facts of undue
hardship, and neither prevents the creditor from waiving service of a
89. Id.
90. See Kurtis K. Wiard, Comment, Brunner’s Folly: The Road to Discharging Student
Loans Is Paved with Unfounded Optimism, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 357, 389-90 (2013) (arguing
that Espinosa may “foreshadow[] a ‘return to an era’ when student loans are more easily
discharged”); Brendan Baker, Comment, Deeper Debt, Denial of Discharge: The Harsh
Treatment of Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy, Recent Developments, and Proposed
Reforms, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1213, 1215 (2012) (arguing that Espinosa is a signal of a return
to an era of more lenient treatment of student loans in bankruptcy).
91. Flaccus, supra note 46, at *23. (“[I]t would be foolish to try to discharge student
debt by declaration in the Chapter 13 plan.”). But see Brubaker, supra note 36 (arguing that
discharge-by-declaration will retain its vitality post-Espinosa in jurisdictions where the
“local legal culture” permits it).
92. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 278 (2010) (citing FED.
R. BANKR. P. 9011); see also Haller, supra note 46, at 94 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 3.1); Liddell & Liddell, supra note 46, at 195 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006);
Mihlar & Giannino, supra note 78).
93. See Mihlar & Giannino, supra note 78, at 95.
94. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/2

2015]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTOPPEL (VOL. II)

751

summons and complaint.” 95 We therefore advise debtors' attorneys to seek
stipulations from creditors but avoid clandestine discharges-by-declaration.
Some practitioners have proposed other ways that debtors' attorneys “can
be creative” in “proposing new and innovative solutions in [C]hapter 13
plans” for their clients “while also being ethical,” 96 but other attorneys have
questioned these proposals. 97
95. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 278 (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004; FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)).
96. Haller, supra note 46, at *94. Mr. Haller makes the following recommendations
when attempting to utilize “a non-standard proposal for repayment”:
1. Do not include issues in a chapter 13 plan that are listed as adversary
proceedings under Bankruptcy Rule 7001;
2. When filing plans with alternative treatment, make the proposed
treatment clear and obvious. Identify the language in bold. CAPS and
underline. Include in the plan the language of the statute or case you are relying
on for the alternative treatment. This will put the creditor on notice and give the
court a better understanding of your proposed treatment;
3. Ask your local bankruptcy court whether it would insert a paragraph in
the uniform plan (if applicable) that identifies proposed treatment under 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A);
4. Send a letter to the creditor upon filing with a description of your
proposed treatment in the plan and request a response;
5. Contact creditor's counsel, if any, to discuss the treatment before
confirmation; and
6. Keep your client advised of the potential likelihood of success.
Id.
97. See Mihlar & Giannino, supra note 78, at 95. Mihlar and Giannino respond to
Haller's proposals as follows:
Debtor's counsel may propose creative solutions including questionable
provisions in a chapter 13 plan. For instance, debtor's counsel may attempt to
put the creditor on notice by highlighting the alternative treatment in the plan
through changes in font—bolding, italicizing, underlining or capitalizing.
However, this does not solve the fact that debtor's counsel is proposing
language contrary to the Code.
Let's assume that debtor's counsel sends a letter to the creditor with the
proposed alternative treatment in the plan and requests a response. What, if
anything, does this do to mitigate liability under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 or 11
[sic — this should refer to Chapter 28] U.S.C. § 1927? Does making the
proposed treatment clear and conspicuous provide an answer, or does this still
fly in the face of debtor's counsel's ethical duties as a [sic] an attorney? As a
practical matter, it may mitigate the potential Rule 9011 or § 1927 issues, but it
does not get debtor's counsel “off the hook” in terms of legal and ethical
obligations. Identifying provisions in bold, sending letters or calling the
creditor's counsel does not make it OK to propose illegal provisions. This
presumes that debtor's counsel can propose terms that violate the . . . Code and
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Ultimately, whether discharge-by-declaration is appropriate, Espinosa
sends “mixed signals” that some commentators believe “will likely
perpetuate extreme nonuniformity” in the case law going forward.98
b) Espinosa in the Trenches: Post-Espinosa Lower Court Decisions
Many courts have now grappled with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Espinosa. Some have followed the Court’s directive to excise illegal plan
provisions sua sponte, 99 while others have applied the decision’s preclusive
logic in contexts beyond student loans.100 Enough time has passed since
Espinosa that many Circuit Courts have now issued opinions in this area. 101
In most cases examined below, a bankruptcy court confirmed a plan that
discharged a debt not normally subject to discharge, just as in Espinosa.
Subsequently, a suddenly attentive creditor, dissatisfied with its treatment
under the plan, made an effort to appeal the confirmed plan on the grounds
that the plan contained illegal provisions. In some cases, the language has
been ambiguous or the crucial terms have been absent, leaving the parties to
squabble over interpretation. As one might expect, debtors and their
attorneys have been impressively inventive in their efforts to minimize
debtors’ post-confirmation burdens. Perhaps surprisingly, however, courts
have not uniformly thrown open the gates to illegal discharges, as the
following cases will demonstrate.
(1) Educational Loan Debt
In re Wright, decided shortly after Espinosa, concerns a case with closely
analogous facts. 102 In In re Wright, the debtor’s confirmed plan contained a
provision that purported to discharge her student loan debt as a hardship. 103
The trustee made a mistake reviewing the plan and did not object to the
student loan discharge provision, despite lodging other objections to the
Ethical Rules as long as he or she puts all parties on notice. Surely, this was not
the intended result.
Id.
98. Brubaker, supra note 36.
99. In re Donson, 434 B.R. 471, 475 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (requiring a debtor to
raise objections to the dischargeability of a debt not as claim objections but as assertions in
an adversary proceeding on the same subject previously filed by the creditor, even though
neither party had requested such an order).
100. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Diaz (In re Diaz), 647 F.3d 1073, 1091-93 (11th Cir.
2011) (denying the discharge of domestic support obligations by declaration).
101. See, e.g., id.
102. In re Wright, 444 B.R. 883 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2010).
103. Id. at 884.
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plan. 104 The debtor’s attorney claimed that the debtor intended to file an
adversary proceeding to obtain a finding of undue hardship, but had never
gotten around to actually doing so.105 The court assumed the trustee’s
motion to set aside the plan was predicated on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(1), which deals with mistaken judgment, not Rule 60(4) like
in Espinosa. 106 The court decided that the trustee’s oversight was not
excusable and refused to set aside the plan.107 Like Espinosa before her,
Wright succeeded in discharging her student loan debts by declaration.108
In its decision, the Wright court emphasized the language in Espinosa
urging bankruptcy courts to issue sanctions against attorneys engaging in
improper conduct. 109 The court offered the following thoughts:
[T]he Court . . . takes an extremely dim view of [the debtor’s
plan’s] inclusion of the Student Loan Provision. Counsel insisted
that he included the provision in order to treat “every claim” in
the plan. If that were true, then the plan presumably could have
merely stated only that Debtors intended to file an adversary
proceeding to seek discharge of their student loan obligation as
an undue hardship. . . .
....
. . . Debtors' counsel and the consumer bar are well advised to
take heed of [Rule 9011 sanctions] and to exercise more care in
how they treat student loans within Chapter 13 plans; otherwise
they could, and probably should, be looking down the barrel of a
Rule 9011 motion for sanctions. 110
Of course, not all cases are so straightforward. In Hann v. Educational
Credit Management Corp. (In re Hann), the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit considered a debtor with student loan debts that she
claimed she had already paid.111 Although her creditor filed a proof of
claim, the lender did not appear at the hearing on the debtor’s objection.112
The court, unsurprisingly, found in the debtor’s favor, allowing the claim
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 886-87.
711 F.3d 235, 237 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id.
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for zero dollars, and the lender never appealed.113 After the debtor’s
bankruptcy case ended in 2010, her lender continued to try to collect on the
putative debts under the belief that its claim was not dischargeable in
bankruptcy and therefore survived it in whole. 114 The debtor re-opened her
bankruptcy case, but the original judge had retired, leaving a lingering
question: Had the claim been conclusively adjudicated and reduced to zero
dollars, precluding further collection efforts, or had the bankruptcy court
meant only to exclude the creditor from recovering against the estate,
leaving the debt recoverable post-discharge? 115
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Hann held that Espinosa did not
apply and was not a factor; the court rejected the lender’s argument that the
claim allowance for zero dollars left its claim intact.116 Instead, the Panel
found that the claim allowance and objection process did not merely signify
that the lender would not collect in bankruptcy, but rather that the claim
was paid in full. 117 The Panel concluded that the bankruptcy court’s
allowance in the amount of zero dollars was “tantamount to
disallowance.” 118 Thus, Hann was able to avoid any arguments about
discharge before the Panel, because the Panel was convinced that there was
no existing debt to discharge.
The First Circuit followed suit, noting “the fact that [the debtor] squarely
raised the issue of whether she had repaid her loans distinguishe[d] th[e]
case” from cases involving discharge by declaration. 119 The First Circuit
instead likened Hann’s case to one in which an appellate court must decide
whether a factual issue is a necessary component of an unexplained
judgment. 120 Because Hann’s argument that she had repaid her loans was
her “central” argument against her lender, and because the bankruptcy court
113. Id.
114. Id. at 238.
115. Id.
116. Hann v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hann), 476 B.R. 344, 357 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
2012).
117. See, e.g., id. (reasoning that Espinosa did not apply because “discharge is not
currently the issue”).
118. Id.
119. In re Hann, 711 F.3d at 241 (citing Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Diaz (In re Diaz), 647 F.3d
1073 (11th Cir. 2011)).
120. Id. (citing Hoult v. Hoult, 157 F.3d 29, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1998) and concluding that a
jury verdict that didn’t expressly state a central contention of a woman’s tort lawsuit against
her father, who had raped her, nonetheless undeniably rested on the premise that the rapes
did occur, so as to support the woman’s affirmative defense of truth against her father’s
subsequent defamation lawsuit; the issue “was resolved by the jury at the first trial”).
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indisputably had jurisdiction to determine the amount of the claim, the court
conclusively determined the debt to have been paid in full.121
Ultimately, the First Circuit decided that this case hinged on the proper
interpretation of an inartfully drafted order,122 so the narrow lesson for
debtor’s counsel is simple — offer the judge an order that disallows a
creditor’s claim, not one that allows it for zero dollars. More broadly,
Hann’s case makes clear that, if a debtor can show that she has already paid
the creditor what she owed, the proper place to raise that issue is in the
claims allowance process. Espinosa does not reach into the claims
allowance process, and because courts apply Espinosa unevenly, parties
should resolve disputed claims without relying on it. As such, debtors
should only make an effort to take refuge under the Espinosa umbrella
when they lack the evidence and testimony to prove repayment of a debt
during the claims allowance process.
To provide some contrast to the Hann decision, Greer v. Healthcare
Financial Services (In re Greer) involved a debtor whose efforts to
discharge her student loans without holding an “undue hardship hearing”
were unsuccessful. 123 The debtor included her student loan debts in her
bankruptcy schedules, but mislabeled them as unsecured medical debts, not
educational loan debt. 124 The student loan debts were listed among the
debtor’s unsecured debts but were not designated as non-dischargeable
student loans. 125 The confirmation order treated the debtor’s education
lender simply as an unsecured creditor.126 After plan confirmation, the
creditor continued to pursue its collection efforts, which led the debtor to
initiate an adversary proceeding against the student loan creditor for
allegedly violating the automatic stay. 127
121. Id. (citing In re Hann, 476 B.R. at 357).
122. Id. at 240 (“At the outset, we can agree with ECMC that it is far better for
bankruptcy courts that disallow claims on the ground that the underlying debt is satisfied to
say so in clear language. We think this case would not be before us if the Claim Order
simply said ‘ECMC's claim is disallowed because the underlying loans have been repaid.’
But the onus of avoiding ambiguity in these situations does not rest solely with bankruptcy
judges. The Claim Order was submitted by Hann's counsel as a proposed order; had Hann's
counsel proposed clearer language, this entire second proceeding most likely would have
been unnecessary.”).
123. Greer vs. Healthcare Fin. Servs., LLC (In re Greer), 498 B.R. 98, 111 (Bankr. S.D.
Miss. 2013).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 111.
126. Id. at 101.
127. Id.
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The court assumed that the debtor was attempting to discharge her debts
by declaration, but ruled that her failure to properly categorize the debts on
her schedules resulted in insufficient notice to her student loan creditor of
her intention to discharge the student loan. 128 Even under the relaxed
standards of Espinosa, a debtor cannot discharge a student debt without
affording her creditor due process, and to do so, the discharge declaration
must make it specifically clear which debts are subject to discharge. 129
In a similar case, Haney v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re
Haney), a Chapter 13 debtor listed her student loan as an unsecured,
nonpriority claim. 130 After paying the student loan creditor over the course
of the administration of her plan, the debtor’s student debt remained
significantly in arrears.131 Some seven years after the conclusion of plan
payments, the educational lender’s successor in interest began attempting to
collect the unpaid portion of the debts. 132 The debtor responded by
reopening her long dormant case in an effort to enforce the stay. 133 The
result in In re Haney, however, was not a discharge, because unlike in
Espinosa, the debtor’s plan did not contain “an express provision
purporting to discharge the [d]ebtor’s student loan debt.” 134 Taken together,
In re Haney and In re Greer give clear guidance to student loan debtors
seeking a discharge: the discharge order must be clear that it discharges the
student debt. So clear, it seems, that a creditor would have ample
opportunity to screen the illegal provision out beforehand, otherwise it will
not be effective.
Student loan cases are relatively rare, perhaps for a variety of reasons.
Courts are often able to decide student loan cases on preliminary matters
and, therefore, rarely reach the preclusion issue. 135 Nevertheless, the few
cases surveyed above make it clear that Espinosa is no open floodgate of
student loan discharges. Instead, courts have taken a reasoned and narrow
128. Id. at 111.
129. See id.
130. No. 97-70937, 2011 WL 6000886, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 30, 2011).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *3.
135. See, e.g., Smyth v. Edamerica, Inc. (In re Smyth), 470 B.R. 459, 462 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 2012) (holding that Espinosa has no application to bankruptcy cases filed under Chapter
7); In re McKinnie, 501 B.R. 344, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (same); Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Pulley, Case No. 3:14cv00864-HEH, 2015 WL 2146903 at *11-12 (E.D. Va.
Apr. 30, 2015) (holding that lender's accidental rejection of trustee's plan payments did not
estop lender from pursuing debtor for unpaid student loans).
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approach to apply Espinosa in the realm of nondischargeable student loans.
Thus, the best practice is to draft a discharge order with the clear aim of
discharging a student loan, or else even the best laid schemes of mice and
men may go awry, leaving the debtor naught but grief and pain for
promised joy. 136
(2) “Whose Child Is This?”: Domestic Support Obligations After
Espinosa
The courts have been hesitant to apply the reasoning of Espinosa to
certain varieties of debt, such as domestic support obligations. For instance,
in the case of Florida Department of Revenue v. Diaz (In re Diaz) a Chapter
13 debtor who had completed his plan and received a discharge argued that
the child-support agencies of various states violated the discharge
injunction by attempting to collect past-due child support. 137 The
bankruptcy court had granted the debtor’s objection to one of the agency’s
claims as unopposed and had thereby reduced the claim to cover only
unpaid principal and not interest. 138 The bankruptcy court then confirmed
the debtor’s plan, which provided for the payment in full of only the
reduced portion of the agency’s claim. 139 The debtor then completed the
plan and received a discharge order.140 Following the discharge, the
agencies attempted to collect the full amount of child support owed,
including the interest the bankruptcy court had disallowed. 141
The Eleventh Circuit, notwithstanding Espinosa’s holding that the
Code’s plan-finality provisions may result in the discharge of an otherwise
nondischargeable debt, held that the agencies did not violate the discharge
injunction by attempting to collect the child support because “the
bankruptcy court’s discharge order did not discharge [the debtor’s] childsupport obligation.” 142 First, the court seized upon language in Espinosa
that—unlike student loan debt, which is dischargeable if the debtor makes

136. See ROBERT BURNS, To a Mouse, on Turning Her Up in Her Nest, with the Plough,
in POEMS, CHIEFLY IN THE SCOTTISH DIALECT 138, 148 (Kilmarnock ed. 1786).
137. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Diaz (In re Diaz), 647 F.3d 1073, 1081 (11th Cir. 2011).
138. Id. at 1080.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1081.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1089-93. However, the court also concluded that sovereign immunity did not
categorically bar the debtor’s claims for violations of the discharge injunction. Id. at 108688.
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the difficult showing of undue hardship—”child-support debt is ‘not
dischargeable under any circumstances’ in Chapter 13 proceedings.” 143
Secondly, the court emphasized that a bankruptcy court’s disallowance
of a debt has no bearing on whether that debt is discharged once the debtor
completes his or her plan. “Although a creditor whose claim is disallowed
may not collect from the bankruptcy estate, ‘disallowance of a claim does
not necessarily discharge [the underlying] debt’ and eliminate the debtor’s
personal liability outside of bankruptcy.” 144 In other words, the debtor
remained liable to the creditor for the amount of the domestic support
obligation not settled during the bankruptcy case. 145 Thus, the debtor’s
completion of his plan did not discharge the child-support debt.
The Eleventh Circuit further rejected the debtor’s argument that general
principles of claim preclusion barred the agencies from attempting to
collect the child-support debt. 146 The debtor argued that the agencies were
attempting to re-litigate the amount of the child-support debt; the
bankruptcy court’s order granting the claim objection and reducing the
allowed claim had already adjudicated the total amount of the child-support
debt. 147 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the debtor’s argument:
“The agencies are not attempting to relitigate this issue, as it was never
litigated . . . . [T]he only issue before the bankruptcy court . . . was the
amount of the child-support debt that would be paid by the bankruptcy
estate through [the debtor’s] Chapter 13 plan, not the total amount.” 148 The
Eleventh Circuit found further support for its conclusion by referring to preEspinosa cases holding that claim preclusion does not “prevent a creditor
who holds a nondischargeable tax debt from arguing that the amount of the
debt exceeds the payment that the creditor received during bankruptcy.” 149
Thus, concluded the court, the debtor’s remaining child-support debt was
never discharged, and the agencies did not violate the discharge injunction
by attempting to collect it.150
143. Id. at 1089-90 (quoting United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260,
274 n.10 (2010)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), (8), (15) (2012).
144. In re Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1090 (quoting Cruz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Cruz), 277 B.R. 793, 795 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2000)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1090-92. The court also concluded that issue preclusion did not bar the
agencies from attempting to collect the debt either. See id.
147. See id. at 1091.
148. Id. (citing Bell v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bell), 236 B.R. 426, 429 (N.D.
Ala. 1999)).
149. Id. at 1091-92.
150. Id. at 1092.
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The court cautioned, however, that while the agencies could collect the
interest that had been disallowed in the debtor’s bankruptcy, the agencies
were not permitted to double-collect the allowed principal that the debtor
had already paid through his bankruptcy plan. 151 The court further
cautioned that its decision did not finally adjudicate the total amount of
remaining child support the debtor owed; that was a decision left for a state
court with proper jurisdiction. 152
Although the In re Diaz court could have rested its decision on the idea
that disallowance of a debt is not tantamount to a discharge (a direct split
from the First Circuit’s reasoning in In re Hann), 153 the tone of the opinion
is much more sweeping. The thrust of the opinion—as well as that of a
subsequent Eleventh Circuit decision, Florida Department of Revenue v.
Davis (In re Davis)—is that child-support obligations are never
dischargeable, even if a confirmed plan included a provision explicitly
discharging, rather than merely disallowing, the debt.154
If this interpretation is correct, then Diaz and Davis sharply limit the
applicability of Espinosa. Espinosa explicitly reserved the question of
whether debts that are categorically nondischargeable—such as childsupport debts, certain types of tax debts, and debts arising from incidents of
driving while intoxicated—can nonetheless be discharged if a confirmed
plan so provides. 155 The Eleventh Circuit approach resolves this question in
the negative: the plan-finality sections of the Code only trump the
nondischargeability provisions when the Code provides an exception to the
general rule of nondischargeability, like the undue hardship discharge for
student loans. 156 Because child support obligations—and, by extension,

151. Id. at 1093.
152. Id. (citing Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 907 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985)).
153. See Hann v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hann), 476 B.R. 344, 357 (B.A.P. 1st
Cir. 2012).
154. See State of Fla. Dep’t of Rev., Child Support Enforcement v. Davis (In re Davis),
481 F. App’x 492, 495 (11th Cir. 2012); In re Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1089-92; see also De Boer
v. Talsma (In re Talsma), 496 B.R. 828, 835 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2013) (“[U]nlike the student
loan debt in Espinosa, the domestic support obligation is not dischargeable under any
circumstances.”).
155. United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 273-74 n.10 (2010) (“Sections
1328(a) and 523(a)(8) [of the Code] provide that student loan debt is dischargeable in a
Chapter 13 proceeding if a court makes a finding of undue hardship. In contrast, other
provisions in Chapter 13 provide that certain other debts are not dischargeable under any
circumstances. We express no view on the conditions under which an order confirming the
discharge of one of these types of debt could be set aside as void.”) (citations omitted).
156. In re Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1089-90 (analyzing Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 273 n.10).
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almost all of the categories of nondischargeable debts enumerated in Code
section 523(a)—do not contemplate exceptions to the general rule of
nondischargeability, a provision in a confirmed plan purporting to discharge
them has no preclusive effect.157
Some courts in other jurisdictions have generally agreed with the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach. One bankruptcy court in the Northern District
of Texas held squarely that domestic support obligations “are not
dischargeable under any circumstances.” 158
Purely as a matter of policy, In re Diaz seems sound. The result in In re
Diaz protects federalism: “If bankruptcy courts could fix a debtor’s
personal liability for child—support through rulings [and orders], this
would often result in de facto modification of state child-support orders.
Federal bankruptcy courts have no business becoming embroiled in state
domestic relations to such a degree.” 159
In re Diaz fares less well as a matter of logic. The thrust of Espinosa is
that even illegal provisions of a confirmed plan bind creditors and that
otherwise nondischargeable debts may be discharged in bankruptcy if the
court confirms a plan that provides for their discharge. 160 Yet, there is no
particular reason why this rule would apply to student loans but not to other
types of obligations, including child-support debts.
In re Diaz picks up on Espinosa’s footnote 10 and uses it to distinguish
student loans from child-support debts. Whereas the Code makes student
loans nondischargeable unless the court finds that repayment would
constitute undue hardship, the Code specifies that a child-support debt is
never dischargeable. 161 That analysis is not entirely accurate, however.
Code section 1322(a)(2) permits courts to confirm a plan that does not
provide for full payment of child-support obligations where the holder of
the child-support claim agrees.162 Just as a plan could contain a provision
that a student loan poses an undue hardship even where no hardship
157. Id. at 1091-92.
158. In re Talsma, 496 B.R. at 838.
159. In re Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1092 n.16 (citing Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1579
(11th Cir. 1992); Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 907 (11th Cir. 1985)).
160. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 275-78.
161. Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1089-90 (citing Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273 n.10).
162. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 1322(a)(2) (2012) (“The plan . . . shall provide for the full
payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority under section 507 of
this title, unless the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such
claim.”) Domestic support obligations are included in the category of claims entitled to
priority. See id. § 507(a)(1); see also Burnett v. Burnett (In re Burnett), 646 F.3d 575, 58082 (8th Cir. 2011).
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determination has occurred, 163 so too could a plan contain a provision
stating that a domestic-support creditor agrees to reduced (or zero)
payments. 164 If the creditor fails to object, and if the court fails to catch the
objectionable plan provision in its independent review, then the logic of
Espinosa would give that plan preclusive effect as well, but for the
Espinosa court’s dicta that child-support obligations are never
dischargeable. 165
Indeed, one court has examined the tension inherent between Espinosa
and Diaz regarding the distinction between debts that are “not dischargeable
under any circumstances” 166 and debts like student loans, which the
Supreme Court considered to be dischargeable under some circumstances,
specifically upon a finding of undue hardship. 167 Intriguingly, the In re
Moore court found the distinction between the types of debts to be illusory
at best, pointing out that “[c]hild support obligations, . . . tax debts, . . . ,
and student loan obligations that do not impose an undue hardship are all
always nondischargeable.” 168 Ultimately, the Moore court followed the
Eleventh Circuit decision in In re Diaz, concluding that the precedent’s
logic was most applicable to the tax debts at stake in Moore and finding that
the Eleventh Circuit’s intention was for claims-allowance processes to have
no preclusive effect on non-dischargeable debts outside of bankruptcy. 169
The Moore court made a salient point. Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy
Code is not well-equipped to shed light on which types of debts are really
nondischargeable, like those the Supreme Court enumerated in its tenth
footnote to Espinosa. 170 Ideally, section 523 of the Code would list detailed
descriptions of nondischargeable debts in parallel construction and without
sub-exceptions or conditional language. For student loans, the proposed
language of section 523(a)(8) would be something like:

163. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 276.
164. Unlike In re Diaz, both In re Davis and In re Talsma were Chapter 11 cases. Title
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) does not contemplate full payment of domestic support claims as §
1322(a)(2) does and therefore does not contemplate agreements between parties. Still, all
three courts denied debtors' efforts to reduce their domestic support obligations.
165. See In re Burnett, 646 F.3d at 580-82; see also Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273 n.10.
166. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273 n.10.
167. In re Moore, No. 08-40118-JTL, 2013 WL 4017936, at *7 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Aug. 6,
2013).
168. Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at *9-10.
170. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012); Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273 n.10.
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(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt—
(8) that does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor and
the debtor’s dependents and that is
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made,
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under
any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit
or nonprofit institution; or
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational
benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education
loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual.
By removing the conditional language, the confusion among courts evident
in the Moore decision 171 would, if not disappear, at least diminish. Without
conditional language or exceptions, section 523(a) would be a simple list of
absolute circumstances in which a debtor would be unable to discharge a
debt, and footnote 10 of Espinosa would create fewer questions than in its
current form.
The absurdity of the categorical framework developed in Espinosa and
criticized in In re Moore has opened the door for the In re Diaz court and
others to pick and choose which types of debt are protected from discharge
by declaration and which ones are not, based principally on whether the
applicable subsection of section 523 contains conditional language or
exceptions. As a basis for resolving a split between circuit courts, hairsplitting a statute based upon the presence or absence of a protasis is an
especially weak approach. In its next revisions to the Code, Congress
should reword section 523 in the general style suggested above to avoid this
confusion.
As a result of the absurd approach the Supreme Court adopted, not all
courts follow the In re Diaz approach. For example, in In re Burnett, the
Eighth Circuit considered a confirmed plan that, contrary to Code section
523(a)(5), did not provide for the full payment of accrued interest on

171. Moore, 2013 WL 4017936, at *9.
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spousal support incurred pre-petition. 172 Although the Eighth Circuit
emphasized that the bankruptcy court should have independently refused to
confirm the plan, even though no creditor objected to the offending
provision, the Eighth Circuit, citing Espinosa, other applicable Supreme
Court precedent, and Code section 1322(a)(2), held that the plan-finality
provisions gave the illegal plan binding and claim-preclusive effect. 173
Contrast the In re Burnett decision with Hart v. Luckman (In re Luckman),
in which a court, in part, refused to give a plan preclusive effect against
further collections because it did not explicitly purport to discharge the
domestic support obligation at issue.174
The Burnett approach is superior because it does not subscribe to the
kind of arbitrary ordering of nondischargeable debts that In re Diaz and In
re Luckman do, but instead faithfully applies the Espinosa precedent in a
logical way—equally to all debts that are not dischargeable under the Code.
Assuming that amending the Code is not high on the list of congressional
priorities, it will be up to the courts to fashion a consensus surrounding the
reasonable approach developed in In re Burnett that treats all
nondischargeable debts the same.
(3) Taxes
As one might imagine, debtors have continued to try to use Espinosa to
their advantage, and those efforts have not been confined to the realm of
student loans and domestic-support obligations. Other “nondischargeable”
debts such as taxes and secured loans have proven to be fertile grounds for
litigation in the wake of the Espinosa decision. “Nondischargeable” is in
irony-denoting quotation marks because, as discussed above, the Supreme
Court sowed the seeds of confusion by implying in a footnote an arbitrary
preference for nondischargeable debt categories that are written into the
Code without conditional language or exceptions.175 Unfortunately for
172. Burnett v. Burnett (In re Burnett), 646 F.3d 575, 577, 581 (8th Cir. 2011). However,
the In re Burnett court held that the creditor could nonetheless recover on post-petition child
and spousal support, as well as interest incurred post-petition, because a bankruptcy plan can
only dispose of claims that existed as of the petition date. Id. at 582-83 (citations omitted).
But see Hart v. Luckman (In re Luckman), No. 12-60036-13, 2012 WL 6708586, at *9
(Bankr. D. Mont. Dec. 26, 2012) (finding that confirmation order language specifically
discharging a pre-petition domestic support obligation was necessary to achieve such a
discharge).
173. In re Burnett, 646 F.3d at 580-81 (citing United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559
U.S. 260, 269-70 (2010); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 152 (2009)).
174. In re Luckman, 2012 WL 6708586, at *9.
175. See Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273 n.10.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

764

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:733

debtors with tax debts, the Code provisions that describe the
dischargeability of tax debts are riddled with such exceptions and
conditional language, 176 so the stage is set for similarly contradictory results
as described above in the section on domestic-support obligations. 177
For instance, in United States v. Monahan (In re Monahan), a debtor
filed, and the court confirmed, a plan to pay in full the allowed claim of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 178 The IRS was unsatisfied with the plan’s
payment of its allowed claim in full and sent numerous notices of intent to
levy upon the debtor for interest accrued on its claim post-petition. 179 The
debtor argued that, because she paid the claim in full and the claim did not
include any provision for interest accruing post-petition, the IRS was
precluded from continuing to try to collect said interest. 180
The In re Monahan court was thus faced with deciding whether the
plan’s treatment of the claim was a final settlement of the IRS’s claim,
including all interest pre- and post-petition. “The overwhelming majority of
[C]hapter 13 plans do not provide for post-petition interest on unsecured
claims . . . [because] a Chapter 13 plan can only provide for allowed
claims . . . [and section] 502(b)(2) prohibits a claim from including
unmatured interest.” 181 Yet, section 1322(b)(10) provides an exception to
the rule and allows for the payment of post-petition interest on unsecured
claims that are nondischargeable, but only if the plan otherwise makes full
payment on all allowed claims. 182 The type of tax debt at issue in In re
Monahan was of the type described in Code section 507(a)(8)(C), which is
not dischargeable even if paid in full.183 Regarding such debts, “the debtor
remains liable for any unpaid portion of the claim, including any interest

176. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (2012) (allowing an exception from discharge
debts “for a tax or a customs duty of the kind . . . specified in section 507(a)(3) or 507(a)(8)
of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed”); id. § 507(a)(8)(C)
(describing a category for debts that are “tax[es] required to be collected or withheld and for
which the debtor is liable in whatever capacity”). The exception appears not in these
provisions, but in section 1328(a)(2), which says that such debts may not be discharged at all
in Chapter 13. Id. The Code’s labyrinthine construction here provides fertile ground for
courts to apply Espinosa’s tenth footnote in contradictory ways.
177. See supra Part II.B.1.b.2.
178. 497 B.R. 642, 644 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2013).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 648.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 648-49 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8)(C), 1328(a)(2) (2012)).
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that accrues on the claim post-petition.” 184 Taxing authorities regularly
collect such post-petition interest after a Chapter 13 debtor completes plan
payments despite the automatic stay under the authority of Bruning v.
United States. 185 The only new issue to examine, then, was whether
Espinosa overturned a half-century of widely settled law. 186
As expected, the IRS prevailed because the court held that the plan
simply satisfied the pre-petition debt but did not discharge it.187 The critical
difference between the plan in In re Monahan and the plan in Espinosa was
that Monahan did not expressly state that her plan would discharge the IRS
debt. 188 As explained above, such a provision would have been illegal
because the tax debt at issue in In re Monahan was not dischargeable even
if paid in full under the plan. 189 Without an express declaration of
discharge, the IRS was not on notice of any discharge, illegal or otherwise,
and thus retained its right to collect post-petition interest. 190
In In re Brown, another post-Espinosa bankruptcy court dealt with
Espinosa's footnote ten as it applies to tax debts. 191 The In re Brown court
held that dischargeability of tax debts is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)
and that, in accordance with Espinosa's tenth footnote, tax debts are never
dischargeable. 192 The court so held despite various IRS actions in the
debtors' favor, including that the IRS voluntarily bifurcated its claim into
priority and general unsecured categories, did not object to the debtors' plan
that left much of the general unsecured claims pool unpaid, encouraged the
184. In re Monahan, 497 B.R. at 648-49 (citing In re Sprolito, 359 B.R. 423, 428 (Bankr.
D.P.R. 2006); Tashjian v. IRS, 325 B.R. 56, 59 (D. Mass. 2005)).
185. 376 U.S. 358, 362 (1964).
186. See In re Monahan, 497 B.R. at 650-51 (listing a large sample of cases across many
circuits indicating the extension of the Bruning principle into the Code era and into all areas
of nondischargeable debts).
187. Id. at 652.
188. Id.
189. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (2012).
190. In re Monahan, 497 B.R. at 652. The In re Monahan decision cited three popularly
cited cases with significant discussions on the issue of notice to creditors as it relates to
Espinosa-style discharges: In re Brodeur, 434 B.R. 348, 351 n.2 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2010); In re
Deavila, 431 B.R. 178, 179 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010); In re McLemore, 426 B.R. 728, 744
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010); see also In re Carlin, Case no. 11-11784 (ALG), 2014 WL
5023653 at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2014) (slip op.) (requiring plan to expressly state
discharge of tax debt to achieve discharge). But see In re Ryan, 504 B.R. 686, 704 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 2013) (distinguishing In re Monahan).
191. No. 8:09-bk-27844-CED, 2015 WL 2437913 at *3-4 & n.24 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May
20, 2015) (citing United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 273 n.10 (2010)).
192. Id.
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debtors to seek a hardship discharge, and never indicated that it intended to
seek to collect the unsecured portion of its claim after the hardship
discharge. 193 Put another way, even in such a heavily-pro-debtor set of
facts, IRS conduct heavily implying consent to discharge cannot override
the Bankruptcy Code. 194
Overall, the IRS has been very successful in the post-Espinosa world at
avoiding impermissible discharges in consumer debtor plans.
(4) Secured Debts
Contrast the In re Monahan court’s conclusion with that of the
bankruptcy court in In re Franklin. 195 There, a secured residential mortgage
creditor claimed, after the claims bar date and plan confirmation, that the
debtor owed it roughly $1,700.00 more in arrearages than provided for in
the plan. 196 The secured creditor argued that since § 1322(b) specifically
prohibits Chapter 13 debtors from modifying the rights of residential home
mortgage holders, and since secured lienholders are generally not bound by
plan provisions that modify their rights without initiating a contested
matter, the debtor’s confirmed plan should not be permitted to reduce the
debtor’s liability to the secured creditor.197 The Court, notwithstanding preEspinosa Fifth Circuit case law that supported the creditor’s position, ruled
that Espinosa compelled a ruling in the debtor’s favor that the arrearages
were not collectable.198 Since the creditor in In re Franklin had received
notice and been afforded an opportunity to object to the debtor’s plan, the
creditor was now bound, notwithstanding that the debtor unilaterally
modified his liability on a secured home mortgage debt. 199
The distinction in this case can be found in the specific exceptions to
discharge contained in Code section 1328(a). Section 1328(a)(1) excepts
from discharge a secured debt which is not paid in full under the plan.200 In
this case, however, the secured debt was to be paid in full and thus be
discharged. 201

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
In re Franklin, 448 B.R. 744 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2011).
Id. at 746.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 748.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1) (2012) (referencing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5)).
In re Franklin, 448 B.R. at 747-48.
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In light of cases such as Diaz that applied Espinosa narrowly and
decided in favor of creditors, the result in In re Franklin may seem
somewhat counterintuitive. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has indicated that
debtors can do only so much with seemingly innocuous language in their
plans. 202 In a recent Chapter 11 case, Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White
Transportation, Inc. (In re S. White Transportation, Inc.), a secured creditor
who had participated throughout the bankruptcy and litigated its secured
claim pre-petition remained silent as the debtor submitted a plan for
confirmation that provided no recovery for the secured creditor.203 When
the secured creditor objected post-confirmation, belatedly realizing that
section 1141(c) might very well void its asserted lien, the debtor argued in
part that Espinosa altered Fifth Circuit precedent on this issue. 204 The Fifth
Circuit, however, construed Espinosa very narrowly as simply a case that
dealt with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) concerning void
judgments and held that secured creditors may still sit idly on the sidelines
of a bankruptcy without participating, and continue to look to their lien for
satisfaction. 205
One commentator has suggested that the Fifth Circuit’s decision here
permits creditors to “spring awake and strip debtors of finality” postconfirmation. 206 There is certainly tension between the rights of creditors to
ignore bankruptcy and the ability of debtors to modify secured creditors'
rights with a simple statement in a plan.207 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel addressed this tension by shutting the door on secured
creditors, construing silence as acceptance of even an arguably illegal

202. Acceptance Loan Co. v. S. White Trans., Inc. (In re S. White Trans., Inc.), 725 F.3d
494 (5th Cir. 2013).
203. Id. at 495-96.
204. Id. at 497-98 n.1.
205. Id.
206. Liana-Marie Lien, Note, “Asleep at the Switch”? The Need to Hold Sophisticated
Creditors to Higher Standards in Chapter 11, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 557, 580
(2014).
207. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2012). A debtor must presumably provide notice to the
creditor of its intention to discharge the secured debt and strip the lien; otherwise Espinosa’s
due process requirements would not be met. See United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559
U.S. 260, 272 (2010); see also In re St. Louis, No. 10-11933-TMD, 2013 WL 4498986 at
*5-6 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2013) (holding service of an objection that putatively
sought to challenge a lien but that did not initiate an adversary proceeding was not sufficient
notice to afford a secured creditor due process).
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plan. 208 Other courts have found that even when a secured creditor had
already completed a foreclosure pre-petition, because the secured creditor
failed to object to confirmation of the debtor's plan to cure arrearage and
resume mortgage payments, the creditor was stuck with the plan and the
debtor's retention of the property. 209 Yet another court held that a secured
creditor was stuck with plan treatment impermissible under section 1325's
“hanging paragraph” because the secured creditor failed to object.210
Despite the differences among varying debt categories, courts are
applying Espinosa so as to settle tensions its footnote 10 created, even in
the context of secured debts, as the previously cited cases demonstrate.211
The same Bankruptcy Rule, 7001, that requires a debtor to use an adversary
hearing to prove undue hardship also requires an adversary hearing to
determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien.212 To deal with secured
loans, courts should simply impose the same notice requirements discussed
in Espinosa 213 to secured claimants.214 In the absence of the hearing
required to contest a lien, a plan in which the debtor stripped a lien under
section 1141(c) or 1322(b)(2) is procedurally defective, in no relevant way
distinct from a student loan discharge-by-declaration. 215 As such, secured
creditors need to pay attention and object to confirmation of plans, even
when they believe their rights are being improperly or illegally affected.

208. Bronitsky v. Bea (In re Bea), Nos. NC-14-1376-DKiTa & 14-41272-MEH13, 2015
WL 3441169 at *8 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 29, 2015). The Panel went on to find, however, that
the code did not plainly state that the proposed plan treatment was illegal. See id.
209. In re Best, No. 14-30692, 2014 WL 3700698, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 24,
2014); In re Ulrey, 511 B.R. 401, 407-08 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2014).
210. In re Ross, No. 11-04792-HB, 2015 WL 3781074, at *4 (Bankr. D.S.C. June 16,
2015) (slip op.).
211. See, e.g., In re Best, 2014 WL 3700698, at *5; In re Ulrey, 511 B.R. at 408.
212. FED R. BANKR. P. 7001(2),(6).
213. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (quoting
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (requiring notice
“to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections”)).
214. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2), (6).
215. Potentially, 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) may be of additional interest to secured creditors in
this position, but it only applies if a secured creditor filed a claim which was not allowed.
See Ralph Brubaker, Lien Voiding or Lien Pass-Through Upon Confirmation of Chapter 11
Plan? (Part II): The (Ir)Relevance of Secured Creditor Participation 34 No. 1 BANKRUPTCY
LAW LETTER NL1 (Westlaw), at nn.59, 60 (2014) (providing more analysis on the
application of Espinosa to secured debts).
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Tension arises (or should arise) when courts attempt to square their preEspinosa precedents with that decision’s new notice requirements.216 Many
Circuit Courts, including the Fifth, had previously developed the concept of
“creditor participation,”217 which generally requires the creditor to do more
than passively make an appearance and receive bankruptcy court notices
and documents to “participate.” 218 Creditor participation is generally a
required element for a debtor to avail itself of the lien modification
provisions of section 1141(c), though courts differ on what constitutes
participation. 219 At least one court has defined participation to be no more
than receiving notice of the plan and an opportunity to object.220 That is
consistent with minimal Espinosa notice, in which actual, even informal,
notice of a debtor’s plan to illegally discharge a debt was held to be
sufficient to foreclose a creditor’s subsequent effort to object. 221
The Fifth Circuit in In re S. White Transportation held, however, that
secured creditors must do more than simply receive the plan and an
opportunity to object. 222 As a result, yet more nuances have been introduced
into the world of preclusion in the wake of Espinosa, as secured creditors in
the Fifth Circuit must now do more than receive notice to have their rights
impacted by a debtor’s illegal plan provision. A student loan lender,
domestic support creditor, or a taxing authority does not receive that same
level of protection—if they simply receive a copy of the debtor’s proposed
plan and don’t object, Espinosa’s notice requirement is satisfied. It is
appropriate for secured lenders to receive this additional protection in light
of the long tradition protecting their right to remain aloof of bankruptcy

216. The Fifth Circuit in In re S. White Transportation appears not to have experienced
any Espinosa-related reservations when holding that it changed nothing with regard to
secured creditor participation precedents. 725 F.3d 494, 497-98 (5th Cir. 2013).
For an excellent discussion of the participation requirement in a post-Espinosa world, see
James N. Duca, Now Where Did That Mortgage Not Go? A Two-Act Play Under U.C.C. § 3301 and 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c), 16 HAW. B.J. 71, 82-92 (2013).
217. See, e.g., In re S. White Transp., 725 F.3d at 498; Universal Suppliers v. Reg’l Bldg.
Sys., Inc. (In re Reg’l Bldg. Sys., Inc.), 254 F.3d 528, 530 (4th Cir. 2001); FDIC v. Union
Entities (In re Be-Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1996); In re Penrod, 50
F.3d 459, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1995).
218. See, e.g., Elixir Indus., Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters., Inc.), 507
F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Penrod, 50 F.3d at 462.
219. In re S. White Transp., 725 F.3d at 497.
220. In re Reg'l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 251 B.R. 274, 287 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000).
221. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 277 (2010).
222. In re S. White Transp., 725 F.3d at 498.
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proceedings. The Fifth Circuit should simply have made its position clearer
vis-à-vis Espinosa.
(5) Espinosa Analysis
As the preceding cases show, Espinosa can be an exceedingly powerful
decision in favor of debtors who manage to put their creditors on notice of
their illegal plans without attracting an objection; they can often preclude
their creditors from challenging their discharge of otherwise
nondischargeable debts. The threat of sanctions against debtors’ attorneys
that attempt this gambit clearly dampens the practice. Still, enough
divisions remain between jurisdictions on these preclusion issues to afford
debtors’ attorneys some cover if they decide to risk submitting a plan with a
so-called “discharge by declaration.” Until the precedents solidify and the
Supreme Court resolves the circuit split regarding Espinosa’s footnote ten,
plenty of ambiguity will remain. Such a situation, in which debtors and
creditors do not know what to expect, will undoubtedly lead to more
“shooting for the moon” from debtors. This practice, even when
unsuccessful, ultimately works out to the detriment of creditors, who are
charged under Espinosa with remaining extra vigilant, always anticipating
how an order may be interpreted in the future, especially by other judges.
Only a much more strenuous effort by courts to achieve some level of
uniformity in decision-making or to distribute sanctions to debtors that
propose such discharges in bad faith will effectively discourage debtors’
efforts to circumvent Congress’s priority debt structure.
C. Peeking Behind the Curtain: Brown, Archer, and Exceptions to Claim
Preclusion in Bankruptcy
As the foregoing demonstrates, claim preclusion is generally applicable
in consumer bankruptcy. As will be described below, however, the
Supreme Court, in Brown v. Felsen 223 and Archer v. Warner, 224 established
categorical exceptions to the applicability of claim preclusion in the context
of dischargeability proceedings.
Nevertheless, the lure of claim preclusion remains strong, and
practitioners have continually requested lower courts to find exceptions to
the exceptions: instances in which claim preclusion applies notwithstanding
Supreme Court precedent. As will also be described below, lower courts
have largely rejected these requests in recent years and held that the

223. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
224. 538 U.S. 314 (2003).
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Supreme Court meant what it said in Brown and Archer: claim preclusion
generally does not apply in dischargeability proceedings. However, a few
important recent cases suggest that claim preclusion may apply in certain
limited circumstances.
1. Dischargeability Proceedings in Bankruptcy
Before discussing the holdings of Brown and Archer, a word about
dischargeability in bankruptcy is necessary to orient the uninitiated. The
following analysis applies equally in consumer and nonconsumer
bankruptcies under various chapters of the Code, but given this article’s
focus on consumer bankruptcy cases, for the sake of brevity and clarity the
article will analyze the issue from the perspective of a consumer
reorganization under Chapter 13 of the Code.
A Chapter 13 debtor that completes her bankruptcy plan 225 is afforded a
discharge of many of her debts. 226 However, this discharge is not absolute.
Congress opted to deem certain categories of debts nondischargeable in
bankruptcy. 227 These include, inter alia, debts for domestic support
obligations, 228 debts for willful and malicious injury to persons or
property, 229 debts incurred through fraud or defalcation,230 certain tax
debts, 231 and so forth. A creditor may obtain a determination that a certain
debt is nondischargeable by initiating an adversary proceeding in the
debtor’s bankruptcy case pursuant to Rule 4007. 232
Commonly, the debt that a creditor seeks to declare dischargeable is
based on a judgment obtained in state or federal court. The question in such
circumstances is this: to what extent is that prior judgment given claim
preclusive effect in the subsequent dischargeability proceeding?
a) Brown v. Felsen
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Felsen, a case brought
under the prior Bankruptcy Act (the Act). 233 The facts of that case were as

225. A bankruptcy court may also grant a discharge to a debtor who has not completed
her plan, but only under very limited circumstances. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2012).
226. Id. § 1328(a).
227. See, e.g., id. § 1328(a), 1328(c).
228. Id. § 523(a)(5); see also id. § 523(a)(15).
229. Id. § 523(a)(6).
230. Id. § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4).
231. Id. § 523(a)(1), (a)(7), (a)(14), (a)(14A).
232. See FED R. BANKR. P. 4007.
233. 442 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1979) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 17a, 32 (1975)).
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follows: Mark Paul Felsen (Felsen) owned a car dealership. 234 Felsen
obtained a bank loan to finance his dealership235 and induced G. Garvin
Brown III (Brown) to guarantee the bank loan. 236 Brown later sued Felsen
in Colorado state court, alleging that Felsen obtained the guarantee from
Brown “‘by misrepresentations and non-disclosures of material facts.’” 237
Brown and Felsen then settled the state court case by a stipulation
providing that the bank would recover jointly and severally against Brown,
Felsen, and the dealership, and that Brown would, in turn, have judgment
against Felsen and the dealership. 238 Neither the judgment nor the
stipulation specified the cause of action upon which Felsen’s liability to
Brown was based. 239 Notably, because Brown and Felsen settled the case,
the state court never admitted a sworn deposition by Felsen into the
record. 240
Felsen then filed bankruptcy and sought discharge of his debt to
Brown. 241 Brown argued that the bankruptcy court should declare the state
court judgment a nondischargeable debt because Felsen obtained it by
fraud, deceit, and malicious conversion. 242 Felsen responded that because
the state court proceeding did not result in a finding of fraud, claim
preclusion barred the bankruptcy court from redetermining the nature of the
debt. 243 He advanced this argument even though the dischargeability
provisions of the Act had not been at issue in the state court proceeding
because he had not yet declared bankruptcy. 244
The bankruptcy court, following Tenth Circuit precedent requiring the
court to apply claim preclusion in dischargeability proceedings, 245
“somewhat reluctantly confined its consideration to the judgment,

234. Id. at 128.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. Specifically, Brown alleged that Felsen “had prepared false title certificates, sold
automobiles out of trust, and applied the proceeds” of the bank loan “to private purposes.”
Id. at 129.
238. Id. at 128.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 129.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See In re Nicholas, 510 F.2d 160, 160-61 (10th Cir. 1975), abrogated by Resolution
Trust Corp. v. McKendry (In re McKendry), 40 F.3d 331 (10th Cir. 1994).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/2

2015]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTOPPEL (VOL. II)

773

pleadings, exhibits, and stipulation which were in the state-court record.” 246
It declined to hear other evidence, including Felsen’s deposition, which the
state court had never admitted into the record. 247 The bankruptcy court
concluded that, because neither the judgment nor the state court record
showed that the judgment followed from Felsen’s fraud, Brown failed to
establish that the debt was nondischargeable under the Act.248
The district court and the court of appeals, both applying claim
preclusion, affirmed, holding that “the prior consent decree was conclusive
as to the nature of [Felsen]’s liability.” 249 The courts concluded that because
neither the stipulation nor the judgment mentioned fraud, the debt was
dischargeable. 250
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the
Tenth Circuit, which applied claim preclusion in dischargeability
proceedings, and “every other Court of Appeals that ha[d] considered the
question,” which “rejected [claim preclusion] and held that extrinsic
evidence may be admitted in order to determine accurately the
dischargeability . . . of a debt previously reduced to judgment in state
court.” 251 The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that claim preclusion
was inapplicable because “neither the interests served by [claim
preclusion], the process of orderly adjudication in state courts, nor the
policies of the [Act] would be well served by foreclosing [Brown] from
submitting additional evidence to prove his case.” 252 Unlike most situations
in which a party raises claim preclusion, Brown was not attempting to
“assert a new ground for recovery” or “attack the validity of the prior
judgment” in the dischargeability proceeding. 253 Instead, Brown was
attempting to meet the “new defense of bankruptcy” that Felsen had
“interposed between [Brown] and the sum determined to be due him.” 254 By
declaring bankruptcy and attempting to discharge the debt owed to Brown,
Felsen had “upset the repose that would justify treating the prior state-court
246. Brown, 442 U.S. at 130.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 130-31.
251. Id. at 131 (citing Houtman v. Mann (In re Houtman), 568 F.2d 651, 653-54 (9th Cir.
1978); In re McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 293 n.6 (3d Cir. 1978); Bailey v. Wright (In re
Wright), 584 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir. 1978); Hovermale v. Pigge (In re Pigge), 539 F.2d 369,
371-72 (4th Cir. 1976); Raley v. Nicholas (In re Nicholas), 510 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1975)).
252. Brown, 442 U.S. at 132.
253. Id. at 133.
254. Id.
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proceeding as final, and it would hardly promote confidence in judgments
to prevent [Brown] from meeting [Felsen]’s new initiative.”255
The Supreme Court further reasoned that Congress, in enacting the
dischargeability provisions of the Act, intended for bankruptcy courts, not
state courts, to make dischargeability provisions in the first instance. 256 The
legislative history of the Act suggested that the bankruptcy court’s review
of the dischargeability of debts should be exclusive and plenary. 257
Additionally, state law elements of fraud and the like are not necessarily
identical to the federal prerequisites for nondischargeability. 258
Furthermore, Congress, “in the interest of justice and honest dealing and
honest conduct,” intended for all debts incurred through “offenses against
good morals” to be excepted from discharge, even those reduced to a
stipulated judgment. 259
Most importantly, when a plaintiff seeks a state court judgment against a
defendant, the defendant has oftentimes not yet declared bankruptcy; “the
debtor’s bankruptcy is still hypothetical.” 260 Dischargeability
determinations are thus “not directly in issue” at the state court level, and as
a result “neither party has a full incentive to litigate them.” 261 If state court
judgments were entitled to claim preclusive effect in a subsequent
bankruptcy proceeding, it “would force an otherwise unwilling party to try
[dischargeability] questions to the hilt in order to protect h[er]self against
the mere possibility that a debtor might take bankruptcy in the future.” 262 If
the defendant does not subsequently declare bankruptcy, then the state court
and the litigants would have unnecessarily wasted time and resources
arguing the dischargeability issue.263 In sum, “[i]t makes little sense . . . to
resolve a federal dischargeability question according to whether or not the

255. Id. at 133-34.
256. Id. at 134-39. Note, however, that there may be categories of debts over which
“[b]ankruptcy courts and state courts share concurrent jurisdiction.” Monsour v. Monsour
(In re Monsour), 372 B.R. 272, 278 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007). Monsour is discussed in
greater detail below.
257. Brown, 442 U.S. at 134-39.
258. Id. at 135 (citing Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934)).
259. Id. at 138 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1698, at 3, 6 (1902); 36 CONG. REC. 1375 (1903)).
260. Id. at 135.
261. Id. at 134-35.
262. Id. at 135.
263. Id.
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parties in state court waived their right to engage in hypothetical litigation
in an inappropriate forum.” 264
Thus, the Supreme Court rejected Felsen’s claim preclusion argument. 265
“[T]he mere fact that a conscientious creditor has previously reduced h[er]
claim to judgment should not bar further inquiry into the true nature of the
debt.” 266 The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Tenth Circuit
and held that “the bankruptcy court is not confined to a review of the
judgment and record in the prior state-court proceedings when considering
the dischargeability of” a debtor’s debt. 267 Instead, the bankruptcy court
was permitted to “weigh all the evidence,” 268 including additional evidence
not admitted into the record during the state court proceeding. 269 As a result
of Brown, bankruptcy courts, when tasked with the responsibility of
determining whether a prior judgment falls within a statutory exception to
dischargeability, independently determine whether the type of action
predicating the judgment is the sort of action that Congress intended to be
exempt from discharge in bankruptcy. 270
However, the Supreme Court stressed in a footnote that even though
claim preclusion was inapplicable in the dischargeability proceeding, the
Court would not reach the question of whether or not the state court’s
factual determinations would be accorded issue preclusive effect. 271
However, the Court strongly suggested that if a state court determines
factual issues using standards identical to those of the Act’s dischargeability
provisions in the course of adjudicating a state law question, then issue
preclusion would bar relitigation of those issues in the bankruptcy court in
264. Id. at 137. After all, one of the purposes of claim preclusion is judicial economy.
Incentivizing parties to litigate potentially irrelevant issues in inappropriate fora would
stymie rather than further that purpose.
265. Id. at 138.
266. Id. (citing Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co. v. Hudson, 111 F. 361, 362-63
(E.D. Mo. 1901), aff’d, 122 F. 232, 235-36 (8th Cir. 1903)).
267. Id. at 138-39.
268. Id. at 138.
269. Id. at 132. The Supreme Court did note, however, that the bankruptcy court was
permitted to “take into account whether or not [Brown’s] failure to press these allegations at
an earlier time betrays a weakness in his case on the merits.” Id. at 138. This statement is
somewhat at odds with its argument that Brown lacked a full incentive to litigate these issues
at the prior stage of the litigation.
270. See, e.g., Bennett v. Smith (In re Smith), No. 05-10041, 2006 WL 3333801, at *2,
*8-13 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Nov. 16, 2006) (assessing whether a judgment based on North
Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act satisfies the Code’s statutory
prerequisites for fraud).
271. Brown, 442 U.S. at 139 n.10.
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the absence of some countervailing statutory policy. 272 As explained below,
this is because issue preclusion, unlike claim preclusion, affords preclusive
effect only to questions actually and necessarily decided in a prior
proceeding. The Supreme Court subsequently recognized in Grogan v.
Garner that issue preclusion is indeed applicable in nondischargeability
proceedings. 273
b) Archer v. Warner
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided Archer v. Warner, 274 which built
upon Brown v. Felsen. The Court summarized the facts of Archer as
follows:
1) A sues B seeking money that (A says) B obtained through fraud;
2) the parties settle the lawsuit and release related claims;
3) the settlement agreement does not resolve the issue of fraud, but
provides that B will pay A a fixed sum;
4) B does not pay the fixed sum;
5) B enters bankruptcy; and
6) A claims that B’s obligation to pay the fixed settlement sum is
nondischargeable because, like the original debt, it is for [money
obtained by fraud.] 275
Therefore, the question at issue was the dischargeability of the settlement
debt. 276
The bankruptcy court, district court, and court of appeals all concluded
that the debt was dischargeable.277 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
settlement “had worked a kind of ‘novation’” 278 that eliminated the original
potential debt for money obtained by fraud and replaced it with a new
debt. 279 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, because this new debt was not for

272. Id.
273. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 285 n.11 (1991) (citations omitted); accord, e.g.,
Leventhal v. Schenberg, 484 B.R. 731, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Kyte v. Clifton (In re Clifton),
No. 10-43681-drd-7, 2011 WL 2224631, at *3-4 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. June 7, 2011).
274. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003).
275. Id. at 316-17 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000)).
276. Id. at 316.
277. Id. at 318.
278. A novation is “[t]he act of substituting for an old obligation a new one that either
replaces an existing obligation with a new obligation or replaces an original party with a new
party.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (9th ed. 2009).
279. Id. (citing 283 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2002)).
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money obtained by fraud, but rather obtained as part of a settlement, it was
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 280
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on this
issue. 281 In a 7-2 decision, 282 the Court reversed and remanded. 283 The
Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the settlement agreement
amounted to a novation that fully addressed all underlying state law claims
and created a new debt.284 The Court nonetheless concluded that the new
settlement debt amounted to a debt for money obtained by fraud that could
be adjudged nondischargeable.285
The Court reasoned that this result flowed inexorably from Brown. 286
Both the stipulated judgment in Brown and the settlement agreement in
Archer effected a novation, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, of a
previous potential debt. 287 If the bankruptcy court in Brown was
permitted—and indeed required—to look behind the face of the stipulated
judgment to determine the true nature of the underlying debt, there was no
reason the bankruptcy court could not and should not do the same in
Archer; “[a] debt embodied in the settlement of a fraud case ‘arises’ no less
‘out of’ the underlying fraud than a debt embodied in a stipulation and
consent decree.” 288 In other words, “if reducing a fraud claim to settlement
definitively changed the nature of the debt for dischargeability purposes,”
then “the nature of the debt in Brown would have changed similarly,
thereby rendering the debt dischargeable.” 289
The Court further noted that “[p]olicies that favor the settlement of
disputes, like those that favor ‘repose,’” were “neither any more nor any
less at issue” in Archer than in Brown. 290
In Brown, the doctrine of [claim preclusion] itself ensured ‘a
blanket release’ of the underlying claim of fraud, just as the
contractual releases did here . . . what has not been established
280. Id. (citing 283 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2002)).
281. Id. (citing United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re West,
22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994)).
282. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent joined by Justice Stevens. Id. at 323-28 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
283. Id. at 323.
284. Id. at 318-19.
285. Id. at 319.
286. Id. at 319-22 (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979)).
287. Id. at 320.
288. Id. at 320-21.
289. Id. at 320.
290. Id. at 321.
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here, as in Brown, is that the parties meant to resolve the issue of
fraud or, more narrowly, to resolve that issue for purposes of a
later claim of nondischargeability in bankruptcy. 291
Indeed, as in Brown, the issue of dischargeability was not—and could not—
have been raised in the state court fraud litigation, because dischargeability
determinations are for the bankruptcy court to resolve in the first
instance. 292
Thus, the Court ruled that claim preclusion did not bar the creditors from
arguing that the settlement debt was nondischargeable.293 As in Brown, the
Archer Court did not reach questions of issue preclusion; those were left for
the Fourth Circuit on remand. 294
By solely relying on Brown (a case decided under the Act) to resolve
Archer (a case decided under the Code), the Archer Court reaffirmed that
Brown’s holding survived the enactment of the Code.295 However, Archer
went further than merely reaffirming the applicability of Brown; it also
widened the exception to claim preclusion in dischargeability proceedings.
The Archer Court took seriously Brown’s admonition that “the mere fact
that a conscientious creditor has previously reduced h[er] claim to
judgment,” settlement agreement, or, presumably, to any other form,
“should not bar further inquiry into the true nature of the debt” in a
nondischargeability proceeding. 296 “‘Congress intended the fullest possible
inquiry’ to ensure that ‘all debts arising out of’ fraud are ‘excepted from
discharge,’ no matter what their form,” 297 and courts should not apply claim
preclusion in a manner that would flout this congressional will. This is true
even where, as in Archer, “[t]he parties . . . executed a blanket release,
rather than entered into a consent judgment.” 298
291. Id. at 321-22.
292. Id. at 321.
293. Id. at 323.
294. Id. at 322-23. Interestingly, the Court also left for the Fourth Circuit the ability to
decide other questions involving claim preclusion. See id. at 322. However, given the overall
thrust of Brown and Archer — that claim preclusion generally does not apply in
dischargeability proceedings — it is unlikely that the Court left much for the Fourth Circuit
to do in this area.
295. Indeed, the Archer Court’s reference to the “Code” when discussing Brown suggests
the Court may not have been aware that Brown was decided under a different statutory
regime at all. See id. at 321.
296. Id. at 320-21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S.
127, 138 (1979)).
297. Id. at 321.
298. Id. at 324 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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In sum, when faced with opportunities to apply claim preclusion in the
dischargeability context, the Supreme Court has exhorted lower courts to
elevate function over form: if a later debt has its genesis in a previous debt
that would otherwise be nondischargeable in bankruptcy, the court may,
notwithstanding claim preclusion, look below the surface of the document
creating the later debt and determine whether the later debt is also
nondischargeable.
Thus, in practice, creditors need not litigate allegations of fraud to the
hilt in state court out of concern that the debtor may declare bankruptcy in
the future:
[O]ftentimes . . . the creditor can easily establish the debtor’s
liability based on a promissory note or other loan document
simply by proving the debtor executed the document and failed
to pay the debt, not bothering to present the more extensive
evidence necessary to prove the debtor also committed fraud or
other misconduct in connection with the debt. Brown v. Felsen
means such a creditor is free to take the easy route to a state
court judgment on the debt, and wait until the debtor actually
files for bankruptcy before trying to prove the same debt also
involved misconduct that makes it nondischargeable.299
c) Recent Developments: Brown and Archer in the Trenches
Since 2005, lower courts have issued countless opinions interpreting
Brown and Archer. The majority of these cases are simply straightforward
applications of the two cases. 300 In an unsettling number of cases, the
practitioner simply did not know that Brown and Archer existed, or, at the
very least, did not fully appreciate or understand the consequences of their

299. Frontier Farm Credit, PCA v. Norris (In re Norris), No. 05-43551-7, 2007 WL
1946547, at *2 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 29, 2007).
300. See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank v. Carlson (In re Carlson), 464 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th
Cir. 2012); JHK Venture Capital Ltd. P’ship v. Wellens (In re Wellens), No. 11-35835 ABC,
2012 WL 2871666, at *1 (Bankr. D. Colo. July 12, 2012); Voss v. Pujdak (In re Pujdak),
462 B.R. 560, 569-70 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011); Era Franchise Sys. L.L.C. v. Kroeber (In re
Kroeber), No. 09-32125 (LMW), 2010 WL 4064026, at *10 (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 15,
2010); Allen v. Loughery (In re Loughery), No. 09-69033-PWB, 2010 WL 4642131, at *2-3
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 12, 2010); V2R, LLC v. Schneider (In re Schneider), No. 05-2382JNF, 2006 WL 1431603, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 23, 2006); Rainey v. Davenport (In re
Davenport), 353 B.R. 150, 193-95 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2006).
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holdings. 301 This demonstrates this article’s importance to educate
practitioners of the applicable law.
In the more interesting cases, the practitioner was aware of Brown and
Archer and tried to distinguish them. As will be described below, most of
these attempts have failed, even though many of them exhibited deep
engagement with the cases and clever reasoning. In other words, the lower
courts have largely reaffirmed that Brown and Archer mean what they say.
The upshot for practitioners is that attempts to sidestep these cases, even
well reasoned ones, are likely to fail. In the most interesting cases, however,
the attempt worked. Thus, there are times, albeit very few of them, where,
notwithstanding Archer and Brown, claim preclusion is applicable in
dischargeability proceedings. Finally, a few courts have extended the
holdings of Brown and Archer beyond the nondischargeability context.
(1) Brown and Archer Mean What They Say
It is worth briefly mentioning the various ways in which courts have
reaffirmed the essential holdings of Brown and Archer.
Although Brown and Archer only dealt with debts arising out of fraud,
Code section 523(a) exempts from discharge debts from other categories,
some of which are listed above. Following Archer, “numerous courts have
applied the Supreme Court’s holding to other categories of
nondischargeability actions under section 523(a).” 302 Courts have also
extended the Brown/Archer rule beyond the nondischargeability provisions

301. See, e.g., West Coast Rentals, Inc. v. Perez (In re Perez), 415 B.R. 546, 552 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 2009); Frontier Farm Credit, PCA v. Norris (In re Norris), No. 05-43551-7, 2007
WL 1946547, at *1-2 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 29, 2007).
Some of this ignorance might stem more from the unfortunate tendency of some
practitioners to lump claim preclusion (which, under Brown and Archer, generally does not
apply in dischargeability proceedings) together with issue preclusion (which may apply in
dischargeability proceedings) under the single umbrella term “res judicata.” See, e.g., Ngo v.
Webb (In re Webb), No. 08-bk-743, 2009 WL 1139548, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 31,
2009).
Additionally, some of these cases involved pro se litigants, who understandably might not
be familiar with Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Wendt v. Hanson (In re Hanson), No.
10-19165-MM7, 2011 WL 6148429, at *2-3 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011); Tomlin v.
Crownover (In re Crownover), 417 B.R. 45, 50-51 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009).
302. Bauer v. Colokathis (In re Colokathis), 417 B.R. 150, 158 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009)
(citing Giaimo v. DeTrano (In re DeTrano), 326 F.3d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying
Archer to “willful and malicious injury” prong)).
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of section 523(a) to the nondischargeability provisions of Chapter 13 of the
Code. 303
Additionally, Brown and Archer permit the bankruptcy court to look
behind the terms of a settlement agreement even where that agreement
explicitly releases the debtor-defendant from the plaintiff-creditor’s fraud
claims, 304 or where the settlement agreement contains a provision that
purports to preclude the creditor from pursuing a nondischargeability
determination in the debtor’s bankruptcy case. 305 “Regardless of any release
which may have been executed by the creditor, or any potential novation, if
the particular debt arose out of fraud, then [the bankruptcy court] may find
the debt to be nondischargeable, no matter its current form.” 306
Likewise, the bankruptcy court may look behind the terms of a
settlement agreement or judgment to determine whether the debt truly arises
out of fraud, even where the settlement agreement explicitly states that the
debt is indeed predicated on fraud and is therefore nondischargeable.307 “If
it is permissible for a bankruptcy court to look behind a state court
judgment to find a debt is not dischargeable, the reverse is also true, and the
court may look behind the judgment and conclude a debt is
dischargeable.” 308
Courts have held that claim preclusion does not apply in a
dischargeability proceeding, even where the plaintiff attempts to give
preclusive effect to a default judgment that contains explicit findings that
the debtor perpetrated a fraud. 309 Thus, claim preclusion generally does not
apply in a nondischargeability proceeding, even where the parties agree that
303. See League v. Lowther (In re Lowther), No. 10-04155-8-JRL, 2011 WL 61603, at
*1-2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 4, 2011).
304. See Weilert v. Parker (In re Weilert), No. CC-07-1448-MkMOD, 2008 WL
8462953, at *1-5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2008); OSB Mfg., Inc. v. Hathaway (In re
Hathaway), 364 B.R. 220, 242-43 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
305. See In re Weilert, 2008 WL 8462953, at *5.
306. In re Hathaway, 364 B.R. at 242.
307. See Simmons Capital Advisors, Ltd. v. Bachinski (In re Bachinski), 393 B.R. 522,
529-34, 540-42 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008).
308. Hackney v. Hackney (In re Hackney), No. 07-40952-JJR-11, 2008 WL 4830040, at
*10 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Oct. 10, 2008) (emphasis added).
309. See Bublitz Mach. Co. v. Brewer (In re Brewer), No. 05-51960, 2006 WL 1109409,
at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 2006).
The Bublitz Court further held that issue preclusion did not apply because a default
judgment is not a judgment on the merits. Id. at *1-2. This is not true in all jurisdictions,
however; in some courts, “[i]t is well-established that default judgments may be entitled to a
preclusive effect under the theory of res judicata.” See Voss v. Pujdak (In re Pujdak), 462
B.R. 560, 568-69 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (citations omitted).
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the debtor committed fraud; the bankruptcy court must look behind the
record to determine the true nature of the debt.
Following Brown’s admonition that dischargeability determinations are
the exclusive province of the bankruptcy court,310 some state appellate
courts have reversed state trial court rulings that purport to declare a debt
nondischargeable in a defendant’s bankruptcy. 311
Some courts, interpreting Archer, have held that when a debt subject to a
dischargeability proceeding has previously been reduced to a settlement, the
court “need only look to the underlying civil action”—that is, to “the
underlying complaint and the allegations contained in it”—”to determine
whether [the] claim is nondischargeable.” 312
(2) Failed Attempts to Sidestep Brown and Archer
Many practitioners have tried and failed to distinguish Brown and
Archer. 313 In Simmons Capital Advisors, Ltd. v. Bachinski (In re Bachinski),
for example, a judgment creditor “attempt[ed] to turn the tables and make
offensive use of the novation doctrine” discussed in Archer. 314 Specifically,
the creditor argued that because “the contractual doctrine of novation does
not operate so as to alter the nature of a debt for dischargeability purposes,”
it follows that “a debt allegedly arising from fraudulent conduct, which is
made the subject of a settlement agreement, is ipso facto nondischargeable
310. Note, however, that there may be categories of debts over which “[b]ankruptcy
courts and state courts share concurrent jurisdiction.” Monsour v. Monsour (In re Monsour),
372 B.R. 272, 278 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007). Monsour is discussed in greater detail below.
Moreover, some courts hold “that, when a debtor fails to schedule a debt, the debtor loses
the benefit of the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction,” such that “the bankruptcy court
may share jurisdiction” with a state court “for dischargeability issues, but only to the extent
that the bankruptcy court in its discretion remands or abstains from hearing the matter.”
Cotter v. Skylands Cmty. Bank (In re Cotter), No. 08-12504 (NLW), 2011 WL 5900811, at
*4 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2011) (citing In re Strano, 248 B.R. 493, 502-03 (Bankr. D.N.J.
2000)). Thus, there are instances where a state court may decide dischargeability issues. See
id. at *4-5.
311. See, e.g., Birry v. Birry, No. 256627, 2006 WL 2457488, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug.
24, 2006).
312. Bauer v. Colokathis (In re Colokathis), 417 B.R. 150, 158 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009)
(citing Giaimo v. DeTrano (In re DeTrano), 326 F.3d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 2003)).
313. See, e.g., V2R, L.L.C. v. Schneider (In re Schneider), No. 05-2382-JNF, 2006 WL
1431603, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 23, 2006).
For instance, Brown and Archer apply even when the debtor argues that following them
would produce an unfair result in a given case. See Rainey v. Davenport (In re Davenport),
353 B.R. 150, 195 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2006).
314. 393 B.R. 522, 541 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008).
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under [Code section] 523(a)(2)(A).” 315 The bankruptcy court agreed with
the creditor’s premise regarding the inapplicability of novation in a
nondischargeability proceeding, but disagreed with the creditor’s
conclusion that the debt in question was necessarily nondischargeable. 316
The bankruptcy court explained: “Archer permits a creditor to demonstrate
that the debt underlying a settlement arises out of fraud, false pretenses or
false representation, but it does not relieve a creditor of meeting its burden
under [Code section] 523(a)(2)(A)” to show that the debt is
nondischargeable. 317
In Sukola v. Nader, the debtor argued that the bankruptcy court could not
look beyond a settlement agreement to determine whether a debt was
nondischargeable under Code section 523(a)(2)(A), 318 because, unlike in
Brown and Archer, the settlement agreement was made between the
plaintiffs and “the [d]ebtor’s wholly owned company, rather than directly
between the [p]laintiffs and the [d]ebtor.” 319 The bankruptcy court
concluded that this “difference is not determinative as a matter of law” and
therefore rejected the debtor’s argument. 320 The court reasoned that “[t]o
find Brown and Archer inapplicable would undermine the purpose of
[Code] section 523 and the Supreme Court’s reasoning.” 321 Therefore, the
court concluded that further inquiry into the true nature of the debt was
proper. 322
Claim preclusion does not apply in a dischargeability proceeding even if
“the underlying fraud is twice removed from [the] disputed debt,” unlike the
once removed settlement agreement as in Brown and Archer. 323 For
instance, in Star High Yield Investment Management Corp. v. Schwartz (In
315. Id. at 541-42.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 542 (citing Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 323 (2003); Burrell-Richardson v.
Mass. Bd. of Higher Educ. (In re Burrell-Richardson), 356 B.R. 797, 802 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
2006)).
318. Sukola v. Nader (In re Nader), No. 11-13042 (DHS), 2012 WL 1614856 (Bankr.
D.N.J. May 9, 2012). Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Code renders nondischargeable any debt
“for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the
extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition.” 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
319. In re Nader, 2012 WL 1614856, at *4.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Star High Yield Inv. Mgmt. Corp. v. Schwartz (In re Schwartz), No. 07-30508,
2007 WL 3051865, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007) (emphasis added).
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re Schwartz), the creditor held a debt that arose “from a state court
judgment, which arose from breach of a promissory note, which arose from
a settlement of alleged fraudulent conduct.”324 The creditor commenced an
adversary proceeding to declare the debt nondischargeable.325 The debtor
argued he was “entitled to summary judgment because” the creditor’s claim
arose “from a promissory note, not fraudulent conduct.” 326 The court ruled
that “[l]iable parties can not [sic] erase the history of a debt’s origin through
a settlement and subsequent breaches of the settlement.” 327 Because Archer
and Brown require bankruptcy courts to inquire into “the conduct from
which the debt originally arose,” the number of steps between the original
fraud and the debt the creditor seeks to enforce is irrelevant. 328 At least one
other case accords with this result.329
The form of the debt that the creditor seeks to declare nondischargeable
is also generally irrelevant. For instance, Brown and Archer apply “the
same whether the stipulation arises out of a consent judgment or simply an
agreement between the parties.” 330 Likewise, Brown and Archer apply even
where the award that the creditor seeks to declare nondischargeable is the
product of an arbitration rather than a judicial proceeding. 331
A clever litigant may not sidestep Brown and Archer “by narrowly
defining the claim subject to preclusion as fraud” or another basis for
dischargeability. 332 “The claim is the debtor’s right to discharge, not the
creditor’s objection, based on fraud, to discharge.”333
(3) Exceptions to the Exceptions
Notwithstanding the foregoing, courts have recognized several
exceptions to Brown and Archer. First, courts have emphasized that Brown
and Archer stand only for the proposition that claim preclusion does not
324. Id.
325. Id. at *1-2.
326. Id. at *2.
327. Id. at *3.
328. Id.
329. See Hodges v. Buzzeo (In re Buzzeo), 365 B.R. 578, 580-83 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
2007).
330. Infinity Grp. LLC v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 477 B.R. 236, 246 (Bankr. M.D. Ala.
2012) (citing Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003)).
331. See Data Mountain Solutions, Inc. v. Giordano (In re Giordano), 472 B.R. 313, 32324, 335 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012).
332. Crowe v. Moran (In re Moran), 413 B.R. 168, 179 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (citing
Graham v. IRS (In re Graham), 973 F.2d 1089, 1096 (3d Cir. 1992)).
333. Id. at 180.
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apply in dischargeability proceedings; they do not stand for the proposition
that claim preclusion does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings
generally. 334 For instance, “several circuits have recognized that Brown
applies to the federal dischargeability issue, but not to issues of definition
of property in the estate, in which Congress has given the states a key
role.” 335
Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. Jensen (In re Jensen) exemplifies another
exception to Brown and Archer. 336 In that case, the State of Colorado and
its Attorney General obtained a default judgment against the debtor in state
court. 337 The State then commenced an adversary proceeding against the
debtor-defendant seeking to declare this debt nondischargeable.338 The
debtor-defendant attempted to challenge the validity of the underlying
judgment by arguing that she had not in fact violated the law that gave rise
to the default judgment. 339 The bankruptcy court, notwithstanding Brown
and Archer, held that claim preclusion barred the debtor-defendant from
contesting the validity and amount of the debt in the nondischargeability
proceeding. 340 The court reasoned that, although “a bankruptcy court is not
bound by the state court judgment or record when considering the
dischargeability of the debt under federal bankruptcy principles,” claim
preclusion “may prevent the bankruptcy court from reexamining matters
other than the dischargeability aspect, such as the validity and the amount
of the debt.” 341 The court therefore ruled that the debtor-defendant was
“precluded” from asking the court “to redetermine the validity and amount
of the debt” by “alleging that she did not violate the law, and signed an
admission of violation only under duress.” 342 Other decisions recognize this
exception. 343
334. See McGarry v. Chew (In re Chew), 496 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2007).
335. Id. (citing Comer v. Comer (In re Comer), 723 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1984); Goss
v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1983); Collateral Control Corp. v. Deal (In re
Covington Grain Co.), 638 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1981)).
336. 395 B.R. 472 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008).
337. Id. at 479.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 491.
340. Id.
341. Id. (citing Griego v. Padilla (In re Griego), 64 F.3d 580, 584 (10th Cir. 1995);
Dennis v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 25 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1994); Comer v. Comer (In re
Comer), 723 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1984)).
342. Id.
343. See Davidson v. Investors Title Ins. Co., No. 3:08-cv-00243-FDW, 2008 WL
4426142, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2008).
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This exception is sound. Allowing a debtor-defendant to contest the
underlying debt by raising a new defense in a nondischargeability
proceeding would upset principles of finality. Unlike dischargeability, the
parties have the opportunity and incentive to debate the defense to the
underlying cause of action in the state court. The state court also has the
authorization and the expertise to determine the merits of the defense,
which it does not necessarily have in the dischargeability context.
Another exception applies when the creditor lost in the prior action. The
creditors in Archer and Brown had each obtained a victory of sorts in the
prior state court action—a settlement in the former, and a consent judgment
in the latter. Where, however, the creditor loses completely and entirely in
the prior state court action, claim preclusion may apply in a dischargeability
proceeding notwithstanding Archer and Brown. In Gleason v. Gleason (In
re Gleason), the plaintiff had previously sued the defendant in state court
for fraud, embezzlement, and theft. 344 The state court ruled that the plaintiff
failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his claims, and therefore
granted summary judgment to the defendant. 345 The plaintiff then brought a
dischargeability complaint in the defendant’s bankruptcy case on the same
fraud, embezzlement, and theft claims. 346 The bankruptcy court applied
claim preclusion and dismissed the adversary proceeding. 347 Unlike in
Brown and Archer, the putative creditor in Gleason did not ask the court to
determine whether an existing debt was nondischargeable. The state court
had “fully and finally determined that [the p]laintiff ha[d] no claim against
[the d]efendant.” 348 Because no debt existed, there was “no purpose . . . in
proceeding with a dischargeability complaint to determine whether that
non-existent debt would theoretically be dischargeable.” 349
Thus, claim preclusion applied even though the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant procured the state court judgment by fraudulent evidence.350 The
bankruptcy court explained that, if the defendant had done so, the plaintiff
should have moved the state court to reconsider the judgment and/or
appealed the judgment to the state appellate courts. 351 The plaintiff did

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

No. 08-41471, 2009 WL 982154, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Mar. 27, 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1-3.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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neither, and therefore could not use the bankruptcy court as an avenue for
appellate review of a state court judgment. 352
Gleason is also an obviously correct exception to Brown and Archer.
When a creditor has already lost in state court, all of the interests normally
served by finality are present (namely, economy of resources and repose for
the defendant), while all of the countervailing interests set forth in Brown
and Archer are absent. Applying claim preclusion to bar a state court loser
from relitigating her claim in a dischargeability proceeding will not cause
state courts to make (and state court litigants to defend) premature and
wasteful dischargeability determinations outside their authority and
expertise. Nor will applying claim preclusion prevent the searching inquiry
into the nature of debts envisioned by Congress when enacting the
dischargeability provisions; that searching inquiry has already been made in
the state court when the claim was litigated to a conclusion. Nor will
applying claim preclusion allow debtors to get away with offenses against
good morals; the state court has already conclusively determined that no
such offense occurred. Thus, the exception to claim preclusion should only
apply when a court has determined that debt actually exists.
Likewise, claim preclusion may apply in a nondischargeability
proceeding when a bankruptcy court, in an adversary proceeding in a
previous bankruptcy case involving the same debtor, has entered a
judgment deeming the debt in question nondischargeable.353 If a bankruptcy
court deemed a debt nondischargeable in a debtor’s first bankruptcy, the
debtor cannot challenge the prior court’s determination in his or her second
bankruptcy. 354 Similar results obtain where the parties settle the issue of
dischargeability in a prior nondischargeability proceeding, and the
bankruptcy court dismisses the nondischargeability proceeding on the basis
of that settlement.355 “In other words, once nondischargeable, always
nondischargeable,” 356 and vice versa. 357
352. Id. The bankruptcy court added in a footnote that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
prohibits such tactics by state court losers. Id. at *2 n.9 (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994); Abboud v. Abboud (In re Abboud), 237 B.R. 777, 780 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 1999)); see also Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
353. See Sanders v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (In re Sanders), No. AZ-06-1382-PaBMo,
2007 WL 7540961, at *1-3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2007).
354. See id.
355. See Hackney v. Hackney (In re Hackney), No. 07-40952-JJR-11, 2008 WL
4830040, at **1-2, 3-5, 10-12 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Oct. 10, 2008).
356. In re Sanders, 2007 WL 7540961, at *3 (citing Paine v. Griffin (In re Paine), 283
B.R. 33, 37 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)).
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This exception too seems obviously correct. The importance of finality
counsels against allowing a debtor to repeatedly relitigate a
nondischargeability determination by filing successive bankruptcies.
Moreover, unlike a state or federal court that initially issues the judgment
giving rise to the debt in question, the bankruptcy court is uniquely
authorized and qualified to determine the dischargeability of that debt.
When a bankruptcy court has previously determined that a particular debt is
nondischargeable, it has done so in an adversary proceeding where the issue
was squarely presented to the bankruptcy court, and where the parties had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate it. Indeed, because of Brown and Archer,
the original bankruptcy court has likely already looked behind the facts
leading to the judgment to determine whether the debt is nondischargeable.
Thus, claim preclusion does—and should—apply to a bankruptcy court’s
prior determination that a debt is nondischargeable, even in a subsequent
nondischargeability proceeding.
Not all exceptions to Brown and Archer are as obvious as those
discussed above. Calaway v. Cozart (In re Cozart), for example, is an odd
case in which the bankruptcy court found Brown and Archer
inapplicable. 358 The creditors sued the debtor, along with the debtor’s
related corporate entities, for fraud and other causes of action in state
court. 359 Specifically, the creditors alleged that the defendants had induced
them to purchase a poorly constructed residence through fraud and other
wrongdoing. 360 Because the creditors never served the individual debtor,
however, the state court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the debtor. 361
The state court accordingly entered judgment against the corporate entities
but not the debtor. 362 While the case was on appeal, the defendants,
including the individual debtor, entered into a settlement agreement,
notwithstanding the state court’s prior ruling that the creditors had never
properly served the individual debtor. 363 The debtor then declared
bankruptcy. 364 The creditors then commenced an adversary proceeding,
seeking a declaration that the state court debt was nondischargeable.365
357. See In re Hackney, 2008 WL 4830040, at **1-2, 3-5, 10-12.
358. Bankruptcy No. 5:08-bk-73392, 2009 WL 1955294, at *4-5 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. July
6, 2009).
359. Id. at *1.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at *2.
365. Id. at *1.
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The bankruptcy court, notwithstanding Brown and Archer, ruled that it
could not look behind the settlement agreement. 366 It noted that, unlike in
Archer and Brown, there existed no underlying debt that initially resulted
from a lawsuit resolved by a settlement or stipulation.367 Although a
settlement agreement existed in the case, it did not arise from an underlying
debt; the creditors obtained a judgment from the debtor’s related corporate
entities, but did not obtain a judgment against the individual debtor.368
Because the court had dismissed the individual debtor from the underlying
lawsuit, the debt against the debtor first arose in the settlement agreement
itself. 369
The bankruptcy court therefore reasoned that, “[w]ithout an underlying
debt,” it could not “look beyond the settlement agreement; there was no
debt owed by [the debtor] prior to his entering into the settlement
agreement.” 370 As a result, rather than looking at whether the debtor
induced the creditors to purchase a shoddy house through fraud, the court
considered whether the debtor induced the creditors to enter the settlement
agreement through fraud, false pretenses, or false representations. 371
However, not all courts follow the reasoning of Cozart. For instance, in
Hodges v. Buzzeo (In re Buzzeo), the codebtor, like the debtor in Cozart,
was “not a party” to the prior litigation and “was not named as a
defendant,” but nonetheless “join[ed] as a party to the [s]ettlement
[a]greement” that was the subject of a nondischargeability proceeding. 372
The bankruptcy court, rather than inquiring whether the codebtor
committed fraud in entering the settlement agreement, instead inquired
whether the underlying debt had its genesis in fraud, and denied summary
judgment because the factual record was insufficient to reach that
conclusion. 373
Monsour v. Monsour (In re Monsour) is another case with unusual facts
in which a bankruptcy court concluded that claim preclusion was applicable
in a dischargeability proceeding notwithstanding Brown and Archer. 374 The
plaintiff-debtor and the defendant-creditor were spouses who filed for

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5-6.
365 B.R. 578, 583 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007).
Id. at 583-85.
372 B.R. 272, 277-79 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007).
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divorce in state court. 375 The plaintiff-debtor declared bankruptcy and
received a discharge before the state court entered a spousal support award,
but after the state court had entered a final decree of divorce. 376
After the plaintiff-debtor received his discharge, a state court
commissioner in chancery recommended that the plaintiff-debtor pay a
lump sum alimony payment to defendant-creditor in order to pay the
parties’ joint debts. 377 The plaintiff-debtor filed exceptions to the
commissioner’s report in which he “asserted that he received a discharge of
the lump sum obligation” in the bankruptcy case because “the lump sum
obligation constituted a property settlement,” which may be dischargeable
in bankruptcy, “and not spousal support,” which is generally
nondischargeable. 378 The state court overruled the plaintiff-debtor’s
exceptions. 379 The plaintiff-debtor then moved to reopen his bankruptcy
case and commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a declaration that the
lump sum obligation had been discharged.380
The bankruptcy court, with minimal discussion of Brown and Archer,
ruled that claim preclusion prevented the plaintiff-debtor from relitigating
whether the lump sum was dischargeable. 381 The bankruptcy court noted
that although “bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction to decide
exceptions to discharge that arise under” some subsections of Code section
523(a), “[b]ankruptcy courts and state courts maintain concurrent
jurisdiction to decide all other exceptions to discharge arising under Section
523(a), including Section 523(a)(5), which excepts from discharge any debt
to a spouse for alimony, support or maintenance made in connection with a
divorce decree.” 382 The court stated that the plaintiff-debtor “had an
opportunity to fully litigate dischargeability and any exceptions arising
under Section 523(a)(5) in state court proceedings because he filed
bankruptcy and received his discharge before the [state court] entered its
[d]ecree.” 383 Indeed, as noted above, the plaintiff-debtor “did, in fact, raise
the issue of dischargeability in the state court proceeding” in his challenge

375. Id. at 275.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 276.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. See id. at 277-79.
382. Id. at 278 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 523(a)(5) (1996); In re Crawford, 183 B.R.
103, 107 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a)).
383. Id. (citing Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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to the commissioner’s report.384 Therefore, the court held that claim
preclusion barred the plaintiff-debtor from relitigating whether the lump
sum was dischargeable in the adversary proceeding. 385
Thus, Monsour suggests that claim preclusion may apply in a
dischargeability proceeding, notwithstanding Brown and Archer, where the
exception to discharge at issue is one over which state courts share
concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts, and where the debtor
receives a discharge before the state court entered its judgment giving rise
to the debt in question. 386 However, even though the Monsour court ruled it
“need not determine the dischargeability of the lump sum obligation on [its]
merits,” 387 the court nevertheless proceeded to analyze the merits of
whether the debt was dischargeable in the plaintiff-debtor’s bankruptcy, 388
which suggests that the court’s claim preclusion ruling may be dicta.
Moreover, the Court did not explicitly analyze how its decision was
consistent with the Brown and Archer’s holdings that claim preclusion is
generally inapplicable in dischargeability proceedings. 389 Therefore, time
will tell whether Monsour represents a robust exception to Brown and
Archer.
(4) Extensions of Brown and Archer
Brown and Archer hold that claim preclusion is generally inapplicable in
nondischargeability proceedings, but a nondischargeability proceeding is
only one of many types of adversary proceedings a litigant may commence
in a bankruptcy case. Interestingly, a few courts have extended Brown and
Archer beyond the nondischargeability context by ruling that claim
preclusion may be inapplicable in other types of adversary proceedings.
In Vineyard v. Vineyard (In re Vineyard), the plaintiff filed an adversary
proceeding in the defendant-debtor’s bankruptcy case “seeking a
declaration that [the plaintiff was] the owner of certain property in the
possession of [the d]efendant or, in the alternative, imposition of a
constructive trust on assets of the [d]efendant.” 390 The plaintiff and the
defendant had previously engaged in state court litigation over certain life
insurance proceeds, and had entered into two settlement agreements
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id. at 282.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 277-79.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 279-82.
Id. at 277-78.
No. 10-63518-fra13, 2011 WL 306068, at *1 (Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 27, 2011).
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throughout the course of the litigation.391 The bankruptcy court noted that
the plaintiff was “seeking a determination of the ‘nature and extent of
property of the estate’” in the adversary proceeding, and observed that such
determinations are “a fundamental core bankruptcy function.”392 The
bankruptcy court, “analog[izing] to the holding in Archer v. Warner,” ruled
that it could “look ‘beyond the state-court record and the documents
terminating the state-court proceeding’ to determine [the p]laintiff’s interest
in property alleged by [the d]efendant to be property of the estate.”393 By
ruling that the bankruptcy court could look behind the terms of the
settlement agreements, the Vineyard court extended Brown and Archer
beyond the nondischargeability context into other adversary proceedings
that implicate a “fundamental core bankruptcy function.” 394 Time will tell
whether other courts follow the reasoning of Vineyard and expand Brown
and Archer beyond its original domain.
D. Intervening Change in the Law
As we have previously noted, claim preclusion bars not only claims that
were brought in a subsequent proceeding, but also claims that could have
and should have been brought in that prior proceeding. What happens when
a judicial decision comes down in between the two proceedings that
arguably provides the litigant with a new legal argument that was not
available or viable during the prior proceeding? Should claim preclusion
bar the litigant from raising that new argument?
In Dover v. United States (Dover II), 395 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said claim preclusion should indeed apply in
such a situation. Dover pled guilty to defrauding Sunbelt Federal Savings
(Sunbelt), a savings and loan institution.396 He was sentenced to two years
probation and ordered to pay $19.6 million in criminal restitution to the
FDIC. 397 Dover then filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7
391. Id. at **1, 3.
392. Id. at *4.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. 367 F. App'x 651 (6th Cir. 2010). Hereinafter this decision will be cited as Dover II,
for clarity. “Dover,” unitalicized, shall refer to the plaintiff-appellant in Dover II. We note
that as an unpublished decision, the precedential value of Dover II is limited. However, the
issues that it raises are of great interest, and its reasoning is sufficiently persuasive that other
courts may adopt the decision's logic.
396. Id. at 651.
397. Id. at 651-52. This is admittedly an oversimplification for the sake of clarity.
Initially, “[r]estitution was to be paid to the District Court Clerk for disbursement to” an
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of the Code. 398 “Instead of listing a governmental entity as the judgment
creditor on the schedules filed with the bankruptcy petition, Dover listed
[Sunbelt] in the amount of $19.6 million.” 399 The bankruptcy court entered
a discharge and closed the case.400
When Dover made no payments toward the criminal restitution, the
FDIC brought suit to collect the judgment 401 (Dover I 402). Dover sought to
avoid the FDIC’s collection efforts by arguing that the expiration of his
probation period relieved him of his duty to pay restitution, and that the
FDIC could not collect the criminal restitution levied against him because
he and the FDIC settled the civil judgment against him based on the same
acts. 403 The Sixth Circuit “rejected both arguments and granted the FDIC
summary judgment in the enforcement action, thereby holding that the
FDIC was entitled to execute on its nineteen million dollar restitution order
against Dover.” 404
Following Dover I, “Dover again sought to stop the attempts to collect
the restitution by filing a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against the
FDIC and the United States. Dover claimed this time that the criminal
restitution was discharged in his bankruptcy proceedings—a question that
was not specifically adjudicated in” Dover I. 405 The Sixth Circuit in Dover
II concluded that Dover could have raised the discharge issue in Dover I but
did not; therefore, Dover was barred by claim preclusion from raising it in
Dover II. 406
Dover argued, inter alia, that he could not have brought the discharge
argument in Dover I because an “argument regarding discharge was not a
viable argument until the Sixth Circuit rendered its decision in Hughes v.
Sanders several months after Dover I.” 407 In Hughes, the Sixth Circuit
entity known as “the Resolution Trust Corporation as a receiver for Sunbelt,” but “[l]ater, by
statute, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ('FDIC') succeeded to the Resolution
Trust Corporation's interest in restitution.” Id. at 652 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(m)(1)
(2006)).
398. Id. at 652.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. Again, we have simplified the procedural posture somewhat for clarity. See id.
402. FDIC v. Dover (Dover I), 453 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2006).
403. Dover II, 367 F. App’x at 652.
404. Id. (citing Dover I, 453 F.3d at 710).
405. Id.
406. Id. at 651-54.
407. Brief of Appellant at 10-11, Dover v. United States, 367 F. App'x 651 (6th Cir.
2010) (No. 08-6196), 2009 WL 1683546 [hereinafter Dover II Brief].
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interpreted Code section 523(a)(7), which renders any “fine, penalty, or
forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit” that is “not
compensation for actual pecuniary loss,” other than certain tax penalties,
nondischargeable in Chapter 7 liquidations.408 The Hughes court held that a
default judgment entered against a Chapter 7 debtor in a legal malpractice
action did not fall within section 523(a)(7)'s exception to dischargeability
because it constituted compensation for actual damages and was payable to
the plaintiff rather than to a governmental entity. 409 Dover argued that his
criminal restitution order was no different than the judgment deemed
dischargeable in Hughes, and therefore was discharged in his Chapter 7
case. 410 Dover further argued that Hughes marked a change or clarification
in the law that could not have been anticipated.411 Therefore, concluded
408. 469 F.3d 475, 477 (6th Cir. 2006).
409. Id. at 476-79.
410. Dover II Brief, supra note 407, at 7-8.
The Hughes Court held that [Code] § 523(a)(7) only provides an exception to
discharge for restitution orders that are payable both to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit. The Hughes Court further determined that when a judgment
amount is explicitly calculated to compensate the complainant for its damages,
such a judgment does not fall within the exception to discharge because it is
compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
In [Dover's] criminal case, the restitution was ordered payable to and for the
benefit of the defrauded victim . . . which was not a governmental unit. Also,
the restitution was compensation for actual pecuniary loss because it is the
precise amount of damages alleged by the victim.
Id. (citations omitted).
411. Id. at 12, 14, 18, 20.
In order to understand why Mr. Dover's claim that the restitution obligation was
discharged in bankruptcy is a valid claim and is a claim that was not available
in the prior litigation, it is important to first analyze the case that provides the
basis for that claim. The Hughes case is an interpretation and application of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Kelly v. Robinson . . . .
....
Courts have taken the Kelly decision in many different directions. With
respect to the requirement that the restitution be “payable to and for the benefit
of a governmental unit,” some courts have adopted Kelly's very broad
interpretation and have concluded that all restitution is, to some degree, for the
benefit of the state and, therefore, meets this criteria. Other courts have rejected
the Kelly approach, opting instead for a literal reading of the statute's
requirements. Some courts have determined that Kelly only applies to state
restitution orders. . . .
....
In summary, the decision in Hughes marked the first time the Sixth Circuit
had decided to narrowly interpret Kelly and [Code section] 523(a)(7) in such a
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Dover, he could not have raised this dischargeability argument in Dover I,
“because the Hughes decision had not been rendered and, accordingly, the
defense was not available, or 'ripe' for presentation.” 412
The Dover II court rejected Dover's argument. Although the Sixth
Circuit acknowledged that a change in the factual basis underlying a
litigant's claim can deprive a prior judgment of claim preclusive effect,413
the Sixth Circuit, citing an influential treatise, concluded “that a
clarification in the law” is not “the same as a change in facts . . . . [A]
change in the law is not a sufficient justification to avoid the res judicata
effect of the earlier judgment.” 414 Because the facts had not changed, Dover
I and Dover II involved identical causes of action, so the dischargeability
issue could have and should have been litigated in Dover I. 415
Alternatively, the Dover II court argued that Hughes did not actually
effect a change in the law at all:
[T]he law has not changed. At most, Hughes fills a small gap in
the law regarding federal restitution orders left by the Supreme
Court decision in Kelly v. Robinson, which held that state
criminal restitution orders are not dischargeable in federal
bankruptcy. Dover himself acknowledges that Hughes is “an
interpretation and application” of the Kelly decision. . . .
Additionally, the Kelly decision was handed down years
before Dover defended against the FDIC enforcement action, as
were the other Courts of Appeals cases cited by Dover on this
point. Consequently, Dover had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his discharge defense at that time. The Hughes decision

way as to support the argument that a federal restitution order can be
discharged in bankruptcy. For the first time, the Sixth Circuit endorsed an
interpretation of 523(a)(7) that comported with its plain language and that,
arguably, embraced the dissent in Kelly. . . .
....
. . . . Prior to Hughes, Mr. Dover did not have such a defense available to
him because that was not the state of the law in the Sixth Circuit.
Id. (citations omitted).
412. Id. at 10.
413. Dover II, 367 F. App'x at 653 (citing Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d
521, 529-30 (6th Cir. 2006); Kane v. Magna Mixer Co., 71 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 1995);
Katt v. Dykhouse, 983 F.2d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 1992)).
414. Id. at 653-54 (emphasis added) (citing 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4415 (2d ed. 2009)).
415. Id.
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does not excuse Dover's failure to make this argument in Dover
I. 416
The Dover II court therefore concluded that Dover's declaratory judgment
action was barred by claim preclusion.417
II. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel)
A. Definition
Many practitioners are familiar with the terms “collateral estoppel” and
“issue preclusion” because the two labels have historically been used
interchangeably. 418 As the latter is the more accurate term, this article will
exclusively utilize the term “issue preclusion” in lieu of the more antiquated
“collateral estoppel.” The Restatement (Second) of Judgments defines the
doctrine as follows:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined
by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential
to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim. 419
The doctrine is intended to conserve judicial resources and to protect the
adversaries of a party—and sometimes a non-party—from the expense and
vexation of facing multiple lawsuits.420 In other words, issue preclusion
prevents issues of ultimate fact from being re-litigated in a future lawsuit if
those issues have already been determined by a valid and final judgment. 421
This treatment effectively denies litigants a second bite at the apple,
conserving judicial resources and promoting consistency in judicial
decisions. 422 The “actually litigated” requirement of issue preclusion differs
from the claim preclusion doctrine, which prevents the litigation of an issue
416. Id. at 654.
417. Id.
418. Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 n.4 (2009) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980)).
419. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980). It should be noted that while
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides the general rule for issue preclusion, the
application of these elements vary depending from which underlying court the prior
judgment came as discussed below. Therefore, this rule, while certainly persuasive, is not
authoritative in all jurisdictions.
420. Berry v. Vollbracht (In re Vollbracht), 276 F. App’x 360, 365 (5th Cir. 2007).
421. Vines v. Univ. of La. at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 2005).
422. Melnor, Inc. v. Corey (In re Corey), 583 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2009).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/2

2015]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTOPPEL (VOL. II)

797

or cause of action that has never been litigated.423 In other words, whereas
claim preclusion bars the relitigation of any claim that was or could have
been litigated in a prior proceeding, issue preclusion bars any claim based
on facts that were actually litigated. 424
In Grogan v. Garner, the Supreme Court, while holding that a
preponderance of the evidence was the correct burden of proof under 11
U.S.C. § 523, clarified that the issue preclusion doctrine applies in
bankruptcy proceedings. 425 While this was the Court’s first formal
acknowledgment regarding the doctrine’s applicability to bankruptcy
proceedings, the Court noted that it was not inconsistent with prior holdings
under the Code and the former Bankruptcy Act. 426 This holding is also
consistent with the Full Faith and Credit Act, 427 which requires all federal
courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those
judgments would receive in the courts of the state from which such
judgments emerged. 428 Likewise, federal courts must give deference to
judgments from an underlying federal court.
For judgments in diversity cases, “federal law incorporates the rules of
preclusion applied by the State in which the rendering court sits.”429 Federal
common law governs the preclusive effect of a judgment issued by a federal
court sitting in diversity. 430 While bankruptcy courts are required to give
preclusive effect to final judgments entered by a state court, the bankruptcy
court retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a debt is
dischargeable.431 In the consumer bankruptcy context, the issue preclusion

423. Id.
424. Carlson, supra note 1, at 353.
425. 498 U.S. 279, 285 n.11 (“We now clarify that collateral estoppel principles do
indeed apply in discharge exception proceedings pursuant to § 523(a).”).
426. Id. (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 48 n.8 (1986); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S.
127, 139 n.10 (1979); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 736 (1946)).
427. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
428. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 284 n.11; Marciano v. Chapnick (In re Marciano), 708 F.3d
1123, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013); Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 2011)
(citing Raju v. Rhodes, 7 F.3d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1993)).
429. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 n.4 (2008) (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001)).
430. Semtek Int’l Inc., 531 U.S. at 508.
431. 11 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 283–85, 291; Gupta v. E. Idaho
Tumor Inst., Inc. (In re Gupta), 394 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a bankruptcy
court may apply issue preclusion to prevent re-litigation of findings relevant to
dischargeability, but the ultimate determination of whether a debt is dischargeable is a
federal question); Caton v. Trudeau (In re Caton), 157 F.3d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1998)
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doctrine arises most frequently in situations involving a debtor’s
discharge. 432
B. Recent Developments
This section will discuss the current state of the issue preclusion doctrine
with particular focus on current developments as it applies to consumer
bankruptcy cases. When initiating an issue preclusion analysis, it is
necessary to first determine in which court the underlying judgment
originated to establish the specific elements needed to satisfy the rule.
While federal common law—as well as the majority of states—generally
rely on the Restatement (Second)’s interpretation of issue preclusion, a
body of common law has since developed based on unique jurisdictional
interpretations of the general rule.433
1. The Underlying Judgment: What Elements Apply?434
The first step in an issue preclusion analysis is to determine from which
jurisdiction the underlying judgment stems. This step is important to
establish the required elements in an issue preclusion argument. For
example, the preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by
(“[Issue preclusion] applies in bankruptcy dischargeability proceedings, but the bankruptcy
court retains exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a debt is dischargeable.”).
432. In particular, adversary proceedings objecting to a debtor’s discharge pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6).
433. In addition to common law interpretations, some states have codified their rendition
of the issue preclusion doctrine. It is imperative to adhere strictly to the preclusion rule
adopted by the state that issued the underlying judgment when conducting an issue
preclusion analysis. The occasional misstatement of an applicable preclusion rule creates
conflicting case law and misleads the court.
To illustrate, at least two Louisiana appellate courts declined to recognize the doctrine of
issue preclusion at all. Regions Bank v. Weber, 2010-1169, pp. 8-9 n.4 (La. App. 4 Cir.
12/15/10); 53 So. 3d 1284, 1290 n.4 (“We distinguish equitable estoppel and [issue
preclusion], and emphasize that Louisiana law does not recognize the doctrine of [issue
preclusion].”); Alonzo v. Louisiana, 2002-0257, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/04); 884 So. 2d
634, 639 (“With regards to [issue preclusion], it is imperative that we restate that Louisiana
law does not recognize this doctrine.”). But “Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4231 embraces
the broad usage of the phrase ‘res judicata’ to include both claim preclusion (res judicata)
and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).” Williams v. Williams, 2006-1471, p. 3 (La. App.
1 Cir. 2/9/07); 2007 WL 437767, at *3; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231(3) (2012);
Foley v. Entergy La., Inc., 06-0983, p. 15 n.4 (La. 11/29/06); 946 So. 2d 144, 156 n.4
(“While it is true that LSA-R.S. 13:4231(3) adopts issue preclusion in Louisiana, its
application is strictly limited to narrowly defined circumstances.”).
434. In this section, we will attempt to bring clarity to the complexity of the doctrine and
the confusion associated with its application.
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federal principles of issue preclusion,435 whereas particular state-court
requirements may differ by jurisdiction. Indeed, federal common law
governs the preclusive effect of a prior decision rendered by a federal court
sitting in diversity. 436 As discussed above, federal common law on issue
preclusion generally conforms to the rule outlined in the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments. 437 Thus, a bankruptcy court’s final order should
warrant the same preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings whether it be
a bankruptcy proceeding or otherwise.438
The finality of a particular bankruptcy order depends on the proceeding
or controversy that it was designed to resolve, rather than its effect on the
entire bankruptcy proceeding. The “flexible finality” of a bankruptcy order
is not a concept that is easily grasped. 439 In fact, the flexible finality rule
may ultimately become a rigid reality for a party that elects to delay the
appellate process. 440
It is well-settled that federal courts must give state court judgments the
same preclusive effect they would have in the courts of the rendering

435. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (citing Semtek Int’l Inc., 531 U.S. at
507-08); Foster v. City of El Paso, 308 F. App’x 811, 812 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. McKinney, 936 S.W. 2d 279, 281 (Tex. 1996)); Ball v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2006).
436. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376 n.6 (2011) (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. with
approval); Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. v. Terra XXI, Ltd., 583 F.3d 348, 353 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citing Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1325 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981)).
437. A judgment is preclusive in federal court if: (1) the prior or federal decision resulted
in a judgment on the merits; (2) the same fact issue was litigated in that court; and (3) the
issue’s disposition was necessary to the prior action’s outcome. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891;
Ball, 451 F.3d at 69 (citing Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003)); Fin.
Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Am. Home
Assur. Co. v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 400 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 2005)).
438. While this statement seems axiomatic as to the preclusive effect of bankruptcy court
orders, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Stern v. Marshall, Executive Benefits
Insurance Agency v. Arkison, and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif present a
potential problem. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); Exec.
Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594
(2011); see also infra Part IV.D. Hence, as will be discussed, perhaps “may warrant” is a
more appropriate statement.
439. A problem Part IV.C.1 infra seeks to remedy.
440. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. NA, v. Pac. Lumber Co. (In re SCOPAC), 624 F.3d 274,
281 (5th Cir. 2010), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 649 F.3d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 2011)
(discussing whether it is prudent to upset a chapter 11 plan of reorganization thereby
affecting third-party rights when a period of time has passed after its implementation)
(citations omitted).
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state. 441 The preclusive effect of prior state court proceedings on federal
proceedings is determined by the treatment the state court judgment would
receive in the courts of the state in which those prior proceedings were
held. 442 So while it may be true that most circuit courts (and federal courts
for that matter) follow the Restatement (Second) of Judgment’s approach to
determine the preclusive nature of a prior judgment, it is important to
remember that state courts within a circuit may base their decision to
preclude an issue using a slightly different approach to the general rule,
which, as mentioned above, will govern even the highest of federal
courts. 443
Therefore, a prudent practitioner should be careful not to instinctively
cite a case from an otherwise mandatory authority when making an issue
preclusion argument without first determining to which forum’s law the
court is adhering. This initial determination is not only important to
establish the correct rule of law but also to shed light on the relative weight
an underlying jurisdiction may lend to a particular element in an issue
preclusion analysis. It is for these reasons that each element of issue
preclusion and their current interpretations are discussed in detail below.
2. Valid and Final Judgment
The determination of whether an issue must be precluded from litigation
in a subsequent action is dependent on the existence of a “valid and final”
judgment, regarding the same subject matter, issued by a previous court. 444
A judgment is “valid” if a court of competent jurisdiction 445 renders a
decision affecting an entity that has either submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court or has been given adequate notice and the court has territorial
441. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.11 (1991);
Intervest Nat’l Bank v. Welch, 491 F. App’x 322, 325 (3d Cir. 2012); Vasquez v. YII
Shipping Co., 692 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 2012); White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d
918, 926 (9th Cir. 2012); Capital City Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 632 F.3d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 2011)
(applying Mississippi law to determine the preclusive effect of a prior Mississippi state court
conviction on subsequent bankruptcy proceedings); Plunk v. Yaquinto (In re Plunk), 481
F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Texas law to determine the preclusive effect of a
Texas state court judgment on subsequent bankruptcy proceedings); Raspanti v. Keaty (In re
Keaty), 397 F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that because the underlying judgment
was from a Louisiana state court, Louisiana issue preclusion rules must apply).
442. B.B. v. Bradley (In re Bradley), 466 B.R. 582, 586 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012);
Honkanen v. Hopper (In re Honkanen), 446 B.R. 373, 382 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); Norris v.
Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 460-61 (5th Cir. 2007).
443. See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 284 n.11.
444. Vines v. Univ. of La. at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 2005).
445. See infra Part II.D for another issue involving the competency of bankruptcy courts.
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jurisdiction over the action. 446 A judgment is “final” if the prior
adjudication of an issue is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded
conclusive effect. 447 A judgment is “sufficiently firm” if:
[T]he court should determine that the decision to be carried over
was adequately deliberated and firm, even if not final in the
sense of forming a basis for a judgment already entered. Thus
preclusion should be refused if the decision was avowedly
tentative. On the other hand, that the parties were fully heard,
that the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, that
the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on
appeal, are factors supporting the conclusion that the decision is
final for the purpose of preclusion. The test of finality, however,
is whether the conclusion in question is procedurally definite and
not whether the court might have had doubts in reaching the
decision. 448
The standards for determining the finality of bankruptcy court orders differ
from those applicable to orders stemming from litigation outside the
bankruptcy context. 449 Indeed, “[f]inality is a fairly strict concept in most
federal litigation,” 450 such that a federal-court action is treated “as a ‘single
judicial unit’ from which only one appeal can be made.” 451 Generally,
parties “must wait for the entire case to be disposed of before taking an
appeal.” 452 However, bankruptcy courts are not so constrained. 453
446. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 (1982).
447. Id. § 13 (emphasis added).
448. Haber v. Biomet, Inc., 578 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982) with approval); Greenway Ctr., Inc. v. Essex Ins. Co.,
475 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 2007) (same).
449. Ades-Berg Investors v. Breeden (In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.), 439 F.3d 155,
160 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sonnax Indus., Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp. (In re
Sonnax Indus., Inc.), 907 F.2d 1280, 1283 (2d Cir. 1990)).
450. In re McKinney, 610 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2010).
451. Pinpoint IT Servs., LLC v. Rivera (In re Atlas IT Exp. Corp.), 761 F.3d 177, 181
(1st Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir. 1983)).
452. In re McKinney, 610 F.3d at 401-02 (citing Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558
U.S. 100 (2009)).
453. In re Atlas IT Exp. Corp., 761 F.3d at 182 (“[I]n the world of bankruptcy, ‘final’
does not just describe the last order entered at the case’s end—you know, the one ‘that
ultimately disposes of all the debtor’s assets on the basis (perhaps) of the results of many
individual proceedings and controversies taking place over many years within the context of
the overall bankruptcy case.’”) (quoting Tringali v. Hathaway Mach. Co., 796 F.2d 553, 558
(1st Cir. 1986)).
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The need for different standards arises because a bankruptcy case is an
umbrella under which several contested matters and adversary proceedings
may be litigated simultaneously. Proceedings between two third parties may
come within the bankruptcy court’s subject-matter authority based upon
only a tangential relationship to the debtor. 454 Even so, the outcome in such
cases may affect the overarching bankruptcy case sufficiently to delay an
appeal of a final order. 455 Conversely, even if the debtor litigates such a
proceeding as a named party, a decision may be unreviewable if appellate
jurisdiction exists only at the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding. 456
These two situations comport with the general “finality” requirement in
federal law, but because bankruptcy cases, quote, often live on for many
years, courts “take a flexible approach to finality . . . giving that
requirement a ‘practical’ rather than a ‘technical’ construction.” 457
An area of finality peculiar to bankruptcy is plan confirmation. The
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank resolved a
split among circuit courts by holding that an order denying plan
confirmation is not “final” for purposes of appeal. 458 In doing so, the
Supreme Court noted that while an ordinary civil litigation case in federal
454. In re Bennett Funding Grp, Inc., 439 F.3d at 160 (quoting In re Sonnax Indus., Inc.,
907 F.2d at 1283). Such third parties may be caught in the “large net case by ‘related to’
jurisdiction,” which exists if “the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any
effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Frisia Hartley, L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (In re Talsma), 509 B.R. 535, 542 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014) (quoting Celotex
Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307 n.6 (1995)).
455. Or, as is often the case, the appeal of the district court’s final order after de novo
review of the bankruptcy court’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See 28
U.S.C. § 157(c) (2012); Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173
(2014). Such a stay may be available under the bankruptcy court’s broad authority under 11
U.S.C. § 105(a). Cf. Celotex, 514 U.S. at passim.
456. See In re Bennett Funding Grp., 439 F.3d at 160.
457. In re Atlas IT Exp. Corp., 761 F.3d at 182 (quoting In re Parque Forestal, Inc., 949
F.3d 504, 508 (1st Cir. 1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000); Gillespi v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379
U.S. 148, 152 (1964), overruled in part on other grounds by Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.
v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000)) (internal punctuation omitted).
As examples of the longevity of bankruptcy cases, the bankruptcy case of chemical maker
W.R. Grace & Co. was filed on April 2, 2001, and remained open for more than twelve
years. Peg Brickley, 5 Takeaways From the W.R. Grace Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. BLOG
(Feb. 3, 2014, 6:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/02/03/5-takeaways-from-the-w-rgrace-bankruptcy/. Likewise, the chapter 11 bankruptcy case for Mirant Corp., filed in July
2003, remains open as of the date of publication. In re Mirant Corp., No. 03-46590-dml11
(Bankr. N.D. Tex filed July 14, 2003).
458. 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015).
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district court typically culminates in a final decision, at which point a
district court disassociates itself from such case, a bankruptcy case involves
“an aggregation of individual controversies” that stand independent of the
larger case itself. 459 One such “individual controversy” is an order denying
confirmation. The Court held that the denial of confirmation with leave to
amend “changes little” in terms of a debtor’s bankruptcy case. “The
automatic stay persists. The parties’ rights and obligations remain unsettled.
The trustee continues to collect funds from the debtor in anticipation of a
different plan’s eventual confirmation. The possibility of discharge lives on.
‘Final’ does not describe this state of affairs.” 460
The Supreme Court noted that 11 U.S.C. § 158(a) authorizes appeals “as
of right not only from final judgments in cases but from ‘final judgments,
orders, and decrees . . . in cases and proceedings,’” which demonstrates the
difficulty in applying a rigid formula of finality in the bankruptcy
context.461 It is for this reason that the “valid and final” judgment
requirement is slightly more flexible for purposes of bankruptcy court
orders. 462 Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure afford
bankruptcy courts discretion to grant an appeal taken by leave of court.463
Given this “flexible” standard, a final judgment does not have to dispose of
all matters involved in a bankruptcy proceeding in order to have a
preclusive effect.464 This flexibility is especially important because it
provides finality to bankruptcy court orders for purposes of appeal or
preclusion prior to the disposition of the entire case, which may take
years. 465 Although the concept of finality “still suffers from a lack of
clarity” 466 in the bankruptcy context, the Seventh Circuit has noted that:
While perhaps a contradiction in terms, the concept of flexible
finality is based both on the traditional approach to bankruptcy
459. Id. at 1691-92.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 1692 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2012)).
462. The “valid and final” judgment requirement is also more flexible in an issue
preclusion analysis than it is under a claim preclusion analysis. See Klein, supra note 1, at
853; cf. supra Part I.
463. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012).
464. Pye v. Dep’t of Transp. of Ga., 513 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1975); Guion v. Sims (In
re Sims), 479 B.R. 415, 421 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012).
465. Additionally, a bankruptcy court order may be considered a “valid and final”
judgment even if such order is pending on appeal. See In re Sims, 479 B.R. at 421 (citing
Pye, 513 F.2d at 292); cf. S.P. Auto Sales, Inc. v. Benites (In re Benites), No. 11-35444SGJ-7, 2012 WL 4793469, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2012).
466. In re Comdisco, Inc., 538 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 2008).
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proceedings and the commonsense understanding that the
breadth of bankruptcy cases necessitates an approach that allows
for the efficient resolution of certain discrete disputes that may
arise in a given bankruptcy. 467
The importance of this initial element of an issue preclusion argument
should not be overlooked. Indeed, failing to properly establish whether a
“valid and final” judgment exists could be detrimental to a practitioner’s
argument. Therefore, when developing an issue preclusion argument,
practitioners should be mindful of the flexible nature of bankruptcy court
orders and tailor their arguments accordingly. Moreover, as is often argued,
practitioners should be mindful of the overlay of powers available under
§ 105(a) of the Code for a court to fashion equitable relief.468
3. The Litigation Requirement
Inherent to the doctrine of issue preclusion is the requirement that an
individual be afforded the opportunity to be heard prior to the rendering of
a judgment to which he or she may later be bound. Thus, as a matter of
practice, certain judgments will not support the application of issue
preclusion in subsequent litigation because the issues were never “actually
litigated” in the first place. 469
While an issue need not be thoroughly litigated to satisfy this
requirement, a showing must be made that “the parties disputed the issue
and the trier of fact resolved it.” 470 This determination may seem like a
formality at first blush, but this term of art has been interpreted and applied
differently depending on the jurisdiction. Indeed, the litigation requirement
has become particularly relevant in circumstances when an issue of fact or
law has been previously waived or when addressing judgments previously
entered by confession, consent, or default.
a) Waiver
Waiver is a developing topic within the “actually litigated” requirement.
In Clark v. Zwanziger (In re Zwanziger), the Tenth Circuit considered the
“novel question” of whether a bankruptcy court must give preclusive effect
to a district court’s final determination that a party waived an issue.471 In
467. In re McKinney, 610 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 2010).
468. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
469. Klein, supra note 1, at 854.
470. Gambino v. Koonce, 757 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Harmon v. Gordon,
712 F.3d 1044, 1055 n.4 (7th Cir. 2013)).
471. 741 F.3d 74, 75 (10th Cir. 2014).
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that case, plaintiffs sued their former employer for fraud and violations of
certain state wage laws and requested additional damages for emotional
distress. 472 The plaintiffs’ included their request for damages based on
emotional distress in their complaint but failed to list such damages in the
final pretrial order.473 Notwithstanding the omission, the jury ruled in favor
of plaintiffs and ultimately awarded them a combined sum of $573,000.474
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict on liability, but
held that the plaintiffs waived their right to damages for emotional distress
by failing to include them in the pretrial order. 475 In so holding, the court
noted that it could not determine what portion of the award was attributable
to damages for emotional distress and remanded the case back to the district
court to re-calculate damages. 476 Before the district court could recalculate
damages, the defendant filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy. 477 Shortly thereafter,
the plaintiffs filed an adversary in the defendant-debtor’s bankruptcy case
to determine how much of the liability was nondischargeable. 478
The bankruptcy court determined that it was not bound by the remand
instructions and awarded plaintiffs $181,300 in nondischargeable damages
of which $50,000 was attributable to damages for emotional distress.479 The
defendant-debtor appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP)
arguing that claim preclusion prevented the bankruptcy court from
including damages for emotional distress.480 The BAP determined that the
issue of whether plaintiffs waived emotional distress damages was fully and
finally litigated in the circuit court and therefore binding on any subsequent
court. 481 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the BAP decision and held
that “[a] finding that an issue of fact or law is waived is not a decision on
the merits” and therefore not afforded preclusive effect in a subsequent
case.482
472. Id. at 76.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id. (citing Hamilton v. Water Whole Int'l Corp., 302 F. App’x 789, 797 (10th Cir.
2008) (“[D]amages not included in the pretrial order are waived even if they appeared in the
complaint.”)).
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id. The BAP held that claim preclusion did not apply, but determined that issue
preclusion did. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
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Although the case law is scant, Zwanziger represents a logical approach
to the preclusive nature of a prior court’s determination that a party waived
his or her argument. That is, “[w]here there has been no hearing [on the
merits], and therefore no findings, there can be no issue preclusion.” 483
Thus, “waiver as a general matter is a procedural determination that
governs only the case in which it is made—not another case—except in the
rare instance when waiver is imposed as a sanction intended to preclude
future litigation of that substantive issue.” 484
b) Settlement Agreements and Consent Judgments
Compared to the evolving authority on waiver, settlement agreements
and consent judgments are typically favored by courts as a means of
resolving costly disputes. Indeed, such agreed decisions are “useful
device[s] to resolve disputes and are as much of an adjudication for
purposes of applying the principle of judgment preclusion as any other final
judgment.” 485 Courts will often look to the intent of the parties to determine
whether such agreement or judgment should be afforded preclusive
effect. 486 Thus, to attain preclusive effect, settlement agreements and
consent judgments must also satisfy the “actually litigated” requirement.
The majority of courts have held that an agreed judgment is afforded the
same preclusive effect that a judgment on the merits entered at the end of a
trial is afforded.487

483. Id. at 78 (quoting Borges Colon v. Roman-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2006)).
484. Id. (citing Melnor, Inc. v. Corey (In re Corey), 583 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir.
2009)).
485. Bowers v. Bd. of Appeals, 448 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
486. Blacksmith Invs., Inc. v. Woodford (In re Woodford), 418 B.R. 644, 652 (B.A.P. 1st
Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen considering a consent judgment founded upon an agreement of the
parties, the court must examine the issue of ‘intention’ when determining whether the
‘actually litigated’ requirement of [issue preclusion] has been fulfilled.”).
487. Plunk v. Yaquinto, Jr. (In re Plunk), 481 F.3d 302, 308 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that
agreed judgments in Texas have the same degree of finality and binding force as judgments
reached at the end of adversary proceedings); Diamond Fields, L.L.C. v. Rankin Cnty., No.
3:09-CV-00451, 2011 WL 8198518, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2011) (“[C]onsent
judgments receive the same force as regular judgments, in binding parties under [issue
preclusion].”); Chaisson v. Cent. Crane Serv., 2010-0112, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/29/10); 44
So.3d 883, 886 (noting that while the doctrine of issue preclusion is ordinarily premised on a
final judgment on the merits, it also applies where the opposing parties enter into a
compromise or settlement of a disputed matter).
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c) Traditional v. Post-Answer Default Judgments
The preclusive effect of a default judgment generally hinges on the
parties’ level of participation in the initial lawsuit that gave rise to the
default judgment. A traditional default judgment contains no specific
findings but simply an unopposed judgment. In most jurisdictions, such a
naked default judgment does not satisfy the “actually litigated”
requirement. Indeed, the majority of courts have held that a traditional
default judgment lacks the “actually litigated” prong because it is not a
“judgment on the merits” and therefore has no preclusive effect on
subsequent hearings. 488
Despite this majority position, a bankruptcy court may be forced to reach
a different result where the underlying state law dictates that a traditional
default judgment has preclusive effect. Some state appellate courts have
suggested that a default judgment “imports absolute verity, and is as
effectual and binding as if pronounced upon a trial upon the merits.” 489
Courts following this approach place less emphasis on whether an issue was
“actually litigated” and instead focus on whether a default judgment
constitutes a final judgment on the merits. 490
Post-answer default judgments are less controversial. Courts generally
afford preclusive effect to a post-answer default judgment. For example, in
Harrison v. Kiwi Services, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that issue preclusion
was proper “where the defendant’s answer places the merits of the
plaintiff’s cause of action at issue, where judgment cannot be entered on the
pleadings, and therefore, where a plaintiff in such a case must offer
evidence to prove his case is more than just a garden variety default
judgment.” 491 In fact, the majority of courts agree that a post-answer default

488. See, e.g., Gessin v. Taitano (In re Gessin), Nos. 12-1330-JuKiD, NV-11-51818,
2013 WL 829095, at *5-6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2013) (noting that default judgments are
generally not entitled to preclusive effect). But see Clarke v. Latimer (In re Latimer), No.
14-0004, 2014 WL 2441469, at *2 (Bankr. D. Haw. May 29, 2014) (noting that Idaho law
gives preclusive effect to unopposed default judgments); Voss v. Pujdak (In re Pujdak), 462
B.R. 560, 568-69 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011).
489. TransDulles Ctr., Inc. v. Sharma, 472 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Va. 1996) (quoting Neale v.
Utz, 75 Va. 480, 488 (1881)); see also Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 627 A.2d 374, 379
(Conn. 1993).
490. Dominquez v. Elias (In re Elias), 302 B.R. 900, 912 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003)
(quoting Olson v. Kirkham, 720 P.2d 217, 220 (Idaho 1986)).
491. 180 F. App’x 485, 487 (citing Garner v. Lehrer (In re Garner), 56 F.3d 677, 680
(5th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998)).
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judgment should be afforded preclusive effect.492 When the default occurs
post-answer, the litigant has engaged the judicial process sufficiently to
invoke the “fully and fairly litigated” prong. 493
4. Same Facts and Legal Standard
In addition to a “valid and final” judgment, that was “actually litigated”
in a prior hearing, the underlying facts and legal standard used to assess
those facts must be the same in both proceedings for an issue to be afforded
preclusive effect.494 Thus, while the underlying factual setting in both
matters may be the same, if the legal standard to be applied is different in
each, the issues are not identical and issue preclusion should not apply. 495
Most courts appear to agree with the underlying rule, although some courts
are stricter than others in its application.
A prior court’s determination regarding a defendant’s liability (or, in a
criminal proceeding, culpability) stemming from a cause of action or charge
will not result in per se preclusivity, regardless of whether the underlying
cause of action is identical in name to one that appears in the Code (e.g.,
fraud, embezzlement, or larceny). 496 Indeed, bankruptcy courts within the
Fifth Circuit have consistently applied a narrow interpretation of certain
elements and causes of action. 497
492. Gamble-Ledbetter v. Andra Grp., L.P. (In re Gamble-Ledbetter), 419 B.R. 682, 694
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that a consent or agreed judgment is effectively a written
agreement and adjudication of an issue between parties and is as conclusive as any other
judgment); Gilleylen v. Evans (In re Evans), 252 B.R. 366, 371 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2000)
(“In Mississippi, the application of the doctrine of [issue preclusion] can clearly be
predicated on a previous default judgment.”); Crain v. Limbaugh (In re Limbaugh), 155 B.R.
952, 956 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
493. In re Limbaugh, 155 B.R. at 955–57.
494. Fin. Acquisition Partners L.P. v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2006); see
also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288-91 (1991).
495. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 284-85 (noting that if a clear-and-convincing standard, and not
a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, is applied in nondischargeability proceedings,
“the prior judgment could not be given collateral estoppel effect”); S.P. Auto Sales, Inc. v.
Benites (In re Benites), No. 11-35444-SGJ-7, 2012 WL 4793469, at *1 n.4 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. Oct. 9, 2012) (citing RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1291 (5th Cir.
1995)).
496. Gupta v. E. Idaho Tumor Inst., Inc. (In re Gupta), 394 F.3d 347, 349-50 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that a bankruptcy court may apply preclusion to findings relevant to
dischargeability, but the ultimate determination of whether a debt is dischargeable, is a
federal question).
497. See, e.g., Guerra & Moore Ltd., L.L.P. v. Cantu (In re Cantu), 389 F. App’x 342,
345 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Despite similarities in the language used to describe an injury under
[s]ection 523(a)(6) and intentional torts, [s]ection 523(a)(6) creates a narrower category of
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Issue preclusion may also not apply when a prior court fails to designate
the legal standard used to determine the underlying judgment. At least one
bankruptcy court has declined to apply preclusion of a state court judgment
because the state court did not specifically list findings of fact or which
legal standard was used to support a judgment. 498 Such a conclusion is
logical because the later court cannot discern whether the earlier court
determined if even a minimal burden was satisfied.
What make less sense are the decisions where the earlier court applied a
higher legal standard. While it would seem logical for a court to give
deference to a prior court’s decision that was determined using a higher
burden of proof than is needed in a subsequent proceeding, the results have
been mixed. Several courts have concluded that a prior judgment decided
by a higher legal standard may not satisfy a strict interpretation of the
“same legal standard” test in a subsequent proceeding. 499
Therefore, creditors’ attorneys should fully investigate both the facts and
legal standard used to determine whether a prior judgment may preclude a
debtor from re-litigating facts that may be helpful to attaining a
nondischargeable debt. Debtors’ attorneys or trustees would be served by
scrutinizing prior judgments to look for broad interpretations and differing
standards of law.

tortious conduct.”) (quoting Williams v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 520 (In re
Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 509 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re
Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1998) (“While the definition of ‘fiduciary’ under
§ 523(a)(4) is controlled by federal common law rather than Texas law, it is clear that the
federal common law definition is even narrower than the Texas definition.”).
498. In re Benites, 2012 WL 4793469, at *1 (“[S]ince there were no findings or
reasoning whatsoever set forth in the State Court Judgment . . . there was no basis to allow
the court to conclude, as a matter of law, that the State Court Judgment was
nondischargeable . . . .”).
499. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Prince (In re Prince), No. 09-43627, 2011 WL
861114, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2011) (finding that application of the issue
preclusion doctrine was warranted when a prior court found fraud using a “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard while bankruptcy proceedings, in contrast, only require the lower
standard of preponderance of evidence). Cf. Knott v. Donahoe, No. 3:11-CV-00256-CWRFKB, 2011 WL 6399920, at *3 n.29 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2011) (“[T]here is a different
burden of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) in the criminal proceeding from the burden of
proof (preponderance) to be employed in these civil proceedings resulting from the instant
Complaint. That fact alone precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”)
(citing Lanier v. Oktibbeha Cnty. Hosp., No. CIV.A.1:95CV206-D-D, 1996 WL 671361, at
*4 n.7 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 1996)).
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5. The Facts Were Essential to the Prior Judgment
In addition to being the same facts as in the earlier judgment, the facts
must also have been essential to the outcome of the earlier judgment. A
subsequent judgment would expand the holding of an earlier judgment if
preclusive effect were given to dicta and other irrelevant facts. Courts have
historically required a clear and coherent holding from the prior court for
such judgment to be afforded preclusive effect. 500 This substantive
evaluation usually amounts to a fact-specific determination made by the
reviewing court.
Such determinations may become increasingly complex where both a
civil and criminal proceeding predate the bankruptcy court’s determination
of whether a debt is nondischargeable. The decision in Fitch v. Fitch (In re
Fitch) provides an interesting example. 501 There, the bankruptcy court had
to determine whether to afford preclusive effect to a no-answer default
judgment or a criminal restitution order in a nondischargeability proceeding
brought under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and (7). 502
The facts in Fitch are relatively straightforward. The debtor-defendant
entered into agreement to sell his late mother’s house for $150,000 to a
company owned by his business partner. 503 Around the same time, the
business partner contracted to sell the house to a third party for $275,000. 504
Both transactions closed on January 7, 1997. 505 Almost three years later, in
August 2000, the brother of the debtor-defendant became guardian of his
late-mother’s estate (the Guardian) and sued the debtor-defendant in
probate court over the house transactions alleging fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty. 506 The debtor-defendant failed to respond, and the probate
court entered a no-answer default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.507 In
doing so, the probate court awarded damages for breach of fiduciary duties,
500. Tex. Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l, Inc., 951 F.2d 684, 691 (5th Cir.
1992) (declining to give preclusive effect to a prior decision that “wallows in a pig sty of
confusion”); see also Olstowski v. Petroleum Analyzer Co., L.P. (In re ATOM Instrument
Corp.), 478 B.R. 252, 261 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding that where there are alternative
plausible bases for a prior decision, issue preclusion will not bar the relitigation of the same).
501. 349 B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
502. Id. at 135-36.
503. Id. at 136. Prior to her death, the mother of the debtor-defendant had executed a
power of attorney appointing the debtor-defendant as her agency with respect to the
mother’s property, including her house. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
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constructive fraud, and statutory fraud (the Default Judgment). 508 Shortly
thereafter, the State of Texas brought a criminal complaint against the
debtor-defendant relating to the house transactions. 509 As part of a plea
bargain, the debtor-defendant pled guilty to second-degree theft and was
ordered to pay $150,000 in restitution (the Restitution Order).510
Two years after the Restitution Order, the debtor-defendant filed for
chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing the Default Judgment as being contingent and
of an unknown amount. 511 The Guardian-brother filed an adversary
proceeding on behalf of his mother’s estate to declare the Default Judgment
to be non-dischargeable. 512 The Guardian filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the debtor-defendant’s guilty plea to second degree
theft “involved the same conduct which formed the basis” for the damages
awarded in the Default Judgment. 513 Thus, the Guardian argued, the finding
of second-degree theft was equivalent to common law larceny in federal
courts, which is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). 514
Effectively, the Guardian attempted to bolster the Default Judgment with
the Restitution Order to bootstrap his § 523(a)(4) claim. 515 But the
bankruptcy court segregated the two earlier judgments and analyzed them
separately. 516 While controversy existed as to whether the Restitution Order
was “actually litigated,” the bankruptcy court declined to afford the Default
Judgment preclusive effect.517 Breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud,
and statutory fraud all require different elements than the criminal charge to
which the debtor-defendant pled guilty. 518 As a result, the Guardian could
not demonstrate that the elements of larceny under § 523(a)(4) were
essential to the probate court’s findings of fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty. 519 Accordingly, the Default Judgment—aside from being a no-answer

508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.

Id.
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 137-39.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 136-38.
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 143.
Id.
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default judgment—had no preclusive effect with respect to fraud for the
purpose of dischargeability. 520
Fitch demonstrates several critical steps in the preclusion analysis. First,
the decision shows that a prior judgment cannot be used to establish the
preclusive effect of a subsequent judgment without a showing that the facts
are essential to the court’s determination of the second judgment. Second,
the analysis shows the difficulty of aligning fraud elements under state law
and federal law concerning dischargeability. And, finally, although not
directly on-point, the decision also demonstrates a situation where a
criminal judgment (the Restitution Order) may provide grounds for a
subsequent nondischargeability action, assuming the elements align and the
court will afford preclusive effect to the higher burden of proof.
As to this second lesson from Fitch—the difficulty of aligning elements
under state and federal law—a line of cases under § 523(a)(6) provides
another example. Section 523(a)(6) of the Code excepts from discharge any
debt for “willful and malicious injury by [a] debtor to another entity or to
the property of another entity.” 521 The Supreme Court has defined a
“willful” injury as “a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a
deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.” 522 The authority has split
as to what level of culpability Geiger requires under § 523(a)(6). 523
The split of authority turns on from whose perspective “willful and
malicious” is adjudged. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have interpreted
Geiger to require a subjective standard—that is, the debtor “must have
wished to cause injury or at least believed it was substantially certain to

520. Id. Ultimately, the parties agreed that the Restitution Order was non-dischargeable.
Id. at 138. The bankruptcy court held that the mother’s estate was entitled to recover the
$150,000 under the Restitution Order. Id. at 143.
521. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012).
522. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
523. Compare Via Christi Reg'l. Med. Ctr. v. Englehart (In re Englehart), No. 99–3339,
2000 WL 1275614, at *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 8, 2000) (adopting a subjective standard);
Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 465 n.10 (6th Cir. 1999) (same);
Johnson v. Davis (In re Davis), 262 B.R. 663, 670-71 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001) (same); and
KMK Factoring, L.L.C. v. McKnew (In re McKnew), 270 B.R. 593, 634–41 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 2001) (same); with Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 606 (5th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999) (adopting an objective standard); Baldwin v.
Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 245 B.R. 131, 136 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) (same); and J. Bowers
Constr. Co. v. Williams (In re Williams), 233 B.R. 398, 405 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999)
(same); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (adopting a subjective
standard).
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occur.” 524 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a lesser standard,
requiring only that the injury have been made with “either an objective
substantial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm.” 525
Thus, “[t]he key difference between the Miller and Markowitz holdings is
that Markowitz followed the Restatement's requirement that the debtor
believe that his actions will with substantial certainty cause injury, while in
Miller the subjective belief of the debtor as to the certainty of the harm was
not controlling.” 526
The difficulty with aligning the elements required by fraud under state
law and under § 523(a)(6) comes from this circuit split. For example,
consider the common interaction between a state court judgment of fraud
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) 527 and
§ 523(a)(6). 528 The DTPA includes a so-called “laundry list” of fraudulent
actions that include “[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce . . . .”529 Moreover, the DTPA
defines “intentionally” as “actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or
unfairness of the act or practice . . . coupled with the specific intent that the
consumer act in detrimental reliance on the falsity or deception or in
detrimental ignorance of the unfairness.”530 And intentionality may be
inferred by objective circumstances.531
Despite the specificity of these state statutes, it is still possible even in
the Fifth Circuit that the objective-intent paradigm for interpreting Geiger
from Miller represents an independent element. That result is likely even
more secure under a state following the Markowitz or subjective-intent
standard of Geiger. As a result, even a valid and final state court judgment
in which the DTPA was actually litigated, and which turned on the same
facts and legal standard, may not itself establish fraud under § 523(a)(6).
6. Mutuality of Parties
Generally, if all the other elements of issue preclusion are met, mutuality
is not required. In such situations, the parties need not have been

524.
n.10).
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.

In re Englehart, 2000 WL 1275614, at *3 (citing In re Markowitz, 190 F.3d at 465
In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 606.
Su v. Carrillo (In re Su), 259 B.R. 909, 913 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001).
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (West 2013).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012).
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a).
Id. § 17.45(13).
Id.
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adversaries in a previous cause of action for an issue to be precluded from
re-litigation in a subsequent cause of action. Indeed, under the approach of
the Restatement (Second) of Judgment approach, the application of issue
preclusion does not require strict mutuality of parties. 532 Not all courts
agree with the relaxed standard proposed by the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments.
In Taylor v. Sturgell, the Supreme Court held that federal common law
does not extend the preclusive effect of a judgment to a non-party in a
subsequent case. 533 In so holding, the Court determined that “one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process.” 534 The Court noted that the application of issue preclusion to nonparties “runs up against the ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
should have his own day in court.’” 535 Nonetheless, the rule against
nonparty preclusion is subject to recognized exceptions that can be grouped
into six categories.
First, “[a] person who agrees to be bound by the determination
of issues in an action between others is bound in accordance with
the terms of his agreement.” 536
Second, nonparty preclusion may be justified based on a variety
of pre-existing “substantive legal relationship[s]” between the
person to be bound and a party to the judgment. 537
Third, we have confirmed that, “in certain limited
circumstances,” a nonparty may be bound by a judgment
because she was “adequately represented by someone with the
same interests who [wa]s a party” to the suit. 538

532. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
533. 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008).
534. Id. (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
535. Id. at 892-93 (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).
536. Id. at 893 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 40). A common example of binding parties by agreement is where two different plaintiffs
sue a common defendant, and the parties all agree that the defendant’s liability, if any, will
be determined by one of the cases. Id.
537. Id. at 894 (alteration in original) (quoting DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 75–92 (2001)).
538. Id. at 894 (alteration in original) (quoting Richards, 517 U.S. at 798). This exception
binds parties in privity with one another, such as binding the ward or beneficiary of the trust
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Fourth, a nonparty is bound by a judgment if she “assume[d]
control” over the litigation in which that judgment was
rendered. 539
Fifth, a party bound by a judgment may not avoid its preclusive
force by relitigating through a proxy. 540
Sixth, in certain circumstances a special statutory scheme may
“expressly foreclos[e] successive litigation by nonlitigants . . . if
the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process.” 541
When determining the preclusive effect of a state court judgment,
bankruptcy courts must look to the underlying state law regarding
mutuality. In this regard, most states have held that, unlike claim
preclusion, issue preclusion does not require strict mutuality of parties. 542
Although strict mutuality may not be required, the party asserting issue
preclusion must have been in privity with the adverse party in the prior
action for the doctrine to apply. 543 Privity may be established between two
parties where the subsequent party (1) controlled the first action if she was
not a party to it, (2) had her interest represented by a the earlier party’s
actions, or (3) was a successor-in-interest to the earlier party. 544
Practitioners should be aware that while the Fifth Circuit will apply the
relaxed rule outlined in the Restatement (Second) when determining
mutuality of parties arising from a federal judgment, state courts might be
less permissive.

when the guardian or trustee litigates an issue in his official capacity. Richards, 517 U.S. at
798.
539. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 895 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154
(1979)).
540. Id. Related to third exception, this fifth exception binds the principal where the
agent litigated as the principal’s proxy. Id.
541. Id. (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989), superseded by statute as
stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)).
542. See, e.g., Livingston v. Transnation Title Ins. Co. (In re Livingston), 372 F. App’x
613, 617 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Michigan courts have instructed that an issue ‘must be identical to
that determined in the prior action’ to have been actually litigated.”); Vines v. Univ. of La. at
Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Terrell v. DeConna, 877 F.2d 1267, 1270
(5th Cir. 1989)).
543. Vines, 398 F.3d at 705; Limon v. Berryco Barge Lines, L.L.C., 779 F. Supp. 2d 577,
583 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
544. Fitch v. Fitch (In re Fitch), 349 B.R. 133, 141 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (citing
McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 379 (5th Cir. 2000)).
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C. A “New” Problem Potentially Plaguing the Preclusive Effect of
Bankruptcy Court Orders
A corollary issue to the “valid and final judgment” element of issue
preclusion may be brewing following the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Stern v. Marshall 545 and Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison. 546
We note pejoratively that this problem is “new.” Stern and Executive
Benefits are the latest in a line of cases from the Supreme Court spanning
over three decades, beginning in 1982 with Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 547 that limit the constitutional authority of
bankruptcy courts following congressional overreach. In Stern, the Court
identified one type of proceeding—and implicated others—over which
bankruptcy courts have statutory subject-matter jurisdiction but lack
constitutional final-order authority. 548 The relevant statute authorized the
bankruptcy court to enter a final order whereas the Constitution reserved
such final-order authority for a judge clothed in Article III powers. 549
A slew of decisions following the decision coined such situations “Stern
claims.” The Court adopted the moniker in Executive Benefits and provided
a temporary field dressing to bandage the constitutional infirmity. 550 But the
potential problem arises when a court must decide whether a bankruptcy
court’s final order in a Stern claim merits preclusive effect in a subsequent
case. After all, as the district court in Kirschner v. Agoglia observed,
If there is no appeal, the [bankruptcy court’s] grant of the motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a final judgment
dismissing the claim and is given [claim preclusion] and [issue
preclusion] effect. But this cannot be proper unless the
bankruptcy court had the power to render final judgment in the
first place. 551
This section explores that dilemma and the potential cure posed most
recently by the Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif. 552

545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.

131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014).
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608.
Id.
Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2172.
476 B.R. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citations omitted).
135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
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1. From the 1978 Amendments to Stern
To explore the problem, an overview is necessary of the statutory and
constitutional issues and the direction provided in Stern, Executive Benefits,
and Wellness International. 553 Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests “the
judicial Power of the United States” in judges with salary protection and
life tenure. 554 Federal district courts are empowered under Article III;
bankruptcy courts are created pursuant to Congress’s powers “[t]o
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States.” 555 Without guaranteed protections as to his salary and
tenure, a bankruptcy judge’s ability to exercise “the judicial Power of the
United States” is limited to those matters that lie “at the core of federal
bankruptcy power.” 556
As Congress bears the responsibility for enacting bankruptcy laws,
Congress causes an authority problem by over-allocating authority to
bankruptcy courts. For example, in Northern Pipeline, the Court struck
down the allocation of authority between the district and bankruptcy courts

553. For a more in-depth discussion of the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts, see
Ralph Brubaker, A “Summary” Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy Judges'
Core Jurisdiction After Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121 (2012); Timothy S.
Springer, Two and a Half Hurdles Between Eurozone Debts and U.S. Courts: How Recent
Distressed Foreign Deals Could Soon Be Unwound Domestically, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1109
(2013); Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting the Stern Decision, BANKR. LITIG.
(ABA Bankr. & Insolvency Litig. Comm.), Winter 2012, at 2, available at http://apps.
americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/winter2012-survey-interpreting-ster
n.html; Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting the Stern Decision, Part II, BANKR.
LITIG. (ABA Bankr. & Insolvency Litig. Comm.), Spring 2012, at 4; Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey
of Cases Interpreting the Stern Decision, Part III, BANKR. LITIG. (ABA Bankr. & Insolvency
Litig. Comm.), Summer 2012, at 2; Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting the Stern
Decision, Part IV, BANKR. LITIG. (ABA Bankr. & Insolvency Litig. Comm.), Fall 2012, at 2,
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/fall20121212-survey-cases-interpreting-stern-decision-part-iv.html; Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey of Cases
Interpreting the Stern Decision, Part V, BANKR. LITIG. (ABA Bankr. & Insolvency Litig.
Comm.), Winter 2013, at 2, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bank
ruptcy/articles/winter2013-0313-survey-cases-interpreting-stern-decision-part-v.html; Omar J.
Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting Stern v. Marshall, Part VI, BANKR. LITIG. (ABA Bankr.
& Insolvency Litig. Comm.), Spring 2013, at 2, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/
litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/spring2013-0613-survey-cases-interpreting-stern-deci
sion-part-vi.html.
554. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
555. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
556. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (plurality
op.).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

818

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:733

Congress had enacted in 1978. 557 The initial version of the Code dispensed
with the former “summary/plenary” powers scheme and granted bankruptcy
courts—directly and exclusively—broad jurisdiction over all matters
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.558 These
powers included final-order authority over the breach of contract claim at
issue in Northern Pipeline, which the Court held should have been reserved
for Article-III determination. 559 The Court stayed the effect of its ruling to
give Congress two years to fix the problem. 560
In response, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA), amending title 28 of the U.S. Code to
include sections 157 and 1334.561 Section 1334 grants district courts
“original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11” and original,
but not exclusive, jurisdiction “of all civil proceedings arising under title
11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” 562 By way of section
157, the district court may refer “any or all” bankruptcy cases and
proceedings to their respective district’s bankruptcy judges. 563 The district
court may exercise this broad authority itself, or, as is often the practice by
local rule, the district court may refer this power to the bankruptcy court. 564
Even upon referral, the district court keeps a continuing, albeit passive,
oversight role pursuant to its ability to withdraw the reference to the
bankruptcy of any case or proceeding court at any time. 565
Unlike the broad powers permitted in 1978, a bankruptcy court’s
authority upon referral under § 157 today depends on the type of matter or
557. Id. at 86-87.
558. Id. at 52-53; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 46 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6008 (“The withdrawal from state and federal district courts of
jurisdiction of the so-called plenary proceedings, when coupled with the establishment of
uniform federal standards and rules . . . should eliminate a source of uncertainty and division
of authority which has characterized bankruptcy law.”).
559. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 (“We conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1471, as added by
§ 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of ‘the
essential attributes of the judicial power’ from the Art. III district court, and has vested those
attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an
exercise of Congress' power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts.”).
560. Id. at 88 (“This limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the
bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the
interim administration of the bankruptcy laws.”).
561. Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 101, 104, 98 Stat. 333, 333, 340-41.
562. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b) (2006).
563. Id. § 157(a).
564. Id.
565. Id. § 157(d).
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proceeding. Dispensing with the “summary/plenary” distinction of
authority, Congress adopted the language used by the Supreme Court in
Northern Pipeline and created “core” and “non-core” authority. 566 The
Court in Executive Benefits succinctly summarized the procedural
distinction between core and non-core matters and proceedings, stating:
Put simply: If a matter is core, the statute empowers the
bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on the claim, subject to
appellate review by the district court. If a matter is non-core, and
the parties have not consented to final adjudication by the
bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy judge must propose findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Then, the district court must review
the proceeding de novo and enter final judgment. 567
“Core” proceedings include “arising under” and “arising in” proceedings. 568
In comparison, “related to” jurisdiction exists if “the outcome of that
proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administered in bankruptcy.” 569
Constitutional concerns arise, as in Stern, where § 157 authorizes a
bankruptcy court to enter a final order but the Constitution does not. “Stern
involved a dispute over a considerable inheritance, and a widow’s attempt
to recover in bankruptcy court for a tort claim against her late husband’s
son.” 570 The tort counterclaim arose neither under title 11 nor exclusively in

566. Id. § 157(b)-(c); N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71 (“But the restructuring of debtorcreditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be
distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private rights, such as the right to
recover contract damages that is at issue in this case.”) (emphasis added).
567. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2172 (2014); see also 28
U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (requiring a de novo standard of review for a bankruptcy court’s
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law); FED. R. BANKR. P. 8013 (requiring a clear
error standard of review for a bankruptcy court’s factual findings).
568. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2605 (2011). “‘Arising
under’ jurisdiction involves causes of action created or determined by a statutory provision
of title 11. ‘Arising in’ jurisdiction is ‘not based on a right expressly created by title 11, but
is based on claims that have no existence outside of bankruptcy.’” Frisia Hartley, L.L.C. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Talsma), 509 B.R. 535, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014).
569. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v.
Higgins, 743 F. 2d 984, 994 (1984)). “That state law may affect a proceeding's resolution
cannot be the sole basis by which a proceeding is excluded from the otherwise large net cast
by ‘related to’ jurisdiction.” In re Talsma, 509 B.R. at 542 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3)).
570. Springer, supra note 553, at 1139. The son filed an adversary against the widow for
alleged defamation, along with an attendant proof of claim for the damages, and the
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cases under title 11, thus § 157(c) should have limited the bankruptcy court
to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 571 But “counterclaims
by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate” is a category
included in the non-exhaustive example list of core proceedings under
§ 157(b)(2), 572 so the bankruptcy court entered a final order. 573
As it had in Northern Pipeline, the Court held the offending authority
statute unconstitutional, although limiting its decision to § 157(b)(2)(C). 574
While the core/non-core labels allocated statutory authority, the Court
distilled the constitutional authority to “the question [of] whether the action
at issue stems from the bankruptcy [case] itself or would necessarily be
resolved in the claims allowance process.” 575
2. From Stern to Executive Benefits
The Court provided little guidance beyond saying the decision was
limited. As a result, “the maelstrom surrounding Stern . . . created
considerable consternation among bankruptcy courts and practitioners
trying to grapple with [the decision’s] implications.” 576 Among the many
questions left after the decision was the question of this section: What of
the final orders already in place in Stern claims? Could a bankruptcy court’s
final order in a Stern claim—that is, one in which the Constitution denies a
bankruptcy court final-order authority—be considered valid and due
preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings? And what about consent,
whether express or implied by litigation conduct? Section 157(c)(2)
authorizes a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a “related to”
proceeding with the consent of all parties.577 Does the consent of the parties
elucidate a navigable path around the constitutional concerns identified by
Stern and its progeny?
bankruptcy estate counterclaimed for tortious interference with a gift. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at
2601.
We underplay the trappings of the Stern facts by using generic terms of “widow” and
“son.” Vickie Lynn Marshall, the widow, was known to the public as Anna Nicole Smith. Id.
at 2601. The Stern decision was the second by the Supreme Court in the saga, much of
which was publicized in the tabloids as well as the Supreme Court Reporter. See Marshall v.
Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 300-05 (2006).
571. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
572. Id. § 157(b)(2)(C).
573. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602.
574. Id. at 2619-20.
575. Id. at 2618.
576. Springer, supra note 553, at 1141.
577. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).
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The problem is not limited to final orders pursuant to § 157(b)(2)(C), but
rather all claims potentially reached by the sweeping reasoning in Stern.
Following fractured dissections of the decision by district and bankruptcy
courts, 578 the circuit courts of appeals began to divide on what qualified as a
“Stern claim” and, more importantly, what to do with such claims. The
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have read Stern broadly as delivering a
debilitating blow to bankruptcy courts’ authority. 579 Despite the selflimiting language in Stern, 580 these circuits have extrapolated the sweeping
reasoning employed by the Stern Court to question sharply the limits of
bankruptcy court power. 581 Additionally, these three circuits followed the
Court’s analysis in Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor 582
of private rights versus structural interests implicated by the separation of
powers, concluding that Stern claims implicate structural concerns beyond
the curing power of private litigants’ consent. 583 Given the broad reasoning
employed by the Stern Court, these circuits followed the inference that
concern for structure protections eclipses any tongue-and-cheek declaration
that the status quo remains unchanged.584
In comparison, the Ninth Circuit took a more practical approach in In re
Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. 585 There, Executive Benefits Insurance
Agency (EBIA), the target a fraudulent transfer claim brought by the

578. See generally Alaniz, supra note 553.
579. BP RE, L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, L.L.C. (In re BP RE, L.P.), 735 F.3d 279,
290-91 (5th Cir. 2013); Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P. (In re Frazin), 732 F.3d 313, 32425 (5th Cir. 2013); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 775-76 (7th Cir.
2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 918-21 (6th Cir.
2012).
580. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620 (“We conclude today that Congress, in one isolated
respect, exceeded that limitation in the Bankruptcy Act of 1984.”).
581. See supra note 579.
582. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
583. In re BP RE, L.P., 735 F.3d at 286-87 (citing Schor, 478 U.S. at 850); Wellness
Int’l, 727 F.3d at 769-70 (same); Waldman, 698 F.3d at 917-18 (same); see also Frazin, 732
F.3d at 320 n.3 (noting same in dicta).
584. See George W. Kuney, Stern v. Marshall: A Likely Return to the Bankruptcy Act's
Summary / Plenary Distinction in Article III Terms, 21 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 Art.
1 (2012) (Westlaw) (“Justice Breyer may not have been able to command a majority of the
court and thus be ‘constitutionally correct,’ but he has definitely been right about one thing:
Justice Roberts's statement that as a ‘practical matter’ the Stern v. Marshall decision ‘does
not change all that much’ was either tongue-in-cheek or decidedly incorrect.”). Cf. Stern,
131 S. Ct. at 2620 (“If our decision today does not change all that much, then why the
fuss?”).
585. 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012).
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chapter 7 trustee, argued that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional
authority to determine a fraudulent transfer claim. 586 The Ninth Circuit
agreed, holding that Stern and the Court’s earlier decision in
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg 587 required an Article III court to
determine fraudulent transfer claims. 588 But the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the power to “hear and determine” includes the power to issue
proposed findings and conclusions. 589 Because “Congress enumerated the
examples of core proceedings in § 157(b)(2) with ‘a view toward expanding
the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to its constitutional limit,’” 590 the panel
reasoned that Congress intended for a bankruptcy court to be “vested with
as much adjudicatory power as the Constitution will bear.” 591 By this logic,
where Article III concerns are implicated, the bankruptcy court may
exercise discretion to issue proposed findings and conclusions under
§ 157(b) rather than issuing a final order.592
The Supreme Court granted certiorari following the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Executive Benefits, providing the Court its first opportunity to
revisit Stern. The Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. 593
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas assumed without deciding
that Stern infected fraudulent transfer claims, holding that a de novo review
of the bankruptcy court’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
cured any constitutional deficiency. 594 This holding closed the so-called
“statutory gap” debated among the circuit and lower courts. 595 Moreover,
the Court directed bankruptcy courts, upon identifying a Stern claim, to

586. Id. at 561-65.
587. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
588. In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d at 565-66.
589. Id.
590. Id. at 565 (quoting Duck v. Munn (In re Mankin), 823 F.2d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir.
1987), overruled by Exec. Benefits, 702 F.3d at 561).
591. Id.
592. Id. at 566.
593. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2174 (2014).
594. Id. at 2174-75.
595. Compare Waldman v. State, 698 F.3d 910, 921 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a
bankruptcy court could not issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law when
determining a core proceeding under § 157(b)(2) because it would violate the separation of
powers), with In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d at 565-66 (holding that no
statutory gap existed because the power to “hear and determine” a proceeding under
§ 157(b)(2) encompassed the power to merely hear and submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to a district court).
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issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to be reviewed de
novo by the district court. 596
3. Executive Benefits to Wellness International and Beyond
The court in Executive Benefits expressly left unanswered “whether
Article III permits a bankruptcy court, with the consent of the parties, to
enter final judgment on a Stern claim.” 597 Instead the Court “reserve[d] that
question for another day.” 598 Soon thereafter, the Court set a date to answer
that question, granting certiorari to the Seventh Circuit in Wellness
International 599 and certifying a question squarely addressing whether
consent by litigation conduct can authorize a bankruptcy court to exercise
“the judicial Power of the United States.” 600 So practitioners and courts
needed only to wait one term for the next round of the heavyweight bout
between articles I and III of the U.S. Constitution.
The facts of Wellness International are familiar to many practitioners
who are “chasing” information from debtors. The eventual debtor, Sharif,
sued its former business partner, Wellness International Network
(Wellness), for breach of contract in the Northern District of Texas. 601
Sharif ignored numerous discovery requests, ultimately resulting in a
default judgment for Wellness and a $650,000 sanction for attorneys’ fees
against Sharif. 602 To stave off collection efforts, Sharif filed for chapter 7
bankruptcy in the Northern District of Illinois.603 Wellness, as a creditor
and party in interest, requested documentation that the now-debtor Sharif
was obligated to provide under 11 U.S.C. § 521. 604 Again, Sharif balked at
the request.
In response, Wellness filed a five-count adversary proceeding, seeking,
among other things, a denial of Sharif’s discharge in bankruptcy and a
declaration that a trust Sharif set up was Sharif’s alter ego and, therefore,
was property of the estate under § 541(a).605 In his answer, Sharif, as
596. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency, 134 S. Ct. at 2173.
597. Id. at 2070 n.4.
598. Id. at 2070.
599. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 134 S. Ct. 2901, 2901 (2014).
600. Brief for Respondent at 41, Wellness Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (No. 13-935).
601. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1940-42 (2015).
602. Id. at 1940.
603. Id.
604. See id.
605. Id. Notably, while many academics awaited the result of the bankruptcy authority
question in Wellness International, many consumer practitioners waited an answer on the
§ 541 question. That answer did not come, at least this time, because the Court only reached
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required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012, admitted the
adversary proceeding was a “core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). 606
Following additional discovery violations and sanctions, the bankruptcy
court entered a final order denying Sharif’s discharge and, importantly,
determining that the trust was Sharif’s alter ego and, therefore, property of
the estate under § 541. 607 Following an appeal to the district court, the
Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the bankruptcy court lacked
constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on the trust issue, which
the Seventh Circuit designated a Stern claim. 608
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding
that Sharif’s consent to bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the “core
proceeding” was knowing and voluntary. 609 Speaking in categories, the
justices in the minority in Stern carried a majority in Wellness
International. And the new majority could not leave the flip-flop
unannounced. Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, quelled any
concerns that “the world will end not in fire or ice, but in a bankruptcy
court.” 610 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor downplayed formerly colorful
rhetoric about article III judges forgoing their constitutional birthrights too
easily. 611
Instead, the majority’s analysis emphasized the practical implications of
the decision and the need for relying not on “formalistic and unbending
rules,” but instead acting “with an eye to the practice effect that the practice
will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.” 612
First, the majority distinguished Stern by reemphasizing the explicitly
narrow scope of Stern. 613 Next, the majority reasoned that Stern did not
the authority question on certiorari. So debtor’s attorneys must continue to wait for
instruction of whether the alter ego theories asserts in Wellness International will affect the
debtor’s requirements for scheduling assets under § 521.
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 773 (7th Cir. 2013).
609. Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1947-49.
610. Id.
611. Compare id. at 1947 (noting that reaffirming adjudication based on litigant consent
“poses no great threat to anyone’s birthrights, constitutional or otherwise”), with Transcript
of Oral Argument at 51, Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, No. 12-1200 (Jan. 14, 2014)
(Roberts, C.J.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tran
scripts/12-1200_5f57.pdf (“[T]he authority to decide cases, which is our constitutional
birthright, we said in Stern that Congress can't take that away from us. And your position is
that two parties who come in off the street, if they agree, and take that away from us.”).
612. Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1944.
613. Id. at 1946-47.
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apply because that narrow focus meant consent to adjudication by a
bankruptcy court was unsettled. 614 Finally, the majority aligned its decision
on constitutional consent in bankruptcy court with the well-settled
constitutional consent in other article I courts, including magistrate
courts. 615
Six justices agreed that knowing and voluntary express consent is
sufficient for a bankruptcy court to enter a final order. Perhaps more
importantly, particularly for the issue of appellate jurisdiction, five justices
agreed that “[t]he implied consent standard articulated in Roell supplies the
appropriate rule for adjudication by bankruptcy courts under § 157.”616
Accordingly, a majority of the Court agreed that implied consent will allow
a bankruptcy court to enter a final order so long as the consent was knowing
and voluntary. 617 The Court also noted that, a previously noted in Executive
Benefits, obtaining express statements of consent or nonconsent remains
“good practice.” 618
The Court’s decision in Executive Benefits settled some of the concern
about “valid and final judgments” in Stern claims—at least going forward.
When in doubt, practitioners can plead Stern and obtain from the district
court either a de novo review or a stern reprimand. Either way, the result
will validate a bankruptcy court order for preclusive effect.
But the question remained, at least after Executive Benefits, for
bankruptcy courts’ final orders in Stern claims where the appeals deadline
has expired and a district court blessing is unavailable. One bankruptcy
commentator has noted that “[i]f the Stern right can’t be waived, then
presumably the issue can be raised months or even years later, perhaps with
the effect that the same dispute can be litigated once again, even between
the same parties in a different court.” 619
Now, after Wellness International, the Supreme Court has clarified that
district-court adjudication of a Stern claim can waived. 620 So the Supreme
Court’s holding in Wellness International settles waiver concerns in theory.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.

Id.
Id. at 1947 n.11.
Id. at 1948 (citing Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003)).
Id. at 1948-49.
Id. at 1948 n.13.
Bill Rochelle, Supreme Court Opening Another Constitutional Can of Worms,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 26, 2013), available at https://utcle.org/ecourses/OC4719/get-assetfile/asset_id/31329 (emphasis added).
620. Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1946-49. Express consent carried six votes, while
implied consent garnered only three. See id. at 1944-49; id. at 1949-50 (Alito, J.,
concurring); id. at 1950-60 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Bankruptcy courts will have to interpret Wellness International and import
the Roell line of cases concerning implied waiver into bankruptcy
jurisprudence. 621 As to express waiver, practitioners should secure consent
to a bankruptcy court’s final order wherever possible to avoid the
unnecessary expense of litigating the issue. To that end, two early
developments are worth noting. Initially, continuing a trend begun after
Stern, districts and individual bankruptcy courts are using local rules and
case management orders to require litigants to file statements of consent by
set deadlines after the filing of an adversary proceeding. 622
At present, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7008 and 7012 only
require statements of consent in non-core proceedings. 623 Long term, Rules
7008 and 7012 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure may soon
require a statement of consent in all adversary proceedings, not merely noncore proceedings. 624 But, until proposed rules requiring consent in all
adversary proceedings take effect, local rules and scheduling orders may
before the norm regarding consent.
Another area to which issues with the preclusive effect of final orders in
Stern claims may extend is bankruptcy appeals. Appeals from a bankruptcy
court are normally taken first to the district court or, in some circuits, to a
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP or BAPs, as appropriate).625 A BAP is
composed of three bankruptcy judges of a different district within the
circuit than from which the appeal was taken.626 Alternatively, for novel
issues of law of public importance that require an immediate disposition,
the bankruptcy court may certify, and the circuit court may authorize, a
direct appeal to the circuit court.627
Two problems arise. First, a BAP is composed of article I judges—that
is, no judge whose “birthright” is to exercise “the judicial Power of the
United States.” 628 Even a de novo review would suffer from the same

621. See id. at 1947-48.
622. E.g., Order Requiring Statement Regarding Consent, El Paso Children’s Hosp.
Corp. v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist. (In re El Paso Children’s Hosp. Corp.), No. 15-3005-hcm
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. June 5, 2015).
623. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008(a), 7012(b).
624. Report of the Judicial Conference, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
at 6-7, 9 (Sept. 2013).
625. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(b) (2012).
626. Id. § 158(b)(1), (5).
627. Id. § 158(d)(2)(A).
628. Id. § 157(b)(1); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 611, at 51:1-51:5
(“[T]he authority to decide cases, which is our Constitutional birthright, we said in Stern that
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constitutional infirmities identified in Stern. So error at the bankruptcy level
may actually be compounded at the appellate level in circuits authorizing
BAPs. Second, even the federal courts of appeals—clearly composed of
article III judges—may face similar problems. Following the logic of
flawed bankruptcy court authority, the decision of an appellate court
reviewing a direct appeal from a bankruptcy court’s final order in a Stern
claim may likewise be plagued with issues of “valid and final judgment.” 629
In Ortiz, the Seventh Circuit recognized this second problem while
deciding an appeal that had been pending when Stern was decided. After
considering the parties’ additional briefing about Stern’s effect on the
bankruptcy court’s final order, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter the final order
authorized for the core claims by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). 630 As a result, the
panel concluded that the bankruptcy court’s lack of constitutional authority
stripped the circuit court of its power to authorize a direct appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A). 631 The panel reasoned that the bankruptcy court’s
orders “[could not] be considered interlocutory under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3), or final decisions, judgments, orders, or decrees within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).” 632 Yet the direct appeal provision in
§ 158(d)(2)(A) requires a final order, not proposed findings of fact or
conclusions of law, which in turn requires either a core matter or
proceeding under § 157(b) or a consensual related-to proceeding under
§ 157(c)(2). 633 Thus, the panel had an order that had to be considered final
or else the court lacked appellate jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit opted for
the later determination, dismissing the appeal and remanding the
proceeding to the bankruptcy court.634
Of course, the question of bankruptcy appeals may likewise be solved
under the construct in Wellness International. Although article I judges
comprise BAPs, knowing and voluntary consent to appellate jurisdiction
may likewise cure the constitutional deficiency without threatening
anyone’s birthright. 635 The Seventh Circuit did not address waiver in Ortiz,
Congress can’t take that away from us. And your position is that two parties who come in off
the street, if they agree, they can take that away from us.”).
629. Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906, 908-09 (7th Cir.
2011).
630. Id. at 914.
631. Id. at 915.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 909, 915.
634. Id. at 915.
635. See Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1947.
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so the precedential value of that case as to bankruptcy appeals is unsettled.
Even so, bankruptcy courts, BAPs, or circuit courts will likely have to
address whether Wellness International reaches this area of article I judge
authority.
These lingering questions potentially undermine the preclusive effect of
bankruptcy court orders in Stern claims. Practitioners can ensure preclusive
effect by seeking the district court’s blessing of a bankruptcy court’s order,
in accordance with the procedure Justice Thomas outlined in Executive
Benefits. Further developments in consent requirements by court, local, or
federal rule will also clarify the effect of article I adjudication on the issue
preclusion doctrine.
D. Offensive and Defensive Uses of Issue Preclusion
Assuming an order merits preclusive effect, the doctrine may be used
both offensively and defensively. The Restatement (Second) does not
specifically distinguish between offensive and defensive issue preclusion,636
but case law has established slightly different approaches in the offensive
and defensive application. Offensive use of issue preclusion is when a
plaintiff seeks to preclude a defendant from re-litigating an issue, which the
defendant previously litigated and lost in a suit involving another party.
Defensive use of issue preclusion is claimed when a plaintiff has previously
litigated and lost an issue against another defendant. Although parties may
come to an agreement that the issue preclusion doctrine does not apply in
the case at hand, the application of issue preclusion is a matter of law, not
of agreement. 637
In light of the due process implications and potential consequences that
are associated with non-mutual or “offensive” issue preclusion, the
Restatement (Second) has provided a secondary set of factors to assist
courts in determining whether preclusion would lead to unjust results.
A party precluded from re-litigating an issue with an opposing party, in
accordance with sections 27 and 28, is also precluded from doing so with
another person, unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording
him an opportunity to re-litigate the issue. The circumstances to which
636. The Restatement (Second) does, however, suggest additional safeguards when
applying issue preclusion to a non-party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29
(1982); see supra Part II.F (“Exceptions to Issue Preclusion”) for a more in depth discussion
on offensive and defensive issue preclusion.
637. Gamble-Ledbetter v. Andra Group, L.P. (In re Gamble-Ledbetter), 419 B.R. 682,
694 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009).
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considerations should be given include those enumerated in § 28 and also
whether:
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be
incompatible with an applicable scheme of administering the
remedies in the actions involved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against
whom preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the
presentation and determination of the issue that were not
available in the first action and could likely result in the issue
being differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to
avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the
first action between himself and his present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself
inconsistent with another determination of the same issue;
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by
relationships among the parties to the first action that are not
present in the subsequent action, or apparently was based on a
compromise verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may
complicate determination of issues in the subsequent action or
prejudice the interests of another party thereto;
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively
determined would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for
obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it was
based;
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the
party be permitted to relitigate the issue.638
E. Exceptions to Issue Preclusion
Notwithstanding the successful application of all elements required for
issue preclusion, a bankruptcy court may still decline to afford a prior
judgment preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings under the following
circumstances:

638. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29.
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(1) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a
matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial
action; or
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims
that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is
warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in
the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable
administration of the laws; or
(3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences
in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the
two courts or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction
between them; or
(4) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a
significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the
issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action; the
burden has shifted to his adversary; or the adversary has a
significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action; or
(5) There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination
of the issue (a) because of the potential adverse impact of the
determination on the public interest or the interests of persons
not themselves parties in the initial action, (b) because it was not
sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the
issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or
(c) because the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the
conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not
have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and
fair adjudication in the initial action.639
III. Practice Tips
What practice tips can attorneys take away from the foregoing other than
those the article has already identified? First, it is crucial to understand the
difference between claim and issue preclusion. As demonstrated above, the
two doctrines serve different purposes and have different elements. As a
result, there will be cases where only one of the two doctrines will apply.
The practitioner must therefore argue the correct branch of preclusion, lest
she risk the possibility that the court will construe her argument to plead the
639. Id. § 28.
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incorrect form of preclusion. This is particularly important in
dischargeability proceedings, where, as described extensively above, claim
preclusion is generally inapplicable.640 Sometimes the court will consider
both types of preclusion when a practitioner pleads the wrong form of
preclusion, 641 but sometimes the court will deem the correct argument
waived if not explicitly pleaded.642 Therefore, the practitioner should not
rely on the court to make her legal argument for her.
IV. Other Related Doctrines for Practitioners to Consider
Several doctrines related to the preclusion doctrines described above and
the estoppel doctrines discussed in the prior volume of this article also
come into play in consumer bankruptcies. These include the RookerFeldman doctrine, 643 law of the case, 644 promissory estoppel, 645 standing
(particularly with respect to reservation of rights provisions), 646 quasiestoppel, 647 laches, 648 in pari delicto, 649 and others. 650 While there is not
640. See, e.g., Rustin v. Rustin (In re Rustin), No. 04-50890-NPO, 2011 WL 5443067, at
*6 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Nov. 9, 2011); Rahman v. Park (In re Park), No. 09-78622-dte, 2011
WL 1344495, at *4, *4 n.3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2011).
641. See, e.g., In re Park, 2011 WL 1344495, at *4; Forrest v. Bressler (In re Bressler),
387 B.R. 446, 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); Bublitz Mach. Co. v. Brewer (In re Brewer), No.
05-51960, 2006 WL 1109409, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 2006); cf. Davis Oil Co. v.
Vann (In re Vann), No. 08-11824-DHW, 2009 WL 1311592, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. May
11, 2009) (reconstruing plaintiff’s judicial estoppel argument as a claim preclusion
argument).
642. See, e.g., In re Rustin, 2011 WL 5443067, at *6 (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg.
Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1985)).
643. D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923). For recent cases applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the consumer
bankruptcy context, see, for example, Newman v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 473 B.R. 447
(Bankr. D. Utah 2012).
644. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Robinson Prop. Group, 661 F. Supp. 2d 622, 625-26 (N.D.
Miss. 2009), motion to amend denied, No. 2:07CV048-P-A, 2009 WL 3003261 (N.D. Miss.,
Sept. 16, 2009), aff'd 373 F. App’x 494 (5th Cir. 2010).
645. See, e.g., Aceves v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507, 513-19 (Ct. App.
2011).
646. See, e.g., Dynasty Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating,
L.L.C.), 540 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2008).
647. See, e.g., Forman v. Amboy Nat'l Bank (In re Price), 361 B.R. 68, 78-82 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 2007) (holding that although judicial and equitable estoppel were both inapplicable,
quasi-estoppel barred chapter 11 trustee from seeking recovery of fees paid to mortgage
lender upon closing on debtors' real property); see also Hall v. Hopkins (In re Jacobs), No.
04–42387, 2006 WL 4451566, at *5 (Bankr. D. Idaho, Feb. 10, 2006) (distinguishing quasiestoppel from equitable estoppel).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

832

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:733

space in this article to define these doctrines and discuss their application in
detail, we urge practitioners to familiarize themselves with these doctrines
and brainstorm ways to utilize them against their opponents—or at least
prevent them from being used against their clients.
V. Conclusion
“[S]hame on the poor lawyer who has a case dismissed sua sponte by a
court on . . . grounds that the lawyer has never even heard of.” 651 As these
once obscure doctrines become increasingly important in the consumer
bankruptcy realm, it is incumbent upon practitioners to familiarize
themselves with the nuances and tensions of estoppel and preclusion law.
We have attempted to catalogue, as exhaustively as possible, the most
crucial post-2005 developments in these areas. We encourage attorneys to
also familiarize themselves with the articles written on developments that
occurred prior to 2005.
As the foregoing has demonstrated, with few exceptions, the doctrines of
estoppel and preclusion are in a state of flux. There is plenty of wiggle
room for creative practitioners to develop these doctrines in innovative
ways that serve their clients, be they debtors or creditors, plaintiffs or
defendants, or trustees.652 We hope that this article can assist that
development in ways that are sensible, coherent, and consistent.

648. See, e.g., In re Hawkins, 377 B.R. 761, 768-71 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding both
(1) creditor's equitable lien claim and (2) creditor's attempt to reclassify debt as secured
barred by laches due to creditor's lack of diligence).
649. See, e.g., Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 666 F.3d 955, 965-68 (5th Cir. 2012).
650. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Kipperman (In re Adams), Nos. SC–07–1283–
KMkDo, SC–07–1394–KMkDo, 2008 WL 8444788, at *7-9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008)
(discussing the rule/duty of consistency, “which is in the nature of an estoppel”); Cotter v.
Skylands Cmty. Bank (In re Cotter), No. 08-12504 (NLW), 2011 WL 5900811, at *5-6
(Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2011) (discussing the “entire controversy doctrine,” a preclusive
doctrine that exists under New Jersey law, in the context of a bankruptcy case); In re
Hawkins, 377 B.R. at 771-72 (applying “general principles of equity”).
651. Eric A. Schreiber, Comment, The Judiciary Says, You Can't Have It Both Ways:
Judicial Estoppel—A Doctrine Precluding Inconsistent Positions, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323,
324 (1996).
652. That said, of course, we caution against the abusive use of preclusive doctrines. One
should only plead them if they are supportable. See FED R. BANKR. P. 9011(b)-(c); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)-(c). Estoppel and preclusion should not become stock, knee-jerk
arguments that are employed every time an opposing party is haled into court against its will,
in the way that Stern v. Marshall objections are often reflexively raised in bankruptcy courts
nowadays.
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